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ABSTRACT 
We apply a Bayesian network-based approach for determining the structure of 
consumers’ brand concept maps, and we further extend this approach in order to provide 
a precise delineation of the set of cognitive variations of that brand concept map structure 
which can simultaneously coexist within the data.  This methodology can operate with 
nonlinear as well as linear relationships between the variables, and utilizes simple Likert-
style marketing survey data as input.  In addition, the method can operate without any a 
priori hypothesized structures or relations among the brand associations in the model.   
The resulting brand concept map structures delineate directional (as opposed to 
simply correlational) relations among the brand associations, and differentiates between 
the predictive and the diagnostic directions within each link.  Further, we determine a 
Bayesian network-based link strength measure, and apply it to a comparison of the 
strengths of the connections between different semantic categories of brand association 
descriptors, as well as between different strategically important drivers of brand 
differentiation.  Finally, we apply a precise form of information propagation through the 
predictive and diagnostic links within the network in order to evaluate the effect of 
introducing new information to the brand concept network. 
This overall methodology operates via a factorization of the joint distribution of 
the brand association variables via conditional independence properties and an 
application of the causal Markov condition, and as such, it represents an alternative 
approach to correlation-based structural determination methods.  By using conditional 
independence as a core structural construct, the methods utilized here are especially well- 
i 
suited for determining and analyzing asymmetric or directional beliefs about brand or 
product attributes.   
This methodology builds on the pioneering Brand Concept Mapping approach of 
Roedder John et al. (2006).  Similar to that approach, the Bayesian network-based 
method derives the specific link-by-link structure among a brand’s associations, and also 
allows for a precise quantitative determination of the likely effects that manipulation of 
specific brand associations will have upon other strategically important associations 
within that brand image.  In addition, the method’s precise informational semantics and 
specific structural measures allow for a greater understanding of the structure of these 
brand associations. 
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1.   Directionality and Brand Concept Maps 
1.1   Consumer Belief Mapping and the BCM Methodology 
 Marketing researchers and practitioners have long utilized geometric and 
graphical representations as a means of understanding consumers’ product and brand-
related beliefs as well as to segment consumers into psychographic clusters which are 
related to these differing beliefs (Wells, 1985; Dillon, Madden, and Firtle, 1987).  
Furthermore, an understanding of the dimensionality and structure of consumers’ product 
and brand images is known to be a critical component of a company’s strategic marketing 
mix, and is at the core of firms’ efforts to differentiate their products and brands, as well 
as to establish sustainable brand equity (Park, Jaworski, and MacInnis, 1986; Park, 
Milberg, and Lawson, 1991; Keller, 1993; Aaker, 1996).  Marketing practitioners have 
also realized the competitive advantage to be gained by designing and promoting 
products to fit specific regions within consumers’ perceptual space for the relevant 
product category (Morgan and Purnell, 1969; Klahr, 1970; Shocker and Srinivasan, 1974; 
Huber and Holbrook, 1979; Shocker and Srinivasan, 1979; Hauser and Simmie, 1981).   
 Many different multivariate statistical methodologies have been utilized to obtain 
a graphical or geometric representation of consumers’ perceived market, brand, and 
product structures.  For example, Gwin and Gwin (2003) have compiled a comprehensive 
typology of multivariate techniques which have been applied for this purpose in the 
marketing domain, including multidimensional scaling, factor analysis, correspondence 
analysis and optimal rescaling, principal component analysis, and discriminant analysis, 
among others. 
1 
 
 Although these various multivariate methodologies produce informative spatial 
mappings of consumers’ brand and product concepts, such techniques do not necessarily 
reveal the link-by-link pattern of connectivity among brand associations which 
presumably give rise to the similarities and differences which are perceived to exist 
among brand or product attribute or among the brands and products themselves (Roedder 
John et al., 2006).  While it is true that the similarity matrix on which many of these 
scaling techniques are based does presumably derive from semantic relatedness of the 
given set of associations, Roedder John et al.’s point is valid, namely that even with a 
specific set of similarity ratings, one is still unsure as to the specific association patterns 
that gave rise to these similarities.  For instance, if two brand associations have a certain 
degree of rated similarity, one would not necessarily know whether such similarity comes 
about through a direct connection between these associations, through a series of 
intermediary associations involving other domain variables, or via a combination of these 
various forms of interconnection.   
A core principle of brand management is that a brand’s main locus of 
differentiation from its competitors resides within the network of perceived associations 
to that brand (Keller, 1993).  Furthermore, it is the structure of that network of brand 
associations (and not merely its content alone) which constitutes the brand’s image for 
consumers (Aaker, 1996).  Hence, without knowledge of the exact link-by-link structure 
of the network of brand associations, marketing practitioners are often left without 
sufficient actionable intelligence to determine which variables to manipulate in order to 
affect particular strategically relevant variables which comprise their brand’s image. 
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 An alternative to such multivariate dimensional analysis and imaging techniques 
is represented by qualitative techniques such as projective studies (Kassarjian, 1974;  
Rook, 2006), metaphor elicitation methodologies such as the ZMET (Zaltman and 
Coulter, 1995; Zaltman, 1997) along with several related qualitative techniques (Levy, 
1985; Levy, 2006).  As applied within the consumer behavior domain, such approaches 
typically utilize a combination of in-depth interviews and projective probes in order to 
identify brand associations, and then these associations are typically pieced together into 
a network of brand or product-related beliefs through in-depth post-hoc analyses of the 
recovered associations (e.g., Zaltman and Coulter, 1995).  Furthermore, a very common 
research technique involves using such projective or metaphor-based techniques to elicit 
a collection of brand or product associations, followed by the application of large-scale 
survey-based research to quantify the prevalence of each uncovered belief within the 
target population (Dillon, Madden, and Firtle, 1987).  
 While it is clear that marketing researchers and practitioners can utilize such 
qualitative techniques to uncover deeper product and brand meanings and associations, 
and then follow this up with quantitative (typically survey-based) studies which attempt 
to generalize these findings by exploring their strength and boundary conditions (Dillon, 
Madden, and Firtle, 1987), there have also been attempts to more directly embed 
qualitative techniques within a more general quantitative consumer research framework.  
One quite notable stream of research in this area is that of hierarchical value mapping (or 
means-end chains), which seeks to couple quantitative methods with a qualitative link-
by-link understanding of consumer values and goals as they relate to product attributes 
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(Reynolds and Gutman, 1988; Gutman, 1997).  However, these methods are specific to 
determining the structure of links between levels within a needs hierarchy model for 
specific products or product categories.  Since such methods are tied to this specific form 
of psychological model, it is unknown how they would generalize to the wider setting of 
brand concepts in general.   
Roedder-John et al. (2006) discuss a class of techniques which they term 
‘analytical mapping’, as exemplified by the work of Henderson et al. (1998), which 
utilizes network analysis algorithms to quantitatively derive the link-by-link 
interdependence structure of brand associations.1  However, such analytical mapping 
techniques typically utilize discrete cutoff values to decide when a link exists or does not 
exist between a brand and an association or between two associations, and hence these 
methods do not as of yet utilize the power of statistical analysis to aid in determining the 
robustness or comparative strength of the derived associations.      
A critical development within the consumer belief mapping literature has been the 
work of Roedder John et al. (2006).  These researchers have developed a unique 
methodology which not only uncovers the link-by-link structure of consumers’ brand 
concept maps, but does so in a way that combines various aspects of qualitative methods 
such as the ZMET technique with concept mapping methodologies from the social and 
physical sciences (e.g., Ruiz-Primo and Shavelson, 1996).  Furthermore, the method of 
Roedder John et al. (2006) also provides a determination of comparative strengths of the 
1 Although less well-known, the Galois lattice analysis methodology makes a posit that is similar to that 
used within network analysis, namely that the interconnections between brand or product associations can 
arise via mutual embeddedness or instantiation within the same exemplar or product (Brownstein, Sirsi, 
Ward, and Reingen, 2000). 
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various inter-association links within the derived brand concept map, as well as a means 
of aggregating individual maps into a consensus map of the focal domain.  
The methodology of Roedder John et al. (2006) first employs open-ended 
interviews which establish a corpus of elicited brand associations, and a first round of 
aggregation is incorporated at this stage by selecting only those brand associations that 
are mentioned by at least 50% of respondents.  The next step in this methodology directly 
probes consumers’ beliefs about the connections between brand associations.  Subjects at 
this stage are presented with the aggregated list of elicited brand associations, and are 
asked to assemble them into a network, using either one, two, or three links between 
associations in order to express their perceived strength of that connection.2  Finally, a 
post-hoc aggregation procedure is applied to the individual concept maps produced by the 
respondents in order to derive a consensus map of the domain, which the authors term a 
Brand Concept Map (or BCM).   
To aggregate the individual maps into a BCM, this technique utilizes a fairly 
complex five-stage procedure.  To begin with, core brand associations are identified as 
those which are either included on at least 50% of the respondents’ maps, or which were 
included on 45% to 49% of those individual maps, but which also had an interconnection 
count that was higher than the other identified core brand associations.  Next, the 
identified core brand associations which have ratios of first-order mentions to total 
mentions of at least 50% and which concurrently have more superordinate than 
2 Blank cards are also provided at this stage so that individuals may add any additional associations which 
they feel are necessary, but which are not necessarily on any of the cards in the aggregate list provided.  
Once again, a ‘frequency of mention’ cutoff was used on these individually added associations. 
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subordinate connections are selected to be linked directly to the brand (so-called ‘first-
order associations’), and then the remaining core associations are linked to these first-
order associations if that particular concept-to-concept link was present in at least five 
individual concept maps.  (This criterion is also used to establish links between the first-
order associations as well.)  Finally, non-core associations are added in, and are linked to 
the core associations using a cutoff frequency for the number of times the concept-to-
concept link is included on individual maps.  The final strength of each concept-to-
concept link is established as the average of the number of ‘link bars’ (either one, two, or 
three) that the subjects had ascribed to each particular link which was included in the 
final consensus map, or BCM. 
The final aggregate Brand Concept Map (BCM) for patients’ perceptions of the 
Mayo Clinic brand, as derived by Roedder John et al. (2006, Figure 3A), is shown in 
Figure 1 below.  As one can see, each variable is connected via (typically multiple) 
pathways to every other variable in the network.  While this high degree of 
interconnectivity is capable of portraying the intricate nature of the brand concept 
network topology, it also poses a serious problem for inference within such a structure, 
since one seemingly has no principled means of resolving the multiple (possible 
competing) effects of the different pathways between specific variables.  These concerns 
are further addressed in the following section. 
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Figure 1.   BCM for patients’ perceptions of the Mayo Clinic brand.     
 
From Roedder-John et al., 2006, p. 556. 
 
 
 
 
1.2   Extending the BCM 
Analytical and cognitive tractability.  Consumers’ perceptions of products and 
brands are known to be exceedingly multidimensional and highly intricate constructs 
(Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982; Alba and Hutchinson, 1987; Glazer and Nakamoto, 
1991), and the structures derived via the BCM methodology certainly exhibit a high 
degree of interconnectedness and complexity.  In essence, every variable within such a 
model is associated with all others, either through a direct link or through a connected 
series of links, and it is difficult to resolve the relative contributions of all the different 
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pathways of influence between the brand associations in such a model.  In turn, inference 
and evidence propagation are exceedingly difficult to analyze within such structures.   
As an example of these multiple pathways of influence among variables, consider 
that within the BCM for the Mayo Clinic brand (Figure 1), we see that “Expert in treating 
serious illnesses” is linked to “World leader in new medical treatments” through both a 
direct pathway between these two variables, as well as through the link to the core brand 
“Mayo” and then from there to “World leader in new medical treatments”.  Furthermore, 
the influence of “Expert in treating serious illnesses” can also travel ‘upwards’ in the 
network (i.e., directed towards the top of the graph) through multiple pathways and then 
feeding back down through “Mayo” and finally into “World leader in new medical 
treatments”, or it can travel through the core “Mayo” association and proceed 
‘downwards’ in the graph (e.g., through “Leader in medical research”) and eventually 
circle around (through two different pathways) to “World leader in new medical 
treatments”.    
Analytically, it is difficult to resolve the differing contributions of these multiple 
pathways of influence.  In a parallel fashion, it seems that consumers’ ability to 
cognitively function within such a complex structure would also be very limited.  For 
instance, a consumer routinely encounters tens of thousands of products in just a typical 
supermarket trip (Food Marketing Institute, 2013).  In fact, just the category of toothpaste 
alone routinely has over one hundred exemplars within a typical American supermarket 
(Broniarczyk, 2006).  If a consumer had to cognitively access the myriad product and 
brand associations encountered on such a shopping excursion via a fully connected 
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undirected network (in which each product or brand association is connected to all others, 
either directly or through a chain of associations), such a consumer would have an 
unimaginably difficult cognitive task to perform in order to make general deductions, 
inferences, and choices within such an immense network (e.g., Pearl, 1988).  Hence one 
of the central goals of the extension to techniques such as the BCM which is proposed in 
this thesis will consist of a means to make such structures more computationally and 
cognitively tractable, without in any way diminishing their applicability or universality. 
Brand-specific associations.  A second area in which we wish to extend the 
BCM methodology is in the form of data collection that is utilized and the types of links 
that are retrieved.  Specifically, at the link elicitation stage, respondents in the BCM are 
asked to arrange a set of index cards containing brand associations into an overall map or 
network that portrays what they think of the core brand.  The respondents are instructed 
to place a link between two brand characteristics if they feel that the brand itself is 
characterized by such an association.  This may actually be quite a subtle distinction for 
respondents to make.  For instance, if a respondent draws a link between two particular 
brand attributes, it may be difficult to determine whether that respondent is asserting that 
the brand is characterized by that particular association between the two attributes, or 
merely that the brand is perceived to possess each of these attributes and the attributes are 
semantically related to one another in a wider context that is not necessarily specific to 
the brand being examined. 
For example, the BCM analysis of the Mayo Clinic brand (from Roedder John, et 
al., 2006) involves the brand associations that are listed in Table 1.  To illustrate the 
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potential methodological difficulty described above, suppose that a respondent in the 
procedure is examining the particular brand association “Cares more about people than 
money”, in order to see where to fit this association into the network that he or she is 
currently constructing.  Such a respondent might end up linking this association to other 
such associations that deal with either the general concept of ‘money’, the category of 
‘people’, or the general concept of ‘caring’, since those are the main semantic categories 
that are mentioned in the statement.  Perhaps such a respondent would select “Caring and 
compassionate”, or “Can be trusted to do what’s right for patients”.   However, would 
such a connection between concepts reflect what the respondent truly feels about the 
Mayo clinic as a brand, or would they merely reflect the fact that the respondent has 
connected statements that seem semantically related in general?     
Clearly, it is quite possible that people may conflate certain aspects of their ‘true’ 
opinion of the Mayo clinic as a brand with equally salient (and possibly much more 
cognitively available) reasoning patterns about the general topic at hand.  To the extent 
that this is the case, portions of the consensus map within a BCM may merely reflect a 
culturally shared understanding of which brand associations are semantically related to 
one another in a manner that is not necessarily brand-specific.  Since customer-based 
brand equity is critically dependent upon the set of unique associations held by the brand 
(Aaker, 1991; Keller, 1993), the possible conflation of brand-specific inter-attribute 
associations with attribute associations that may simply reflect respondents’ general 
culturally-based understanding of the semantic relatedness of the probes themselves can 
raise concerns about the interpretability of the derived structures. 
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Table 1 
 
List of Brand Associations Used in the BCM Study of the Mayo Clinic 
 Expert in treating serious illness 
Latest medical equipment and technology 
Leader in medical research 
Known worldwide 
Top-notch surgery and treatment 
Best doctors in the world 
World leader in new medical treatments 
Can be trusted to do what’s right for patients 
Doctors work as a team 
Best patient care available 
Treats patients with rare and complex illnesses 
Can figure out what’s wrong when others can’t 
Publishes health information to help you stay well 
Approachable, friendly doctors 
Caring and compassionate 
Treats famous people from around the world 
It comforts me knowing Mayo exists if I ever need it 
People I know recommend Mayo 
Leader in cancer research and treatment 
Cares more about people than money 
Court of last resort 
Hard to get into unless very sick or famous 
Very big and intimidating 
Expensive 
Uses its reputation to make money 
 
Note.  From Roedder John et al. (2006), p. 554 
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 A main goal of this thesis is to extend the pioneering work of Roedder John et al. 
(2006) by developing a brand concept mapping approach which also seeks to uncover the 
full link-by-link structure of a network of brand associations, but which does not burden 
respondents with the difficult cognitive task of deciding whether a link between certain 
brand associations actually characterizes that particular brand.  Instead, as we shall show, 
the techniques utilized in this thesis will allow respondents to answer the much simpler 
and potentially much more reliable question of whether (and to what degree) a specific 
brand possesses each of a particular set of attributes.  The technique will then utilize the 
dependence and independence structures that arise from these responses to derive a link-
by-link description of the structure of the associated brand concept.3, 4  
 Direct versus indirect influence.  The techniques described in this thesis will 
also help to eliminate an additional potential confound from the link elicitation procedure 
pioneered by Roedder John et al. (2006).  Specifically, by asking respondents to decide 
whether a brand is characterized by a relation between two or more attributes, the 
structure derived via the BCM methodology may tend to conflate direct and indirect 
3 The network analysis algorithm utilized by Henderson et al. (1998), which is discussed by Roedder John 
et al. (2006) as an example of the analytical mapping tradition of brand concept elicitation, also utilizes 
consumers’ evaluations of whether a brand possesses (or is characterized by) a particular attribute in 
order to derive the associated brand concept structure.  However, as discussed earlier, this method is 
based on binary evaluations, and hence information about the degree to which a brand is characterized by 
a particular attribute is lost through strict dichotomization.  Furthermore, the network structure is derived 
without reference to statistical robustness, and hence the derived structures are likely to be somewhat 
idiosyncratic and difficult to generalize. 
4 Structural equation modeling can also be utilized to derive a network structure from consumers’ responses 
to ordinal or interval (typically Likert) data on the degree to which a brand possesses or is characterized 
by specific attributes.  However, such SEM techniques require the researcher or marketer to posit an 
initial model and then the SEM methodology can be used to potentially validate and parameterize that 
possible model.  The techniques described in this thesis will not require an initial model to be proposed.  
Furthermore, unlike most SEM based methodologies, the techniques describes in this thesis will allow 
one to model both linear and nonlinear dependencies among the domain variables in the model. 
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influences between those variables.  For example, if a respondent endorses the belief that 
variable A directly influences variable B, and that variable B directly influences variable 
C, then this respondent will also quite naturally perceive that variable A has an influence 
on variable C.  In such a case, this respondent may be tempted to directly connect 
variable A and variable C, even though the influence between them is actually indirect.  
The potential for such conflation of direct and indirect influences exists when relying on 
the direct elicitation of inter-association links, since such respondents may not have 
cognitive access to the specific link structure itself, but rather may merely sense whether 
one variable has an influence over another, whether through direct or indirect means.    
In comparison, the techniques described in this thesis are specifically designed to 
discern the difference between direct and indirect influences among a given set of domain 
variables.  In fact, such discrimination between direct and indirect influence is actually 
one of the core principles on which the techniques utilized here are based.  As such, these 
methods will provide a valuable extension to the brand concept mapping technique 
pioneered by Roedder John et al. (2006). 
 Link strength interpretability.  One additional area in which we would like to 
make a contribution is in the definition of specific link strength measures within a brand 
concept map.  The methodology employed by the BCM technique for establishing the 
strength of each network link is quite direct: respondents are asked to rate the strength of 
each elicited link on scale of one to three (as indicated by the number of ‘bars’ used in 
that link), and then the resulting strengths of each link are averaged.  However, the direct 
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nature of this quantification procedure can also make it difficult to know what effects are 
incorporated into each such link strength value.  
As an example, consider the excerpt shown in Figure 2, below (as extracted from 
a portion of the Mayo Clinic BCM network given in Figure 1).  Here we see that “Expert 
in treating serious illnesses” has a direct effect upon “World leader in new medical 
treatments”, with an indicated relative strength of two links.  However, “Expert in 
treating serious illnesses” also has a strength-three link to “Mayo”, which in turn has a 
strength-three link to “World leader in new medical treatments”.  Hence it may be 
unclear what the strength-two direct connection between these two associations indicates.  
For instance, one does not know whether this strength-two direct connection already 
incorporates the effects of the strength-three pathway that exists between these variables 
via the core Mayo brand node.  Furthermore, if it does incorporate this additional 
pathway of influence, then it is unclear why this direct pathway only has a strength of 
two when these variables are connected (and hence influence each other) with a strength 
of three via the other pathway by which they are connected.   
 
 
  
Figure 2.   Excerpt from the BCM for patients’ perceptions of the Mayo Clinic  
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Note that we are not asserting that the link strengths indicated in a BCM structure 
are incorrect.  Since the strength assigned to each link represents an average value of the 
perceived strengths of that link across all the respondents whose maps contain that link, 
these link strength values have a de facto validity.  What we are seeking is a delineation 
of what structural influences play a role in determining these link strength values.  For 
instance, as described above, one does not know if a direct link between two attributes 
already reflects the contributions of all existing indirect pathways between these same 
two attributes.  Similarly, there are known interpretability issues with directly assessed 
similarity judgments taken as a whole (e.g., Summers and MacKay, 1976), and the direct 
aggregation of individual judgments is also known to lead to possible intransitivities in 
the resulting aggregate link strength values (e.g., Tversky, 1969).  Therefore, a potentially 
valuable contribution of this thesis will be the determination of a link strength measure 
via information-theoretic means, as well as the use of probabilistic conditioning to more 
precisely separate the specific contributions of each link from those of neighboring links. 
 
1.3    Directional Relations and Marketing Constructs 
As Roedder John et al. (2006) describe, the underlying cognitive model on which 
the BCM technique rests is that of associative networks (e.g., Anderson, 1983).  On this 
basis, it is assumed that the links in the networks derived through the BCM technique will 
essentially be nondirectional entities:  the variables linked together in such a structure are 
merely said to be associated or correlated, with no implicit directionality to their 
relationship.  This is in keeping with the core literature cited in their work, namely 
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Anderson (1983a), Keller (1993), and Aaker (1996).  More specifically, the BCM (along 
with a large number of brand construct models to date) utilizes the foundational work of 
Keller (1993) as guidance in establishing the theoretical core of the model.  Keller, in 
turn, utilizes the associative network construct (Anderson and Bower, 1973; Anderson, 
1983a) as the core structural assumption underlying his model of customer-based brand 
equity.  As Keller (1993) describes these assumptions: 
… the ‘associative network memory model’ views semantic memory or 
knowledge as consisting of a set of nodes and links.  . . .  A node becomes a 
potential source of activation for the other nodes either when external information 
is being encoded or when internal information is retrieved from long-term 
memory.  Activation can spread from this node to other linked nodes in memory.  
. . .  For example, in considering a soft drink purchase, a consumer may think of 
Pepsi because of its strong association with the product category.  Consumer 
knowledge most strongly linked to Pepsi should also then come to mind, such as 
perceptions of its taste, sugar and caffeine content, or even recalled images from a 
recent advertising campaign or past product experiences.  . . .  Consistent with an 
associative network memory model, brand knowledge is conceptualized as 
consisting of a brand node in memory to which a variety of associations are 
linked. (Keller, 1993, p. 2) 
Interestingly, however, both Anderson’s associative network model (Anderson 
and Bower, 1973; Anderson 1983a, 1983b) and the spreading activation model of Collins 
and Loftus (1975) quite often address directional phenomena.  For example, much of the 
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early work on learning paired associations, which played an influential role in the 
formulation of Anderson’s model, has shown distinctly different rates of recall in the 
forward and reverse directions, as well as the possibility of reducing recall in one 
direction without affecting recall in the other direction (e.g., Keppel and Underwood, 
1962; Johnston, 1967; Wolford, 1971; Anderson, 1974).  Hence, in a marketing context, 
this would be akin to information about brand A priming the recall of brand B to a greater 
extent than information about brand B primes the recall of brand A (e.g., Nedungadi, 
1990; Ulhaque and Bahn, 1992).   
Furthermore, it is clear from the wider marketing literature that directionally 
asymmetric relationships exist at all levels of marketing phenomena.  For example, it is 
well-known that consumers’ understanding of a consumption situation often depends 
upon their perception of the directional or causal mechanism which may be generating 
the relevant observed or experienced attributes related to that consumption situation.  For 
example, as Weiner (2000) points out,  
Some products lend themselves to stable attributions.  For example, if I do not 
enjoy the taste of a breakfast cereal  . . .   then I will not purchase it again.  After 
all, I expect that the next box of cereal will taste the same.  (Weiner, 2000, p. 383) 
However, this stable attribution relates to the perceived cause of the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of the experience.  For instance, as Weiner (ibid.) continues,  
Perhaps there is a chance that a hole in my tooth made the sweetness of the cereal 
unpleasant.  This is now an unstable cause  . . .  so that, if I attribute my disliking 
to this temporary state, then I am uncertain about my future liking or disliking of 
17 
 
the cereal and may try it again (i.e., I discount the properties of the cereal as the 
cause of my dissatisfaction).    (Weiner, 2000, p. 383) 
In other words, the sense that a consumer makes of an experience is tied to that 
consumer’s perceived cause of that experience, and this relationship is certainly an 
asymmetric one. 
 As Folkes (1988) discusses, asymmetric phenomena play a central role within the 
process of product choice.  For example, as Folkes (ibid.) describes, “many, if not most, 
products and services are purchased because consumers infer a causal relationship: they 
believe that analgesics reduce pain, deodorants improve one’s social life, athletic shoes 
enhance performance, and so on.”  In other words, products and services are efficacious, 
in that their purchase or consideration involves the belief that certain of their properties 
will cause one or more states or outcomes to occur (or will alter the probability 
distribution over these states or outcomes accordingly).   
 One can, in fact, find directional relations at all levels of marketing phenomena. 
For example, as Folkes (1988) makes clear, consumers’ product recommendation 
behavior as well as their complaint behavior are, to a large extent, based on how the 
consumers assign credit for good performance or assign blame for poor performance, and 
such assignments of credit or blame follow from the consumers’ perceptions of what 
caused or predicted that good or poor performance.  Furthermore, the ascription or 
attribution of causal rationale to information sources (such as spokespeople, commercials, 
etc.) is known to influence the perceived credibility of these sources (Wiener and 
Mowen, 1986, as described in Folkes, 1988). 
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 In fact, even at the level of subcultures of consumption, directional or causal 
concerns often predominate.  For example, as discovered by Sirsi, Ward, and Reingen 
(1996), the form of information which was shared among sociocognitively related 
subgroups was specifically causal information about products and product categories.  
Furthermore, the prominent role represented by causal or directional concerns within 
such subcultures makes sense, since many different subgroups can notice the co-
occurrence (i.e., the undirected association) of various marketplace characteristics.  
However, it is the explanation of those co-occurrences that serves to distinguish the 
beliefs of one consumption subculture from another, and such explanations can often take 
the form of causal “if-then” rules (e.g., Hoch and Deighton, 1989). 
 It should come as no surprise that directional phenomena reside at the heart of so 
many different levels of marketing phenomena.  In fact, As far back as Bartlett’s classic 
work on human understanding and memory (Bartlett, 1932) it has been known that 
people’s ability to comprehend a story or a script is facilitated when the elements of the 
script cohere with their natural understanding of the causal connection between those 
elements, and is inhibited when the presented flow of information does not cohere with 
the perceived directional relation between the relevant events.  More recent studies have 
confirmed and extended this theme.  For instance, Pennington and Hastie (1993) have 
shown that subjects in a mock jury experiment were far more likely to conclude that the 
defendant was guilty of a crime when the evidence was presented in the form of a causal 
story as opposed to when the exact same evidence was presented out of causal sequence.   
As Sloman (2005, p. 89) states when discussing these results, “Strong evidence per se 
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does not automatically lead people to conclude guilt; the evidence must sustain an 
explanation.  The best support for an explanation comes from a plausible causal model.”  
In even more generality, as Sloman (ibid.) points out, legal evidence consisting of 
“merely statistical” facts (as opposed to causal facts) are often rejected by both judges 
and juries as being insufficient to prove guilt.  Apparently, evidence is much more likely 
to be considered relevant if it is a part of a causal story or causal relation, whereas 
evidence that is not part of a causally relevant story is often ignored.   
 Furthermore, many of the heuristics and biases studied by Tversky and Kahneman 
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) can also be seen as resulting from the utilization of 
causal constructs in reasoning (Sloman, 2005).  For example, consider Tversky’s study of 
the “hot hand” decision heuristic (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985).  This is the 
belief that individuals participating in a sport such as basketball are more likely to be 
successful (e.g., make their next shot) if they have already been successful on their 
previous few attempts.  The authors’ exhaustive search of relevant sports records showed 
that such a “hot hand” effect does not actually exist.  However, the majority of players, 
fans, and even coaches persist in the belief that a player being “in the zone” (having a 
“hot hand”, etc.) is indeed causal of that player making his or her next shot successfully.  
Apparently, the notion of a central causal mechanism which can unite the seemingly large 
number of variables which play a role in an athlete’s performance forms a powerful 
enough “gestalt” to allow people to perceive that a causal relation exists despite objective 
evidence to the contrary.  In fact, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 72) summarize, the 
causality construct plays a critical central role in people’s ability to navigate their world, 
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viz., “Our successful functioning in the world involves the application of the concept of 
causation to ever new domains of activity  –  through intention, planning, drawing 
inferences, etc.”  In fact, as these authors also point out, the experiential gestalt of 
causality is one of the “ultimate building blocks of meaning” (Lakoff and Johnson, ibid., 
p. 69). 
 
1.4   Mechanisms Underlying Asymmetric Relations 
Given the central role played by directional relationships in people’s everyday 
experience, it stands to reason that any model of natural reasoning mechanisms would 
have to be able to explain such directional phenomena.  Within the associative network 
model of human reasoning, the key structural element which is hypothesized to generate 
directional asymmetry is known as the fan effect, which corresponds to the assumption 
that multiple associational links lead out of each node much like the shape of a fan 
(Anderson, 1974, 1983a).  Because nodal activation spreads along these links, the 
activation of a particular node will be diminished more quickly if a greater number of 
associations lead out of that node (i.e., the rate of extinction of a node’s activation is 
proportional to the size of that node’s fan).  Stated another way, given a fixed amount of 
nodal activation, the degree or amount of that activation which traverses any one link 
leading out of the activated node will be inversely related to the number of other links in 
the network which share that same source node.  Therefore, if nodes A and B within an 
associative network are connected, and node A has a larger ‘fan’ structure than node B 
(i.e., more associative links lead out of node A than node B), then activation of node A 
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will have less of an effect on node B than an equally strong activation at node B has upon 
node A (where the ‘effect’ on a node is understood in the associative network sense, i.e., 
as the probability that the destination node will become activated given that the source 
node has been activated).   
The fan effect has been experimentally verified in multiple studies (e.g., 
Anderson, 1974; Lewis and Anderson, 1976; Reder and Ross, 1983; Reder and Wible, 
1984; Anderson and Reder, 1987; Schreiber and Nelson, 1998).  In fact, much of 
Anderson’s seminal treatise on associative networks as the foundation of cognition 
(Anderson, 1983a) consists of verifying and quantifying this fan effect within multiple 
different cognitive tasks and domains.5   
Thus there are two distinct but related levels of analysis at which associative 
network theory operates.  At the most basic functional level, there is simply a collection 
of undifferentiated, potentially bidirectional structural links connecting various nodes, 
much as a set of neuronal connections are assumed to link various neural clusters in the 
brain (Anderson, 1983a, p. 86-87).  However, once the overall topology of the multiple 
links in an associative network is taken into account, the fan effect may then become 
5 Many examples of the fan effect examined by Anderson (1983a) consisted of concept pairs which span a 
subordinate-superordinate category dimension (i.e., one member of each pair was often clearly 
superordinate to the other).  Hence, as classically described by Anderson (1983a), the fan effect may be 
said to be an explanation of the possible neural structures which may encode the perception or 
understanding of subordinate-superordinate relationships, and as shown by Anderson (ibid.), the 
associative network representation of such relationships clearly exhibit asymmetric priming and 
facilitation effects.  Further, Anderson demonstrated that such directional differences in priming and 
recall follow from differences in the number of possible associative links emanating from the concepts at 
each level of such superordinate-subordinate hierarchies (i.e., from the size of the ‘fan effect’ differential 
between the associatively linked concepts). 
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operative and hence the overall association between variables that results from the 
network will frequently exhibit a clear directionality.6   
Interestingly, more recent investigations into the boundary conditions of the fan 
effect have shown that when the additional information presented to subjects in an 
association task is schematically or causally connected, the ‘fan effect’ is frequently 
eliminated (e.g., Radvansky, 1999; Gomez-Ariza and Bajo, 2003).  In essence, this 
research shows that the existence of a causal connection between the additional presented 
facts (or a thematic coherence among those facts that would allow a causal 
representation) provides the conditions under which respondents are able to mentally 
‘group’ or ‘coalesce’ the multitude of simple bidirectional links emanating from a source 
node into a single directional (causal) link, thereby removing the ‘fanning out effect’ of 
the multiple links emanating from that source node.  Hence, in order to ‘replace’ a set of 
undifferentiated links (whose complex topology can result in a directional dependence 
between the linked variables) with a simpler connection structure, that replacement 
structure typically must itself be causal in nature.    
The notion of the associative ‘fan effect’ has also been demonstrated within 
marketing phenomena.  For instance, Lei, Dawar, and Lemmink (2008) created fictitious 
brands so that the number of associations linked to each brand could be experimentally 
controlled, and found that the directional strength of association between these brands 
6 Additionally, some models of associative network structures place either a priori or variable ‘strengths’ or 
‘criterialities’ on the various links within the network (e.g., Collins and Quillian, 1972), and it may be 
possible to create an asymmetry through specifying different criterialities in each direction.  This 
argument essentially parallels the ‘fan size’ argument described above.  (In fact, such differing 
criterialities may be derivable from differing fan effect sizes for each variable in the connection.) 
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followed the precise pattern predicted by the associative ‘fan effect’, namely that the 
priming of a brand with a greater number of associations had less of an effect on the 
recall of a related brand with a smaller number of associations than did the converse 
condition of priming a brand with a smaller number of associations.  Further, by 
manipulating the number of shared versus distinctive attributes among the brands in this 
portfolio, Lei et al. (ibid.) were able to rule out Tversky’s well-known contrast model 
(Tversky, 1977; Tversky and Gati, 1978) as a possible explanation of these directional 
effects.  Furthermore, these investigators were able to show that the degree to which 
negative information (i.e., a ‘brand crisis’) at one brand within a portfolio was able to 
affect evaluations of other brands in that portfolio precisely followed from the relative 
directional strengths of the links between these brands.    
One can also posit the existence of an associative fan effect within many of the 
directional phenomena known in marketing.  For example, consider the illustrative 
example provided by Holden and Lutz (1992) of an asymmetric dependence between the 
Budweiser brand and the Superbowl usage situation.  As they describe, when primed with 
the usage situation (i.e., when thinking about something to drink when watching the 
Superbowl), the Budweiser brand may come to mind, but thinking about the brand is 
much less likely to activate that usage situation.  Hence there is a clear asymmetric 
dependence between the brand (Budweiser) and the usage situation (something to drink 
during the Superbowl).  In terms of the underlying fan effect within this situation, it is 
clear that the Budweiser brand has one of the richest and most varied brand images of any 
beer brand in the United States, and it is quite likely that a typical American male 
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respondent would be able to name vastly more associations to the probe ‘Budweiser’ than 
to the probe ‘something to drink during the Superbowl’.  Thus ‘Budweiser’ is likely to 
have a larger (and more complex) fan structure, and hence by the fan theory of 
associative networks, activation of the node or concept ‘something to drink during the 
Superbowl’ would have a stronger effect on the level of activation of ‘Budweiser’ than 
the activation of ‘Budweiser’ would have on ‘something to drink during the Superbowl’. 
As the above example illustrates, the relation between many of the concepts 
within consumers’ brand concepts may in fact have a directional nature.  Furthermore, 
such directionality has been utilized in the marketing management and consumer 
behavior literatures.  For example, Farquhar and Herr (1993) stress that brand building 
activities, which focus on strengthening the directional relationship from the focal brand 
to its many brand associations are different from brand leveraging activities, which focus 
on strengthening the directional relationship stemming from a brand’s associations and 
terminating at the brand itself.7  As further evidence of this directional asymmetry, 
Farquhar and Herr (ibid.) also distinguish between a category dominant brand (which has 
a very high tendency to be named or recalled once the superordinate brand category is 
primed), versus an instance dominant brand (for which priming of the brand has a high 
likelihood of resulting in the brand category being named or recalled).  For instance, 
Farquhar and Herr (1993) describe how the brand ‘Nike’ is both category dominant (if 
consumers are asked to name a sneaker brand, there is a high probability they will name 
7 As Farquhar and Herr (1993) describe, the managerial concepts of brand building and brand leveraging 
are essentially derived from the concepts of instance dominance and category dominance respectively 
(e.g., Barsalou 1983, 1985).   
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‘Nike’) and at the same time is also instance dominant (if consumers are primed with the 
‘Nike’ brand, there is a high probability that this will activate the sneaker category).  
However, as these authors show, these two forms of directional relation do not 
necessarily go hand-in-hand.  For instance, these authors show that ‘Scope’ is more 
category dominant than ‘Listerine’, but ‘Listerine’ is more instance dominant than 
‘Scope’.  Hence, as demonstrated by Farquhar and Herr (1993), brand-category 
relationships in marketing are typically asymmetric phenomena. 
Clearly, based on the evidence discussed, the links within consumers’ brand 
concepts, as well as between consumers’ perceptions of multiple brands within a 
portfolio, can be asymmetric.  Furthermore, based on evidence from the psychology and 
marketing literatures, the degree of asymmetry of these link strengths does seem to 
follow from the predictions of the ‘fan effect’ as initially proposed within the associative 
networks literature.  Hence, consumers’ brand maps may in fact be better modeled by 
asymmetric or directed networks as opposed to presuming that all associative links must 
be nondirectional by nature.8  Interestingly, the pioneers of the BCM methodology are 
distinctly aware of these considerations, and these authors specifically mention the idea 
of link directionality as a potential worthwhile extension of the BCM methodology as it 
currently exists.  Specifically, Roedder John et al. (2006) state: 
… it would be useful to incorporate procedures into the BCM to assess the nature 
of relationships between associations, that is, whether it is causal, correlational, or 
8 There is actually nothing in Keller (1993) which specifically states that the links in an associative network 
model of a brand concept must be nondirectional.  Rather, for the purposes of developing his consumer-
based model of brand equity, it is simply quite likely that Keller (ibid.) saw no overt need to posit any 
form of directionality to the links in the derived network.     
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something else. Although we can speculate about the relationships shown in the 
consensus brand maps, we have not yet developed a technique for doing so on an 
objective basis.  For example, it seems clear that perceptions of Mayo Clinic as 
‘treats famous people around the world’ cause people to believe that Mayo Clinic 
is ‘known worldwide.’ However, being a ‘leader in cancer research’ could be an 
instance of being a ‘leader in medical research,’ or one of these associations could 
be driving (causing) the other. We believe that procedures similar to those used in 
understanding causal reasoning chains (see Sirsi, Ward, and Reingen 1996) could 
be incorporated into the mapping stage of the BCM to provide information about 
brand association relationships.  (Roedder John, et al., 2006, p. 563) 
 
1.5   Causality, Diagnosticity, and Intervention 
In order to further pursue the suggestion of Roedder John et al. (2006) that it may 
be quite plausible for the links in a brand concept map to be causal or directional in 
nature, we must examine what such a link entails for a network of variables or brand 
associations, and how it may differ from a purely associative link between those 
variables.  At first glance, it may seem that if there is a causal or directional link from 
variable X to variable Y (denoted as X  → Y) within a brand concept network, then 
knowing something about the state of variable X would imply something about the state 
of variable Y, but not vice-versa.  However, this initial supposition is not actually true.   
To clarify this point a bit further, let us assume that we have such a directional 
relationship between two binary variables X and Y.  In such a case, the distributions 
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related to this bivariate relationship would be of the form given in Figure 3, below.  As 
indicated by this figure, if we observe that variable 𝑋𝑋 happens to have value 𝑥𝑥1, the 
distribution of variable Y would essentially be ‘collapsed’ to the first row of the 
conditional distribution 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 as given in the right-hand data table within Figure 3.  In 
other words, this knowledge about the value of variable X would alter the distribution of 
variable Y from whatever its initial values were, so that variable Y would now have the 
values indicated in the 𝑥𝑥1 row of the 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 data table. 
  
 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋 𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥2 
 λ 1−λ 
 
𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 𝑦𝑦1 𝑦𝑦2 
𝑥𝑥1 α 1−α 
𝑥𝑥2 β 1−β 
 
 Figure 3.   Directed relation 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 involving two binary variables 
 
Now consider what would occur within the directional structure of Figure 3 if we 
learn that variable Y happens to have the value 𝑦𝑦1.  Contrary to our initial assumption 
that the ‘flow of causality’ from X to Y would preclude knowledge of variable Y from 
having an effect on variable X, we would actually see a definite effect on variable X, and 
this effect can be quantified by Bayes’ theorem.  Specifically, the value of 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) will be 
updated from  λ  to  
𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌�𝑦𝑦1�𝑥𝑥1� ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1)  𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1)  , which in this instance can be computed as   𝛼𝛼 𝜆𝜆 𝛼𝛼 𝜆𝜆  +  𝛽𝛽 (1−𝜆𝜆)   .  Hence, unless either 𝜆𝜆 = 0 or 𝜆𝜆 = 1 (which are ‘degenerate’ cases for the 
X Y 
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distribution of the variable X) or 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 (which would mean that variable Y is 
“accidentally” perfectly independent of variable X to begin with, in which case the model 
𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 that we are utilizing would no longer be valid), we will have that an observed 
value of variable Y will provide diagnostic information about the value of variable X, and 
we will therefore see bidirectional influence between these two variables.    
If, as we have shown, Bayes’ theorem allows for diagnostic influence from the 
‘effect’ or ‘consequent’ variable to the predictive or causal variable within that pair, one 
may wonder what the difference is between this directional (or asymmetric) relationship 
and a correlational (or symmetric) relation.  As it turns out, the difference comes about 
when we act to set the value of one of the variables rather than merely observing its 
value.   
More specifically, within a symmetric (correlational) relationship, the means by 
which the value of either X or Y is established (i.e., whether the variable is set to a 
specific value or is observed to have that value) has no influence upon the determination 
of the effect that this variable has upon the other variable within the correlated pair.  
However, when the relationship between X and Y is directional, such as is the case in the 
scenario exhibited in Figure 3, each direction of the relationship responds differently to 
an intervention to set the value of one of these variables (Lauritzen, 1999).  For instance, 
as long as variable Y is not, by chance, independent of variable X (i.e., assuming that the 
rare coincidence of  𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 does not occur)9, then acting to fix the value of variable X 
9 This assumption, that the two variables are not independent ‘by coincidence only’ (i.e., that the causal 
diagram 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 is valid) is called the causal faithfulness assumption, and will be discussed at greater 
length later in the thesis. 
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will still have the same effect as observing the value of X, namely, such knowledge will 
serve to ‘collapse’ the distribution of variable Y to one particular row of its conditional 
distribution.10   
In contrast, acting to set the value of variable Y will have no effect on the 
distribution of variable X in a directional system such as the one in Figure 3 because the 
diagnostic influence that runs from variable Y to variable X is only operative when the 
value of variable Y actually indicates (or ‘diagnoses’) something about the state of 
variable X.  When the value of Y is established through an intervention rather than 
through the normal causal mechanism running from variable X to variable Y, then 
knowing the value of Y tells us nothing about the possible states of variable X.   
As an example of this phenomenon11, consider the fact that observing a low 
reading on a barometer is certainly diagnostic of the fact that rain is likely.  Thus even 
though a low reading on the barometer does not cause the atmospheric conditions to 
favor rain, we can still utilize the low reading as an indicator of those atmospheric 
conditions.  This is a diagnostic relation (and not a causal one) because the conclusion 
that the low reading indicates rain-like conditions runs in the opposite direction to the 
underlying directional or causal mechanism, namely: rain-like conditions → low 
barometer reading).  However, despite the fact that this diagnostic reasoning pattern runs 
in the opposite direction to the underlying causal mechanism, we still strongly believe in 
its validity because we believe in the validity of the causal mechanism itself (i.e., rain-
10 In essence, the variable 𝑌𝑌 does not “care” who or what caused variable 𝑋𝑋 to have the value that it does.  
Variable 𝑌𝑌 simply “senses” the value that its cause (variable 𝑋𝑋) currently has, and responds accordingly. 
11 This is an extension of an example described in Pearl (2000, p. 111). 
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like conditions → low barometer reading), and we are quite used to ‘reversing’ trusted 
causal mechanisms (via a an intuitive version of Bayes’ theorem).   
On the other hand, if we were to open up the barometer and set the reading to be 
low, we would certainly not believe that this reading was indicative of a high probability 
of rain.  This negative conclusion of course stems from the fact that because we 
intervened to set the value of the effect variable (i.e., the barometer reading), we clearly 
no longer regard the value of the effect variable as being indicative of the distribution of 
the causal variable, and hence we are likely to dismiss any possible effect in the 
diagnostic direction.  Interestingly, if we could somehow ‘seed’ the clouds in order to 
establish particular barometric conditions, we would quite readily believe that this 
intervention would indeed lower the barometer reading, even though we intervened to 
‘set’ those atmospheric conditions.  
Thus, as this example shows, we typically trust directional mechanisms in the 
causal direction no matter whether the level of the causal variable has been observed or 
has been manipulated to be at a certain level or value through an intervention.  On the 
other hand, we only trust causal mechanisms in the diagnostic direction if we observe the 
value of the effect variable, but not if we set that value through some intervention.  The 
fact that these reasoning patterns appear so intuitive (i.e., of such a “second nature” to us) 
reveals how prevalent and central these directional reasoning patterns really are within 
our conception of the world. 
  In summary, we have shown that a causal link between two variables will be 
apparent in an interventional scenario, but not necessarily in an observational one.  The 
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value of the causal variable will always influence the distribution of the effect variable, 
whether we intervene to set the causal variable’s value, or whether we passively observe 
its value.  However, the value of the effect variable will influence the distribution of its 
cause only when we observe the value of the effect (and diagnostically reason from the 
value of the effect to the distribution of the cause), but not when we intervene to set its 
value.  Therefore the asymmetry that Roedder John et al. (2006) discuss as potentially 
providing a deeper explanation of link structure within a brand concept map will typically 
arise under conditions in which we set the values of certain variables, rather than when 
we merely observe their values, and will be manifested in consumers’ sensitivity to 
differences between the predictive and diagnostic directions of the resulting links.   
Note that since we are analyzing consumer belief structures, the idea of fixing or 
setting the values of certain variables with in a consumption domain can also correspond 
to consumers’ beliefs about what would happen if they were to set these values.  In other 
words, the ‘fixing’ of values in this case can just as easily derive from counterfactual 
thoughts about what is likely to happen if one were to take a particular action as it is to 
derive from actual actions undertaken by consumers or firms in the marketplace.  In 
either the enacted or counterfactual scenario, we can expect that many of the links 
between variables in the belief network may be directional in nature.  Furthermore, as 
discussed above, the asymmetric response of such a directed network to interventions 
allows one to regard a directional network as an oracle for determining the likely effects 
of either real or counterfactually imagined choices among the brand characteristics that 
exist within the consumer’s brand concept. 
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1.6   Directed Structures, Part I: Common Cause and Common Effect Structures 
 As we have seen in the previous section, directional networks are sensitive to the 
difference between observing a fact versus intervening to establish that fact, whereas 
nondirectional networks do not necessarily possess such sensitivity.12  In this section we 
will see that the additional expressivity available when one allows the links within a 
brand concept network to be directed also allows one to distinguish several different 
variations of the relationship between triples of network variables, whereas in an 
undirected network all of these variations would collapse into a single nondirectional 
structure.  Furthermore, as it turns out, the difference between these directed triples of 
variables is precisely what provides directed networks with their rich implicational 
structure and semantic meaning.    
 To be more specific, consider a chain structure consisting of three variables, say, 
A, B, and C.  In an undirected network, such a chain can have only one basic 
configuration13, namely A – B – C.  However, within a directed network, this chain-like 
structure can actually have four different variations, namely the causal chain structure            
A → B → C ,  the diagnostic chain structure A ← B ← C ,  the common cause structure  
A ← B → C , and the common-effect structure  A → B ← C.  As it turns out, the 
12 This can also give rise to different reasoning patterns in the predictive versus the diagnostic direction 
(e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1980; Pearl, 1988), which is another distinction that is expressible (and 
modelable) within directed networks, but which is difficult to represent within nondirectional networks. 
13 In this discussion, we are ignoring possible differences in the ‘naming’ of the three variables involved. 
For example, we are considering the undirected chain A – B – C to represent the same basic network 
structure as B – A – C , etc., since these have the same network topology and differ only in the names 
given to the three variables occupying the three positions within that structure. 
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semantic differences between these four directional variants is actually quite profound 
(e.g., Lauritzen, 1999;  Pearl, 2000). 
 As an example of the depth of the implicational differences between each of these 
directed three-variable substructures, consider a typical situation in which a consumer 
utilizes a product review in order to ascertain whether or not he or she is likely to be 
satisfied with the purchase of a particular product under consideration.  Of course, we 
could represent this situation with an undirected network as shown in Figure 4a, but the 
directed representation given in Figure 4b would actually be more accurate since it 
reveals that the product quality directly influences both the review and the consumer’s 
satisfaction with the product, but that neither the review nor the consumer’s satisfaction 
directly influence the product quality.14 
 A consumer who holds the directed cognitive model shown in Figure 4b will be 
able to use the status of the product review to diagnostically infer the likely quality of the 
product in question, and can then infer whether he or she will be satisfied with that 
product.  In other words, within this directed structure, information flows from the status 
of the product review to the determination of the consumer’s likely degree of satisfaction 
with the product. 
14 In both Figure 4a and Figure 4b, we are ignoring the possibility that the customer will derive product 
satisfaction from the review itself.  Rather, we are assuming that the consumer only cares about the 
underlying quality of the product, and is simply using the review as an informational tool to learn about 
that underlying product quality.  (In this simple example, we are also ignoring any potential ‘second-
order’ effects by which a positive or negative review or could ‘feed back’ to affect product quality 
through managerial response to that review, or by which managerial knowledge of overall customer 
satisfaction alters current product quality.) 
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However, suppose that this consumer sets the value of the ‘Product Quality’ 
variable by only incorporating items of a known quality level into his or her consideration 
set.  In such a situation, the product review would become irrelevant to the purchase 
decision, since the consumer can ascertain the quality of the product through this other 
mechanism.15  Hence, once the value of the central variable in this common cause 
structure is fixed (in this case through an intervention, either ‘real’ or counterfactually 
Figure 4.    Alternative models for a product review scenario 
Product Quality 
Product Review 
Customer Satisfaction 
(b) 
Product Quality 
Product Review 
Customer Satisfaction 
(a) 
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simulated) by the consumer, the flow of information from the ‘Product Review’ variable 
to the ‘Customer Satisfaction’ variable will be blocked.  In probabilistic terms, 
knowledge of the ‘Product Quality’ variable “blocks” the passage of information through 
this structure, rendering the ‘Product Review’ and ‘Customer Satisfaction’ conditionally 
independent of each other: Customer Satisfaction  ⫫  Product Review  | Product Quality.  
Similarly, note that one can also block the passage of information through this structure 
via a direct observation of the product’s quality, say, through direct inspection of the 
product by the consumer, or through a product trial, etc.  In other words, the information 
flow through this structure can be blocked either by an intervention to set the level of the 
‘Product Quality’ variable, or via an observation of the product’s quality, and in either 
case, we would have that the two terminal variables in the structure (namely ‘Customer 
Satisfaction’ and ‘Product Review’) become independent when knowledge of the central 
variable (‘Product Quality’) becomes available.    
Now consider a slight variation on this three-variable scenario.  For instance, 
suppose that a consumer is shopping for a new stereo or television, etc., and that he or she 
holds the directional belief structure shown in Figure 5.  Note that if this were an 
undirected structure, it would have the same overall topology as each of the structures 
shown in Figure 4, namely a central variable linked to each of two terminal variables, 
with no direct connection between those terminal variables.  However, what is quite 
surprising is that despite its topological similarity to the structures in Figure 4, the 
15 In this basic model, we are assuming that the product review would not add any additional degree of 
confidence in the product above and beyond the level of confidence that the consumer has already 
established via the incorporation of products with a specific known level of quality into their 
consideration set. (Such a more complex scenario would require an expansion of this basic model.) 
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directional variation shown in Figure 5 will actually have informational properties that 
are completely different than what we saw in the previous example. 
 To derive the informational semantics of this form of directed structure, consider 
what a customer might think if he or she encountered a potential choice of stereo which 
had a great many features.  If this consumer did not know the price level of the stereo, he 
or she would have no way of knowing whether the high number of features was 
indicative of a high quality or a low quality product.16  However, if the consumer does 
16 Some consumers may perceive that certain brands are better than others at increasing feature counts 
without sacrificing quality.  However, to keep this model as simple as possible, we are assuming that the 
consumers in the model do not have an opinion one way or the other on this particular issue.  
Furthermore, for expository purposes, we are disregarding other signals of internal quality (such as 
channel exclusivity, retailer reputation, etc.). 
Figure 5.   Common effect structure 
Price 
 
Internal Quality 
(components, assembly, etc.) 
 
Number of Features 
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know the price level of the product, then the number of features offered by that product 
certainly provides information about the product’s quality level.  Specifically, if the price 
is quite low, then the product’s high number of features would almost certainly indicate 
to the consumer that this particular stereo was likely to have a low level of internal 
quality.  Thus without knowledge of the value of the central variable in this directional 
structure, one of the terminal variables provides no information about the other, and 
hence these two variables are said to be unconditionally independent, i.e.,                        
Internal Quality  ⫫  Number of Features  |  ∅ .  Furthermore, once the price level 
becomes known (either through observing that price level, or through setting that price 
level via limiting one’s choice of products to incorporate into a consideration set), the 
number of features and the perceived quality of the stereo become linked, and hence we 
have that these variables are conditionally dependent on each other given the price level, 
i.e.,  Internal Quality ∦ Number of Features  |  Price . 
 To summarize these findings, let us symbolically denote the variables in each 
structure examined by A, B, and C.  Thus, in the product review example of Figure 4b 
(which we can symbolically denote by A ← B → C), we saw that this structure possessed 
the property that the two terminal variables (i.e., the product quality and the consumer’s 
likely degree of satisfaction with the product) initially provided information about one 
another, but became independent of one another once the central variable in the structure 
(namely the product’s quality level, or symbolically variable “B” in this structure) was 
known or was fixed through either real or counterfactual intervention.  On the other hand, 
the stereo purchase example of Figure 5 (which we can symbolically denote by                                  
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A → B ← C) had the opposite set of independence and dependence properties, namely 
the two terminal variables (number of features and internal quality) initially do not 
provide information about one another, but do become related once the central variable 
(i.e., the price, or variable “B” in the schematic representation) is known or fixed through 
either real or counterfactual intervention.17   
We can state the above findings more succinctly by saying that the common cause 
structure  A ← B → C possesses marginal dependence of A and C, but conditional 
independence of A and C once variable B becomes known (or is fixed through 
intervention).  On the other hand, the common effect structure  A → B ← C possesses 
marginal independence of variables A and C, but conditional dependence of these 
variables once B is known (or set through an intervention).  Stated even more simply, 
within a common cause structure (A ← B → C), the central variable blocks any 
communication or information flow between the two terminal variables, while in the 
common effect structure (A → B ← C) knowledge of the value of the central variable is 
required in order to permit information flow between the two terminal variables.18  Of 
course, note that had these two phenomena been modeled as undirected structures, both 
models would have been identical (namely A – B – C), and all of the rich expressive 
power that was gained through these different directional representations would have 
been lost.   
17 Once again, by “real or counterfactual intervention”, we mean that the consumer either limits his or her 
consideration set to products containing a specific level or value of the variable in question, or 
counterfactually considers what would happen if he or she considered only products with a specific value 
of that variable.  
18  Proofs of these differences in the informational dynamics of the common cause and common effect 
structures are provided in the Appendix. 
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Lastly, it should be pointed out that within a common effect (or ‘collider’) 
structure (A → B ← C), we have seen that confirmation of one of the possible causes of 
the common effect has no influence on the other possible cause until the level of the 
common effect is known, at which time the confirmation of one possible cause reduces 
the belief in the other possible cause of that common effect.  For example, as described 
earlier, both the number of features of a stereo and its internal quality have a direct 
influence on the price of that stereo.  However, once the price of the stereo is observed 
(or is fixed through intervention), any increase in the perceived number of features of that 
stereo will tend to decrease consumers’ perceptions of the possible internal quality of that 
stereo.  This reasoning pattern is often called explaining away (or ‘intercausal 
reasoning’), and may be used to provide quantitative predictions of the degree to which 
changes in the probability of one or more causes of a common effect reduces the 
perceived likelihood of the other causes of that effect (Wellman and Henrion, 1993; 
Pearl, 2000).  Further, note that this hallmark property of the common effect structure is 
also known by the names causal attribution and causal discounting within the social 
psychology literature (e.g., Kelley, 1973), since it models the process by which the 
attribution of causal strength to one possible cause of a common effect has the result of 
diminishing the causal strength associated with other possible causes of that same effect. 
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1.7   Directed Structures, Part II: Causal and Diagnostic Reasoning Chains 
There are, of course, two additional directional structures (besides A ← B → C 
and A → B ← C) which can exist within a chain of three variables: namely the causal 
reasoning chain  A → B → C and the diagnostic reasoning chain A ← B ← C.  
Interestingly, as proven in the Appendix, these two directional structures actually share 
the same informational dynamics as the common cause structure (A ← B → C), namely 
the two terminal variables are dependent upon one another, but become independent once 
the value of the central variable (B) is either observed or is set through intervention.  
However, even without going through the specifics of the proof, we can observe this 
behavior by analyzing some very common marketing phenomena.   
For example, consider the causal reasoning chain shown in Figure 6, which 
models a possible consumer belief system for pain relievers.  For a consumer holding this 
belief structure, the brand of a pain reliever and the belief that this particular pain reliever 
will alleviate their headache are probabilistically dependent upon each other, but once it 
is known whether or not the pain reliever contains a particular active ingredient that the 
consumer believes is effective at headache reduction, the brand name of that medication 
becomes irrelevant to that consumer’s belief in whether or not the medication will relieve 
their headache.19  Hence in such a structure, we have that the two terminal variables in 
the chain are rendered independent of one another once the value of the central variable 
19 In this model, we are assuming that the consumer does not believe in any additional pathways from the 
brand to headache relief that do not pass through the ‘active ingredients’ node.  For example, we are 
assuming that such a consumer would not believe that some brands’ non-active ingredients (such as their 
‘fillers’ or pill coatings, etc.) or even their location of manufacture would influence the medication’s 
headache-reducing capacity.  (If the consumer were to hold such additional beliefs, we would need to 
add additional pathways to the model accordingly.) 
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in the chain becomes known (either through observation of the ingredients in a potential 
pain reliever choice, or through intervening to set the level of the central variable via 
limiting one’s consideration set to just those products which contain a certain level of a 
particular active ingredient).  In other words, within this causal reasoning chain structure, 
we have that  ( headache relief  ⫫  brand )  |  (active ingredients).  Of course, as this 
example illustrates, we have that in any causal reasoning chain  A → B → C, the two 
terminal variables A and C will be dependent in probability (A ∦ C), but are rendered 
independent once the value of B is observed or established through intervention, i.e.,             
the conditional independence relation  ( A ⫫ C ) | B  holds for this structure. 
 Now consider a scenario in which a consumer observes the ‘outcome’ of a causal 
chain structure, and wishes to utilize this information to reason about the state of the 
initial variable within that structure.  Such a case would occur, for instance, if the 
consumer in the previous example observed that a particular medication was able to 
relieve his or her headache, and was using this information to reason about the 
Brand active ingredients headache relief 
   
Figure 6.   Causal reasoning chain model for pain relievers 
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probability that the medication is likely to come from a particular brand.20  This example 
is illustrated in Figure 7 (in which the direction of inference is shown via dashed arrows).  
Since this reasoning problem runs in the opposite direction to the predictive or causal 
direction that exists in the structure, this is termed a diagnostic reasoning chain.   
To discuss the diagnostic reasoning pattern in this example, we have to assume 
that the consumer in question has two characteristics.  Firstly, we must assume that this 
consumer holds the corresponding  forward (or ‘predictive’) reasoning pattern (i.e., that 
the predictive relations from ‘brand’ to ‘active ingredients’ and from ‘active ingredients’ 
to ‘headache relief’ are valid).  Secondly, in order for this consumer to need to engage in 
diagnostic reasoning, we would have to assume that he or she is not certain of the 
medication’s brand, since otherwise he or she would have no need to reason 
diagnostically in the first place.  Since we are assuming that the consumer in this example 
is not certain of the medication’s brand, then he or she will simply have a belief 
20 For instance, we can suppose that this consumer took a pill from a collection of mixed medications that 
he or she had with them, or borrowed a pain reliever from a co-worker, etc. 
Brand active ingredients headache relief 
Figure 7.   Diagnostic reasoning chain model for pain relievers 
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distribution over the possible brands that this medication could be from.  In other words, 
this consumer would essentially have a prior probability that the medication comes from 
each particular possible brand.   
Diagnostic reasoning would then occur in this situation once the consumer learns 
of the headache-reducing capacity of this particular medication (for instance, by either 
taking the medication or by receiving reports from other sources about its headache-
reducing power, etc.).  Once this information about the medication’s headache-reducing 
power becomes known, the consumer is likely to revise his or her beliefs about the 
probability that the medication comes from each of the different possible brands.21              
This belief revision represents the diagnostic reasoning process.  In essence, information 
in this diagnostic reasoning chain ‘flows’ from the variable ‘headache relief’ to the 
variable ‘brand’, thereby modifying the consumer’s prior probability distribution over 
the various possible brands that the medication could have come from.   
As is proven in the Appendix, the flow of (diagnostic) information from the 
‘outcome’ (or ‘effect’) variable headache relief  towards the ‘predictive’ (or ‘causal’) 
variable (Brand) can proceed freely as long as the intermediate variable (active 
ingredients) is not observed or established at any particular value.  This conclusion is 
logical for a consumer who holds a belief pattern such as this, since once such a 
consumer knows whether or not the pain reliever contains a specific active ingredient, 
21 For example, if the medication is found to be quite effective at reducing the consumer’s headache 
symptoms, then this consumer would likely increase the probability that he or she places on the 
medication having come from an ibuprofen-containing brand (and concomitantly reduce the probability 
that he or she places on the medication coming from a non-ibuprofen-containing brand). 
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that consumer can make a conclusion about the likely brand of the medication without 
needing to know about its headache-reducing capacity.22   
 In essence, a diagnostic reasoning chain appears quite similar to a causal 
reasoning chain, in that both have chain configurations, both have the same conditional 
independence property (namely, A ⫫ C | B ), and in both structures the flow of 
information proceeds from one variable to a second variable, and then from that second 
variable to a third variable (i.e., both directed links point in the same direction).  
Therefore, the reason for distinguishing these two structures from one another lies not 
within their overall topology or conditional independence properties (which is the same 
in both cases), but rather because of the differences in the means by which information is 
updated in each structure.   
Within a causal chain such as the example in Figure 6, information is propagated 
in the same direction as the predictive or causal mechanism, and hence updates to either 
the terminal variable or the intermediate variable in this structure can be normatively 
computed simply by applying the distribution of that variable in the chain conditional on 
the observed (or fixed) value of the prior variable in the chain.  For instance, suppose that 
22 One might hypothesize that if the medication failed to alleviate the consumer’s headache, that this would 
provide additional information about the possible brand.  However, according to the belief system 
represented in this model, such an observation would essentially already be incorporated into the 
consumer’s conditional probability of headache relief given various levels of active ingredients (i.e., it 
would already have been incorporated into the consumer’s beliefs about the effectiveness of various 
active ingredients).  Therefore, such an observation (that the medication did or did not reduce the 
consumer’s headache) could alter the consumer’s beliefs about the possible active ingredient 
combinations that the medication may have.  However, once we assume that we know the particular 
active ingredient configuration of the medication, the additional headache reduction observation is 
rendered irrelevant to the deduction about the possible brand, since all it tells us is something about the 
possible active ingredient levels, which is something we would already know for certain (since we 
observed those active ingredient levels or set them through the construction of our consideration set). 
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a consumer perceives there to be four levels of headache relief (say: excellent, average, 
minimal, and none), and five values of the ‘active ingredients’ variable (say: low 
ibuprofen, high ibuprofen, low acetaminophen, high acetaminophen, and ‘other’).  
Furthermore, suppose that the consumer’s initial distribution of the headache relief 
variable is (α, β, γ, 1 – α – β – γ).  Now suppose that this consumer either observes or 
fixes the value of the ‘active ingredients’ variable to be ‘low ibuprofen’ (L.I. for short).  
This consumer’s updated distribution (conditional on active ingredients = L.I.) would 
become: ( P(relief=exc.| LI), P(relief=avg. | LI), P(relief=min,| LI), P(relief=none | LI) ), 
and these values would occupy the row in the conditional distribution table for the 
headache relief variable which is indicated by the value active ingredients = L.I. 
On the other hand, if a consumer observed the value of the headache relief 
variable and wanted to reason ‘back’ (i.e., diagnostically) to the likely value of the active 
ingredients variable, this diagnostic reasoning process would normatively proceed via 
Bayes’ theorem (rather than as a simple predictive conditional probability, as in the 
previous example).  For example, if the consumer’s level of headache relief was average 
(denoted by rel = avg), then his or her distribution of the active ingredients variable 
would (normatively) become updated from its prior distribution to a new distribution with 
parameter values such as: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ | 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)  =   𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 | 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ)  ∗  𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ) ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 | 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑗𝑗 𝑗𝑗 )    (1) 
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where “𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ” denotes a high level of ibuprofen, and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 denotes the 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ 
level of the active ingredients variable (and where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ corresponds to one possible 
value of 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗).  Of course, equation (1) only shows the updated value for the 
probability placed on ibuprofen = high by this consumer.  There would also be equivalent 
calculations for updating his or her perceived probabilities for the other possible values of 
the active ingredients variable once the consumer has experienced a particular level of 
headache relief. 
 In summary, we have seen that despite the differing process by which information 
is propagated in causal reasoning chains versus diagnostic reasoning chains, the overall 
conditional independence properties of these two structures are nonetheless the same.  
Specifically, given a causal reasoning chain A → B → C and a diagnostic reasoning chain 
A ← B ← C (for which A → B → C is the underlying ‘causal’ direction), we will have 
that in both cases, variables A and C will be rendered independent once the value of 
variable B is known or is fixed through an intervention, i.e., (A ⫫ C) | B  in both cases. 
 
1.8   Markov Equivalence  
As demonstrated in the previous section (and as proven in the Appendix), both the 
causal reasoning chain structure A → B → C and a diagnostic reasoning chain structure  
A ← B ← C share the same conditional independence property as the common cause 
structure A ← B → C, namely, the two terminal variables (A and C) in such structures 
are rendered independent once the value of the central variable B becomes known 
through either observation or intervention.  In other words, we have that (A ⫫ C) | B in 
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each of these three structures.  It is also true that without observation or intervention on 
variable B, the terminal variables A and C will be dependent in probability within each of 
these three structures.  Structures such as these which share the same conditional and 
marginal independence properties are termed Markov equivalent structures (c.f., Pearl, 
1988; Lauritzen, 1999; Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Furthermore, since all the structures 
within this Markov equivalence class share the same conditional independence property 
(A ⫫ C) | B, we can label the equivalence class via this conditional independence 
property that is shared by all its members, i.e., we can use the label {A ⫫ C | B} to refer 
collectively to this entire equivalence class of directed structures. 
From a marketing standpoint, the importance of identifying a structure’s Markov 
equivalence class is that each structure within the same Markov equivalence class will be 
indistinguishable based on observations alone.  In other words, no set of observations 
will be capable of singling out any particular member of a Markov equivalence class over 
any other member of that same Markov class (Lauritzen, 1999; Pearl, 2000). 
As an example of this remarkable fact, consider the three members of the Markov 
equivalence class {A ⫫ C | B} which was discussed earlier.  It can be demonstrated that 
any member of this Markov class can be transformed into any other member of this class 
through applications of probabilistic identities such as Bayes’ theorem.  For instance, 
suppose that we begin with the causal chain A → B → C and we wish to demonstrate that 
it can be transformed into the common cause structure A ← B → C.  Essentially, this can 
be accomplished via reversal of the A → B link in the structure A → B → C through 
Bayes’ theorem, which can be calculated as shown in Equations 2a through 2c, below. 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵, 𝐶𝐶) =   𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶|𝐵𝐵) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) (2a) 
 =   𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶|𝐵𝐵) ∗  𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)  ∗  𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)  𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) (2b) 
 =   𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶|𝐵𝐵) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) (2c) 
Note that the resulting factored distribution that occurs in Equation 2c corresponds to the 
common cause structure A ← B → C, and hence we have shown that the common cause 
structure can be derived from the causal chain structure.  In fact, as shown in Figure 8, we 
can utilize such Bayes’ theorem based transformations to convert any specific member of 
this Markov equivalence class into any other member of this same Markov class. 
 
Figure 8.   Equivalence of the members of the {A ⫫ C | B} Markov equivalence class  
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We can also examine these equivalences from a consumer’s standpoint.  For 
instance, consumers are likely to infer facts or properties about the relationships among 
the variables related to a product or brand based on the comparative rates at which these 
variables tend to occur or to co-occur within a set of observations (Hoch and Ha, 1986).  
Now consider the three members of the {A ⊥ C | B} Markov equivalence class, namely 
the common-cause structure (A ← B → C),  the causal chain (A → B → C) and the 
diagnostic chain (A ← B ← C).  In each case, the exogenous variable (namely variable B 
for the common effect structure, variable A for the causal chain, and variable C for the 
diagnostic chain) will tend to occur at its own specific exogenously determined rate, 
which the consumer will typically be interested in monitoring as a primary goal of his or 
her information acquisition process regarding this particular product or brand.  However, 
due to the directional relations among the variables in each of these structures, the rates 
of occurrence of the exogenous variable in each case will tend to get transmitted via the 
directed links within that structure to the variables which are probabilistically linked to 
those exogenous variables.  This rate of transmission of probabilistic information will 
then result in specific co-occurrence rates for each of the linked pairs of variables. 
For example, consider the common-cause structure (A ← B → C).  Assuming 
that the rates of spontaneous occurrence for each of the three variables are minimally 
correlated, then the rates of co-occurrence of variable pairs {B,C} and {A,B} will be 
controlled by the causal mechanisms B → C and B → A respectively.  Therefore, as long 
as these causal strengths are roughly comparable, the two variable pairs {B,C} and {A,B} 
will each occur at about the same rate as one another.  Similarly, in the causal reasoning 
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chain (A → B → C), variable A’s occurrence will lead to that of variable B, which in turn 
will lead to the occurrence of variable C, and hence each of the variable pairs {B,C} and 
{A,B} will once again occur at roughly equal rates.  Finally, in the diagnostic reasoning 
chain (A ← B ← C), the two variable pairs {B,C} and {A,B} will again occur with 
roughly equal rates, since the occurrence of variable C leads to that of B and A.23  Lastly, 
in all three structures, due to the roughly equal co-occurrence rates of variable pairs 
{B,C} and {A,B}, we will also see a significant correlation among all three variables in 
each structure.  Hence, just as each of these Markov equivalent structures can be 
transformed into one another through probabilistic equivalences, so too are these 
structures equally capable of supporting any particular set of observations.  A consumer 
observing these variables’ rates of co-occurrence would not be able to tell which of the 
Markov equivalent structures was actually the underlying mechanism which generated 
that set of product or brand-related observations. 
On the other hand, one can demonstrate that none of the three causal structures in 
the {A ⊥ C | B} Markov equivalence class can be transformed into a common-effect 
structure (such as the example involving the price of a stereo in Figure 5).  For instance, 
attempting to convert the causal chain structure A → B → C  into the common-effect 
structure  A → B ← C  by reversing the  B → C  link would result in the following series 
of algebraic transformations: 
 
 
23 This argument is a slight modification of that given in Steyvers, et al. (2003). 
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𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵, 𝐶𝐶) =   𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶|𝐵𝐵) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) (3a) 
 =    𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐶𝐶)  ∗  𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶)  𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) (3b) 
The resulting expression in Equation 3b does not further simplify, and is obviously not 
equivalent to the structure of the common-effect model A → B ← C, which has a joint 
probability distribution with a factored form that is given by the expression   
𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵, 𝐶𝐶)  =  𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐶𝐶) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶).  Therefore, the simple “reversal” of the  
B → C  link in the causal chain  A → B → C  does not result in the common-effect 
structure  A → B ← C .  Rather, these two are fundamentally different causal structures 
belonging to different Markov equivalence classes; one cannot be transformed into the 
other through probabilistic equivalences.24   
 Evidently, there is more to link directionality than just drawing arrows between 
variables.  There is an entire probabilistic structure “buried” within the structure of these 
links, and this probabilistic structure regulates when link reversal is possible and when it 
is not.  As shown, some link directions can be reversed without altering the conditional 
independence properties of the overall network (such as in the successful conversion of 
the causal chain  A → B → C  into the common-cause structure  A ← B → C), while 
24 Furthermore, from a consumer’s standpoint, if all three variables (A, B, and C) occur at independent 
rates, then in the case of a common-effect structure A → B ← C, the variable pairs {A,B} and {C,B} 
will also occur at differing rates (as dictated by the independent rates of occurrence of the exogenous 
variables A and C respectively).  Such differences in the rates of co-occurrence of the variable pairs 
{A,B} and {C,B} can therefore alert the consumer that there are likely to be two independent causal or 
directional mechanisms that can lead to variable B.  This differs significantly from the conclusions that 
can be drawn from any of the three members of the {A ⫫ C | B} Markov equivalence class discussed 
earlier, in which the variable pairs {A,B} and {C,B} will typically occur at equal rates within any of the 
three members of that equivalence class of directional structures. 
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other links cannot be reversed in this manner (such as in the failed attempt to convert the 
causal chain  A → B → C  into the common-effect structure  A → B ← C).  Link 
directionality is only “fungible” up to a certain point, but not beyond it.  Hence the 
introduction of directionality into an otherwise undirected brand concept map requires 
more than just an introduction of directional arrows where there formerly were none.  
Rather, there is an entirely different structural semantics in a directed network, namely a 
semantics dictated by the conditional independence properties of the data and the Markov 
equivalence properties of the resulting directed structures.   
 
2.   Bayesian Networks and Brand Concepts 
2.1   Observation, Intervention, and Markov Equivalence 
It is clear from our earlier discussion that consumers routinely view all manner of 
marketing phenomena as having directional properties.  However, as we have seen in the 
previous section, one cannot simply ‘introduce directions’ into an otherwise undirected 
brand concept network.  Rather, such directions interact with one another in a manner 
that is controlled by the conditional independence properties inherent in the data and the 
Markov equivalence classes to which the various directional structures and substructures 
within that network belong.  Hence it is critical to examine how consumers may interact 
with and utilize the directional structure of a brand concept network in order to enhance 
their understanding of the possible relations among a brand’s associations. 
For example, as we have seen, the various directional structures that can exist 
within a directional network can be grouped into Markov equivalence classes, each of 
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which contains structures that cannot be distinguished from one another based on sets of 
observations of the variables involved.  However, consumers depend on understanding 
causal structures in order to be able to determine which variables to manipulate or select 
in order to create conditions which favor specific desired outcomes (Hoch and Deighton, 
1989).  Furthermore, consumers also depend on understanding causal relations among 
brand-related variables in order to attribute credit or blame for either good or poor 
product or brand performance (Folkes, 1988; Weiner, 2000).  Hence, the fact that 
directional structures within a brand concept network cannot be distinguished beyond the 
level of a group of Markov equivalent structures might be regarded as problematic by a 
consumer who wishes to determine which variables or variable levels to select when 
assembling a consideration set for a particular purchase, or when making an attributional 
determination concerning a particular product or brand. 
If the various directional structures within a Markov equivalence class all 
represented the same set of causal or predictive relationships, then the observational 
indistinguishability of the structures within such an equivalence class would not pose a 
problem.  However, Markov equivalent structures typically do not indicate the same set 
of causal or directed relationships.  For example, both the causal chain A → B → C and 
the common effect A → B ← C are members of the same Markov equivalence class 
(namely the class {A ⊥ C | B}), yet each of these structures will clearly indicate a 
different set of causal relationships between the three brand associations A, B, and C.   
Interestingly however, even though the structures within the same Markov class 
are indistinguishable through observations alone, consumers can actually “peer into” 
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Markov equivalence classes and begin to differentiate among the various constituent 
causal structures by combining observations of these variables with interventions on one 
or more of those variables.  For example, consider the causal chain A → B → C and the 
common-cause structure  A ← B → C.  As argued previously, if we passively observe the 
patterns of co-occurrence of the variables within these structures, the source of variation 
will reside in the exogenous variable in each case, and since each of these exogenous 
variables is either a direct or indirect cause of the other two variables in its respective 
causal structure, then under observational conditions we would simply expect to see all 
three variables in each structure either become jointly activated or remain jointly 
inactivated.  However, if a consumer intervenes to set the level of one or more variables 
rather than letting an exogenous cause generate the chosen activation levels, then that 
consumer should be able to discern one causal structure from another, even in cases 
where the respective causal structures belong to the same Markov equivalence class, and 
hence are observationally indistinguishable from one another.   
 As an example, consider a consumer evaluating a set of products, each of which 
has some probability of possessing three binary attributes A, B, and C.  As we have 
already argued, no amount of observation of different product exemplars will be 
sufficient to guarantee that this consumer can distinguish among the three potential 
generative causal models  (causal chain, diagnostic chain, and common cause) belonging 
to the { A ⊥ C | B } Markov equivalence class.  However, suppose that our consumer 
intervenes upon the causal structure by, for example, considering only those products 
which are known to possess attribute B.  In such a case, rather than allowing exogenous 
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conditions to determine whether or not attribute B is present, the consumer himself has 
set the ‘level’ (or ‘value’) of attribute B to ‘on’.    
 Now consider the effect that this intervention by our consumer has upon the three 
different observationally indistinguishable causal structures belonging to the {A ⊥ C | B} 
Markov equivalence class.  Since the level of attribute B is now established by the choice 
of the consumer, all other causal influences on the value of this attribute are effectively 
eliminated from consideration.  For example, if the true underlying structure were 
actually a causal chain  ( A → B → C ),  then the causal influence  A → B  of attribute A 
upon the value of attribute B is eliminated by this consumer’s intervention to ‘fix’ the 
level of attribute B to ‘on’ (e.g., through refinement of his consideration set to just those 
products known to possess attribute B).  Similar considerations also apply as well when 
considering the effect of such an intervention upon the other members of this equivalence 
class of otherwise observationally indistinguishable causal (or ‘generative’) structures 
that potentially underlie the observed set of interdependencies among product attributes 
A, B, and C.   
 One can, in fact, determine that our consumer’s intervention upon this set of 
observationally indistinguishable generative structures serves to split this single Markov 
equivalence class into three separate equivalence classes, each of which is now 
observationally distinguishable from the others (c.f., Steyvers et al., 2003).  The main 
principle underlying such a transformation is that by fixing the level of an attribute (such 
as attribute B in this case) to a specific level, the consumer is effectively eliminating the 
effects of all other variables that are graphical parents of the intervened-on variable, but 
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is maintaining the causal effect of the intervened-on variable upon all of its graphical 
children (e.g., Pearl, 2000).  For example, in the case of the consumer who fixes the value 
of variable B by considering only those products known to possess attribute B, the single 
Markov equivalence class { A ⊥ C | B } of underlying generative causal structures is split 
into three different causal structures, as shown in Figure 9, below.25 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 An alternate version of this diagram can be found in Steyvers, et al. (2003). 
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Figure 9.   Splitting the equivalence class {A ⊥ C | B} through intervention on B 
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As Figure 9 illustrates, a consumer who intervenes to ‘fix’ the value of variable B 
(for instance by limiting his consideration set to just those products containing attribute 
B) will observe one of three different resulting patterns of dependence.  In the leftmost 
case shown in Figure 9, we are assuming that the member of the Markov equivalence 
class { A ⊥ C | B } which was responsible for the observed correlation among attributes 
A, B, and C is the causal chain structure  A → B → C.  Since the consumer has selected 
only those product exemplars which possess attribute B, the presence or absence of 
variable A no longer plays a causal role in influencing whether or not these exemplars 
will possess attribute B (since they already do possess the attribute).  Therefore, such a 
consumer will observe that attributes B and C tend to occur together, but that attribute A 
occurs with its original exogenously determined frequency which is unrelated to the 
occurrence of attributes B and C.  This would be akin to a consumer who evaluates a 
particular category of products and notices a correlation between the perceived price level 
(high/low), the perceived quality (high/low), and the perceived channel exclusivity 
(high/low) for these products.  Should such a consumer find that upon considering only 
those products perceived to be of high quality, that price is no longer related to channel 
exclusivity, he or she would likely conclude that it was quality all along that had driven 
channel choice, rather than the price itself driving channel choice directly. 
 In a similar manner, should the underlying generative structure in Figure 9 be the 
right-hand causal structure  C → B → A  (the so-called diagnostic reasoning chain), 
intervention by the consumer to fix the level of attribute B would result in attribute B   
co-occurring with attribute A, but attribute C becoming unrelated to the frequency of 
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occurrence of either of these two other variables.  On the other hand, should the 
underlying causal model actually be the common-cause structure shown in the middle of 
Figure 9, intervention to select only products possessing attribute B would not make any 
change to the observed relationships among these three variables.  The occurrence of 
variable B will still drive the occurrence of both attribute A and attribute C, and since 
attribute B is the exogenous variable in this causal system, all three attributes will tend to 
occur together.   
In terms of the previously discussed consumer who is evaluating a particular class 
of products and who believes there to be a correlation between the price level, the quality, 
and the channel exclusivity for these products, his or her intervention upon this product 
category through considering only those products containing attribute B (high quality) 
would, in the case of the common-cause structure shown in the middle of Figure 9, still 
result in all three attributes (price, quality, exclusivity) occurring together.  Since 
restricting the value of the ‘quality’ attribute to ‘on’ has not disturbed the rates of co-
occurrence of the different variable pairs in this system, such a consumer would likely 
conclude that the intervened-upon variable ‘product quality’ was a common cause of the 
other observed variables rather than being an effect of either one of them.  After all, if a 
variable (such as variable B in the causal structures in Figure 9) were an effect of one or 
more other variables (such as variables A or C for instance), then fixing the level of 
variable B should indeed serve to break the dependence of variable B upon the values of 
those supposed causes.   
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 Interestingly, consumers do not necessarily have to actually perform interventions 
such as this, which serve to ‘fix’ the values of particular variables or attributes at certain 
levels, in order to reason about their likely effects.  Rather, such reasoning on the part of 
consumers can be counterfactual in nature (McGill, 2000).  For instance, a consumer in 
the previous example would not necessarily need to purchase items for which the value of 
attribute ‘B’ (high quality) is set to ‘on’ in order to reason about the likely effect of such a 
restriction.  Rather, he or she can merely consider what would happen if such a restriction 
were to be made (Krishnamurthy and Sivaraman, 2002).  In fact, consumer theorizing and 
fantasizing about the potential effects of various consumption choices is an important 
determinant of consumer preference and satisfaction (Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982), 
and more generally, counterfactual thinking is known to be a core component of normal 
cognitive and social functioning (Summerville and Roese, 2008). 
 Counterfactual reasoning can be considered as a form of “guided thought 
experiment” in which events that are potential causes of other events are mentally 
negated (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1982; Klayman & Ha, 1987)) or mentally enacted or 
‘set’ to specific values (Dunning & Parpal, 1989;  Markman et al., 2007) and the effect of 
this intervention on other causally related variables is assessed.  We can utilize such 
counterfactual manipulations to mentally “test” which possible causal structures from 
among a group of observationally equivalent models is the most plausible based on the 
data or our general knowledge and beliefs about the causal domain (Woodward, 2003).  
The notion of testing which directional structure from within a class of 
observationally equivalent structures is likely responsible for generating a set of 
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observations quite closely parallels the differences between observational findings and 
experimental findings within the process of normal scientific investigation (Woodward, 
2007).   Specifically, within an observational study, one can only ascertain that certain 
values of one event or variable tend to occur within the same datum as certain values of 
another event or variable, i.e., a correlational finding.  In order to make the claim that 
manipulation of an independent variable will affect a specific dependent variable, one 
must intervene on that structure (Babbie, 1998).   
More specifically, in a controlled scientific intervention, one changes the 
independent variable from value x to value y, but all other relationships are kept intact.  
On the other hand, in a correlational study, one does not know what other changes are 
occurring in the system, and therefore one does not have license to make the 
counterfactual assertion that had the independent variable not changed from value x  to 
value y, the dependent variable would not have changed from a to b.  In other words, 
whereas a correlational finding allows us to say what we observed happening in an 
undisturbed system, a causal finding allows us to make counterfactual claims about what 
would and would not happen among several different possible scenarios that differ from 
one another in specific and known ways (Hunt 1991: 112).  As Roese & Olson (1996) 
summarize the matter, “asserting that the addition or deletion of antecedent X ‘undoes’ 
outcome Y leads to the causal attribution that X caused Y.”       
Within the consumer behavior literature, Hoch and Ha (1986) point out that 
consumers treat informational claims in the marketplace as tentative hypotheses about 
specific products, brands, and services, and then make purchase and usage choices which 
61 
 
act as specific tests of these hypotheses.  Hoch and Deighton (1989) add that consumers 
actively construct hypotheses as sets of  “ ‘if p then q’ condition-action rules” created 
through the processes of abduction and generalization, and then inductively strengthened 
through subsequent product experience.  Eisenstein and Hutchinson (2006) describe such 
experiential market-based learning as “action-based” learning, which is the result of 
“repeatedly making decisions about concrete actions and then observing the outcomes.”   
Furthermore, as argued by Lagnado et al. (2007), the fact that interventions are freely-
chosen human actions allows individuals to create a quasi-experimental conditions since 
such freely-chosen human actions are essentially an intuitive means for individuals to 
remove or reduce confounds.  Even more generally, as Lagnado and Sloman (2004) state,  
We are continually conducting informal experiments of our own to learn about the 
world around us.  We remove items from our diet to see what is making us 
unhealthy or overweight, we tinker with new software programs to see what does 
what, we experiment with different ingredients in search of a tasty meal.   
(Lagnado and Sloman, 2004, p. 856) 
Hence individual decision makers also manipulate their environment in an attempt to 
determine which choices lead to which outcomes, and thus which member of a set of 
observationally indistinguishable causal structures is the most likely generative 
mechanism that is operative within a product or brand domain.  We are all informal 
scientists in this respect. 
 Furthermore, since the determination of causal structure is so paramount for 
consumers’ understanding and decision-making processes (Folkes, 1988; Weiner, 2000), 
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it stands to reason that any structures which can regulate or determine when consumers 
will require the use of interventional reasoning in order to ascertain needed facts about a 
market will be of paramount importance.  Clearly, the notion of when various market 
configurations are observationally (or correlationally) indistinguishable from one another 
is such a critical construct, since this will determine when consumers are most likely to 
intervene and make choices in a market.  As we have seen, observationally or 
correlationally indistinguishable structures are known as Markov equivalent structures, 
and hence the Markov equivalence construct provides an essential framework for 
understanding both the rationale and intended content of consumers’ marketplace 
interventions. 
 
2.2    Bayesian Networks and the Screening-Off Condition 
 Our main goal in this thesis is to determine an appropriate directional semantics 
for understanding consumers’ brand constructs.  Hence it will be quite useful to place 
some fairly commonsense limits on the types of directed structures which we will utilize 
to model such marketing-related phenomena.  Specifically, in this thesis we will limit our 
modeling focus to the most widely-used category of directed structures, namely the 
category of Bayesian networks. 
As defined by Pearl (1988), a Bayesian network is a directional model in which 
each node represents a variable from the domain being modeled, and the links between 
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nodes represent directional influences between the variables connected by that link.26  In 
addition, a Bayesian network must possess the following three regularity properties: 
(1) The graphical structure must not contain any directed ‘cycles’ (i.e., it contains no 
‘infinite loops’). This condition is meant to insure that there is a clear flow of 
information among the variables within the domain, and information never gets 
‘trapped’ inside an infinite regress or continual ‘loop’.  Directed graphical 
structures with no such infinitely repeating loops are called Directed Acyclic 
Graphs (or DAG’s for short).  Hence this condition can be summarized by saying 
that a Bayesian network must have a DAG structure. 
(2) Within a Bayesian network graphical structure, the immediate graphical ‘parents’ 
of a variable must be capable of rendering that variable independent of all other 
variables besides its effects (or graphical “children”).  This condition is generally 
known as the causal Markov condition (Pearl, 1988), or the screening-off 
condition (Sloman, 2005).  Hence, under this condition, once the state of a 
variable’s parents is known, the only remaining way to affect the state of that 
variable is through diagnostic reasoning ‘backwards’ from its effects, or graphical 
‘children’.  Therefore, under this condition, we are able to avoid having to reason 
through lengthy chains of indirect causal influences in order to determine the 
value of a particular variable (Sloman, 2005).   
26 Some authors also require that the network parameters of the form P(Xi | pa(Xi))  also be fully specified.  
In other words, there is both a qualitative component of a Bayesian network which consists of that 
network’s overall topology and directional structure, and a quantitative component which consists of the 
resulting conditional distributions at each node of that network (e.g., Pearl, 1988). 
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(3) All probabilistic independencies that exist among the variables in the causal graph 
must be the result of the structure of the connections among the variables in the 
graph, and not due to any unusual (or “unstable”) coincidences of the various 
marginal and conditional probabilities involved.  Formally, this condition is 
known as causal faithfulness, and it is meant to rule out “accidental” 
independencies, such as would be the case, for instance, if two different causal 
pathways with precisely opposite weights connected two variables A and B within 
a causal model, so that the effects of the two different causal pathways exactly 
cancel each other out.  Such an apparent independence between A and B would 
merely be the result of a coincidental (and unstable) set of parameter values, and 
hence would not be the result of an application of the causal Markov condition to 
the structure of the corresponding causal graph.  Such coincidental and unstable 
arrangements are precisely what the faithfulness condition guards against.  In this 
sense, the faithfulness condition simply reflects people’s natural desire to base 
their perceptions of a domain upon stable generative mechanisms rather than upon 
rare numerical coincidences (Sloman, 2005). 
From a consumer modeling standpoint, the most important of these three 
properties is the causal Markov condition, since this property delineates precisely why a 
Bayesian network forms a much more cognitively efficient model of human reasoning 
within probabilistic domains as compared to an undirected graphical model of that same 
domain.  For instance, consider a set of variables X = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}, where n may be 
a fairly large number if this domain is reasonably large.  In general the joint probability 
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distribution P(X) of this set of variables would need to be expressed using the chain rule 
of probability as:   
P(X)  =  P(Vn | V1, V2, . . . , Vn-1) P(Vn-1 | V1, V2, . . . , Vn-2)  · · ·  P(V2 | V1) P(V1) (4) 
 
Even in the ‘best case scenario’ in which each variable in this domain is binary, such a 
computation would still require an immense number of probabilities to be estimated from 
the data, and it is difficult to imagine a typical consumer being able to cognitively 
manage such a computation at all, much less within the time frame allotted to typical 
shopping decisions involving domain variables such as these.  On the other hand, if these 
variables exist within a Bayesian network representation of the domain, then due to the 
causal Markov condition, the overall probability distribution P(X) can simply be 
expressed as  P(X) =  ∏ P( Vi | pa(Vi) )𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , where pa(Vi) denotes the graphical ‘parents’ 
(i.e., the immediate graphical ancestors) of variable Vi within the Bayesian network 
representation (Pearl, 1988; Lauritzen, 1999; Koller and Friedman, 2009).   
For example, consider the Bayesian network example given in Figure 10. 27    
Even in the ‘best’ case, in which all fourteen variables are binary, computation of the   
full joint probability distribution in this domain would require over 16,000 probabilities 
to be estimated (and the problem gets exponentially worse if one or more of the variables 
involved contains more than just two possible values).  In fact, by the chain rule of 
27 Note that even though there is a ‘loop’ structure in this network configuration, the directions within the 
loop do not allow one to ‘cycle around’ forever.  Hence this loop structure is not a directed cycle, and 
therefore this structure is a directed acyclic graph (or DAG). 
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probability, the full expression for the probability distribution P(X) for this entire joint 
density would take the form: 
P(M|A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K,L) P(L|A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K) · · · P(B|A) P(A)        (5) 
However, by employing the causal Markov condition within this Bayesian 
network representation, we can reduce this enormous multivariate density containing 
over 16,000 parameters to a simple product of very small local distributions, each of 
which typically involves just a few variables and a correspondingly small number of 
parameters.  For example, since variable M has only one graphical parent, we do not need 
to condition its distribution on all 13 remaining variables (as is done in the first factor in 
Equation 5).  Rather, we can simply condition variable M on its single graphical parent, 
variable K.  Similar reductions are possible throughout this Bayesian network.  In fact, by 
using the causal Markov property, one can reduce the massive probability density 
expression in Equation 5 to the much simpler expression given in Equation 6 (in which 
we have omitted the symbol “P” in front of each argument for compactness sake). 
(A) (B|A) (C|B) (D|C) (E|C) (F|B,D) (G|F) (H|G) (I|H) (J) (K|G,J) (L|J) (M|K) (N|I)      (6) 
 
 
Figure 10.   Bayesian network example with 14 variables 
A B F G J L 
C 
E 
D K M 
H I N 
67 
 
Note that the reduction of the full density expression of Equation 5 to the much 
simpler representation of Equation 6 is possible because the Bayesian network 
representation replaces each global factor in the full expression by a much more compact 
local factor.  This is achieved because the Markov condition in a Bayesian network 
enables the parent nodes of a variable to render that child node independent of the effects 
of any of its nondescendant nodes (including additional ‘ancestor’ nodes which lead to 
that child node’s parents), and hence the only knowledge that is necessary to specify the 
distribution of a node within a Bayesian network is the conditional distribution of that 
node given the various states of its direct parent nodes, along with the state of those 
parent nodes.  Complex, global factors become reduced to simple, local factors defined 
over far fewer nodes.  For example, whereas a direct determination of the full joint 
distribution over the 14 variables shown in Figure 10 would require specification of over 
16,000 parameters (even in the ‘best case’ scenario of completely binary variables), the 
causal Markov condition applied to the corresponding Bayesian network allows us to 
reduce this number to merely 30 parameters required to fully specify the joint 
distribution.   
 Now consider the reasoning task required of a consumer scanning the myriad 
products available in a typical supermarket trip, for instance.  As commented before, such 
a consumer routinely encounters tens of thousands of products in a typical shopping 
exercise such as this (Broniarczyk, 2006), and hence an undirected and/or minimally 
structured cognitive framework that represents the various brands, products, and related 
characteristics involved in a shopping scenario such as this would almost certainly be 
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beyond the ability of any consumer to fully comprehend.  Hence a natural question to ask 
is whether such a consumer could potentially employ a similar complexity-reduction 
strategy to that utilized within a Bayesian network in order to effectively reduce this 
incomprehensibly large set of product and attribute combinations to a manageable and 
much more cognitively tractable structure.    
Clearly, a consumer is unlikely to derive and parameterize a Bayesian network.  
However, consider the fact that the operative principle which enables a Bayesian network 
to drastically simplify the representation of a domain is that of conditional independence.  
For instance, when a Bayesian network representation reduces a complex global set of 
factors to a much simpler set of local factors computed over a far smaller set of nodes, 
such a reduction is afforded by the ability of the graphical parents of a node to render 
their child node conditionally independent of all other nodes which are not descendants 
of that child node in question. 
Interestingly, human reasoners do routinely utilize an intuitive cognitive analog of 
the conditional independence relation: namely the principle of conditional irrelevance.  
This principle allows a reasoner to decide that knowledge of the state of one or more 
variables is sufficient to allow other variables to be effectively ignored (or severely 
discounted in importance).  For instance, consider the following example described by 
Pearl (1988): 
A person who is reluctant to estimate the probability of being burglarized the next 
day or of having a nuclear war within five years can nevertheless state with ease 
whether the two events are dependent, namely, whether knowing the truth of one 
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proposition will alter the belief in the other.  Likewise, people tend to judge the 
three-place relationship of conditional dependency (i.e., X influences Y, given Z) 
with clarity, conviction, and consistency.  For example, knowing the time of the 
last pickup from a bus stop is undeniably relevant for assessing how long we must 
wait for the next bus.  However, once we learn the whereabouts of the next bus, 
the previous knowledge no longer provides useful information.                        
(Pearl, 1988, p. 79) 
In this example, the time of the last pickup and the time of the next pickup are 
certainly correlated variables: knowing that the last pickup was recent reduces the 
probability that the next bus will arrive soon.  However, once we learn the location of the 
next bus, the variable “time of last pickup” no longer influences the variable “time of 
next pickup”.  Stated another way, these two variables have become conditionally 
independent given this additional piece of knowledge.  Statistically, this conditional 
irrelevance relationship is:  𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 ⫫  𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  |  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑥𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝.   
Similarly, in a marketing context, a consumer might believe that the price of a 
product and the level of quality of that product are correlated, but become independent 
once we know that the product comes from a specific brand.  For instance, such a 
consumer might think that generally, the more expensive an automobile is, the higher 
quality it is likely to have.  However, this consumer might also believe that once he or 
she knows the car is a BMW, then price no longer determines quality for this car because 
he or she feels that all BMW automobiles are of high quality, and within the BMW brand, 
higher price just buys more features but not additional quality.  Hence, the brand concept 
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map for such a consumer should contain the conditional independence property:   
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 ⫫  𝑞𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦  |  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵. 
At an even more basic level, consider the simple act of ignoring certain product or 
brand attributes altogether.  For example, some types of consumers tend to ignore 
packaging differences among products.  However, rather than being a unary relation of 
the form “packaging is irrelevant”, this phenomenon may actually be a trinary relation of 
the form “given the product’s ingredients, the packaging becomes irrelevant to the 
expected performance of the product.” 28  In more generality, if some product or brand 
feature is considered irrelevant by a consumer, it must be irrelevant to something, i.e., 
irrelevant to some particular desired state that the consumer is seeking with regards to 
that product.  However, even a feature that is considered irrelevant by the consumer is 
still associated with that product or brand in some manner (since otherwise it would not 
be considered a brand or product feature, irrelevant or otherwise).  Hence such a feature 
could, in theory, have some relevance to that desired state or end goal.  It is merely that 
some other product or brand feature provides enough of a clue to that desired state or end 
goal to render any additional clues irrelevant in the mind of the consumer.29, 30   
28 After all, if the ingredients were completely unknown, then aspects of the packaging might become a 
secondary source of clues about the product’s intended positioning or functioning. 
29 In fact, this conditional irrelevance construct (i.e., aspect x is irrelevant to goal y in the presence of 
another aspect z) may be so innate or so deeply embedded within the means by which we cognitively 
deal with large consumption domains that we typically take it for granted that a feature that is considered 
irrelevant is relegated to such irrelevance by the presence of other features which are more indicative 
(either predictively or diagnostically) of the desired goal being sought with such a product or brand. 
30 It could be that some product or brand features are truly irrelevant ab initio.  However, we maintain that a 
significant number of product or brand features may be irrelevant to a desired state or end goal because 
the presence of some other product or brand feature renders them irrelevant.  Hence, the delineation of 
how the conditional irrelevance construct interacts with other aspects of consumers’ brand concepts may 
offer a valuable contribution to the understanding of the motivations and decision-making apparatus that 
drive consumption decisions. 
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In conclusion, what we have argued for here is the notion that the same ‘screening 
off’ process that allows a Bayesian network model of a consumption domain to reduce a 
set of complex global factors to a much simpler set of small, local factors, thereby 
rendering the joint density of those marketplace variables much more readily computable 
is precisely the same construct that allows consumers to ‘screen off’ many product or 
brand characteristics, thereby rendering a massively complex consumption domain 
cognitively tractable.  Thus, we are arguing that the relation which a statistician terms 
conditional independence is also conceived of by consumers in a more innate fashion as 
simply ‘conditional irrelevance’, i.e., the notion that knowing some brand or product 
characteristics renders many other such characteristics irrelevant to the main goals being 
sought through that product’s consideration or purchase. 
 
2.3   Variable Separation Within Directed Structures 
 As we have seen in the preceding sections, the information semantics within a 
directed network are quite different than they are within an undirected network.  For 
instance, the directions of the links in a Bayesian network representation of a domain 
entail specific conditional and marginal independence properties among those domain 
variables.  Since the property of conditional independence is a three-place relation             
(i.e., X is independent of Y given Z), these conditional and marginal independence 
properties are graphically encoded within several basic three-variable directed structures 
that exist within a Bayesian network, namely the causal chain (𝐴𝐴 → 𝐵𝐵 → 𝐶𝐶), the 
diagnostic chain (𝐴𝐴 ← 𝐵𝐵 ← 𝐶𝐶), the common-cause structure (𝐴𝐴 ← 𝐵𝐵 → 𝐶𝐶), and the 
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common-effect (or ‘collider’) structure (𝐴𝐴 → 𝐵𝐵 ← 𝐶𝐶).  However, once we assemble these 
more basic structures into a larger-scale Bayesian network model, the various conditional 
and marginal independence properties represented by these basic structures can interact 
in more complex ways, making it difficult to judge specifically when one variable or set 
of variables can probabilistically “shield” one group of product or brand associations 
from the effects of the other such associations.  In order to determine the resulting 
independence properties of the resulting structure, there must be a single criterion which 
can determine when two variables (or sets of variables) anywhere in the network are 
probabilistically separated from one another.31  Such a criterion is known as the directed 
separation principle (or “d-separation” for short), e.g., Pearl (1988; 1990).   
To understand the d-separation principle, recall that for a chain connection (either 
a causal chain or a diagnostic chain), information propagation becomes blocked if we 
observe (or set) the value of the central variable in the chain.  Also recall that for a 
common cause structure (𝐴𝐴 ← 𝐵𝐵 → 𝐶𝐶), information propagation is also ‘blocked’ by 
knowledge of the value of the central variable in the connection.  However, within a 
convergent connection (i.e., a common effect structure, or ‘unshielded collider’, such as  
𝐴𝐴 → 𝐵𝐵 ← 𝐶𝐶 ), information propagation is facilitated by knowledge of the value or 
distribution of the central variable, but is blocked when the value or distribution of the 
central variable is not known.  Based on these principles, we can elucidate a global 
criterion which can determine when two variables or sets of variables anywhere in the 
31 Note that if two variables (or sets of variables) are probabilistically separated from one another, then they 
are conditionally independent given the values of the variables which separate them.  Thus, this 
separation criterion can also be referred to by the conditional independence properties that it 
encompasses. 
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network are probabilistically separated (and hence are conditionally independent).  This 
directed separation (or ‘d-separation’) principle can be stated as follows (Korb and 
Nicholson, 2004): 
d-separation principle 32 : 
Given variables X and Y, along with a set of variables Z disjoint from both X and 
Y, the variables X and Y are d-separated given Z if and only if all paths Φ between 
X and Y are “cut” by one or more of the following graph-theoretic conditions: 
1.     Φ contains a chain  A → B → C  or  A ← B ← C  such that  B∈Z. 
2.     Φ contains a common-cause connection  A ← B → C  such that B∈Z. 
3.     Φ contains an unshielded collider (or ‘immorality’)  A → B ← C  such that 
neither B nor any of B’s descendants is in Z. 
Note that these three conditions are essentially just formalizations of the separation 
properties which we have previously discussed for the four different types of directed 
triples that can exist within a Bayesian network.  For example, Conditions (1) and (2) 
merely state that if a path between variables X and Y contains a subgraph that is isomorphic 
to either a causal chain, a diagnostic chain, or a common cause structure in which the 
central variable belongs to the putative separating set Z, then that separating set Z is 
capable of blocking information transmission along this path.  Similarly, Condition (3) 
states that if a path between variables X and Y contains a subgraph that is isomorphic to an 
32 There are several equivalent statements of the d-separation criterion, as well as an alternative means of 
detecting conditional probabilistic independence, termed the directed global Markov condition.  A more 
complete discussion of these various additional methods for determining when information propagation 
between two groups of variables is blocked can be found in the Appendix. 
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unshielded common effect structure, then the lack of an observation of the value of the 
central variable in this structure or any of its descendants can block information 
transmission along this path.   
What is truly interesting about the d-separation principle is that by formalizing 
these earlier observations about the separation properties engendered by each of the 
different three-variable directed substructures, this principle allows one to formalize the 
relation between the topological properties of the graph and the properties of those 
probability distributions which describe the conditional and marginal probabilities at each 
node of that graph.  Specifically, it can be shown (e.g., Verma and Pearl, 1988; Pearl, 
Geiger, and Verma, 1989; Geiger and Pearl, 1990; Pearl, 2000) that if a probability 
distribution over the variables in a particular Bayesian network generates conditional and 
marginal probability values at each node which satisfy the causal Markov condition with 
respect to that network, then the relation between conditional independence and the              
d-separation property within that network is both sound and complete: every d-separation 
in the network will represent a true conditional independency within that probability 
distribution, and every conditional independency in that distribution will be identified by 
the d-separation principle as applied to that network. 
Another interesting fact related to directed separation within Bayesian network 
models is that due to the probabilistic differences between directed and undirected 
structures, d-separation and ‘regular’ (i.e., ‘undirected’) graphical separation do not always 
coincide.  For instance, looking at the sample Bayesian network of Figure 10, it turns out 
that despite “appearing” like a separator of sorts, variable 𝐾𝐾 does not actually d-separate 
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variable 𝐺𝐺 from variable 𝐽𝐽, since variable 𝐾𝐾 occurs in an unshielded collider (or common 
effect) configuration, and hence knowledge of variable 𝐾𝐾 will actually facilitate 
information propagation between variable 𝐺𝐺 and variable 𝐽𝐽.  On the other hand, variable 𝐾𝐾 
does d-separate variable 𝐺𝐺 and variable 𝐵𝐵, since the single path from 𝐺𝐺 to 𝐵𝐵 (namely the 
pathway 𝐺𝐺 → 𝐾𝐾 → 𝐵𝐵) is a causal chain, and as such, would be blocked by knowledge of 
the value of variable 𝐾𝐾.  Additionally, one can say that variables 𝐺𝐺 and 𝐽𝐽 are 
unconditionally d-separated (i.e., d-separated given ∅) since without knowledge of the 
value of the collider at variable 𝐾𝐾, there would be no way for 𝐺𝐺 and 𝐽𝐽 to probabilistically 
communicate.   
Within a marketing domain, such considerations can be quite relevant because they 
provide practical guidelines for dealing with the introduction of directionality into 
otherwise undirected models.  For instance, consider a situation in which a firm’s product 
or brand has a set of established associations, and there is an additional influence on 
several of those variables (e.g., from a competing firm’s actions, etc.) which the firm 
wishes to curtail.  If this collection of brand associations is considered as an undirected 
network (such as would be the case via utilizing a modeling procedure such as the BCM) 
one might end up with a model such as that shown in the left panel of Figure 11.  Within 
this model, let us assume that brand association B is a strategically central association that 
the firm wishes to protect, but which is not easily manipulable.  Based on this undirected 
model, the firm’s strategy seems simple: by fixing the values of attributes A and C, one 
would presumably block the ability for information from association E to enter this 
reasoning chain and influence variable B.   
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However, if the underlying model is a directed one (in which reasoning in one 
direction is predictive and reasoning in the opposite direction is diagnostic in nature), then 
the situation would actually be more appropriately modeled by the diagram shown in the 
right panel of Figure 11.  In this case, fixing the values of attributes A and C would not 
serve to d-separate the strategically critical association B from the new association E.  In 
fact, if the firm responded to this threat by fixing the values of attributes A and C, they 
would actually be creating a situation where attribute E and attribute B can become 
probabilistically related through the collider structure at attribute C.  In a competitive 
situation such as this, the firm’s best strategy would be to fix the value of just brand 
association A, and to try to make the value of brand association C (as well as any of its 
descendants, such as association D, etc.) as vague as possible in the mind of the consumer. 
  
Figure 11.    Directed and undirected models of a brand association scenario 
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2.4    Markov Equivalence and Causal Variation 
 Now that we have introduced the definition of a Bayesian network as a specific 
form of directed network that possesses certain regularity properties, and we have 
examined the associated constructs of directed separation between variables and the 
screening-off (or conditional irrelevance) property, we can apply these concepts to the 
elucidation of some truly novel and quite surprising marketing-related ramifications of 
the Markov (i.e., observational) equivalence of brand concept structures.    
To begin with, there is a surprising set of criteria for determining precisely when 
two or more directed structures are Markov equivalent (i.e., when the structures encode 
the same set of conditional dependencies and independencies).  To describe these criteria, 
we make the following two definitions: first, we define the skeleton of a Bayesian 
network to be the undirected structure that represents the link topology, with all notions 
of directionality removed.  (In other words, the skeleton of a directed network structure is 
the undirected analog of that directed structure.)  Secondly, we must single out one 
particular form of directed link configuration: a common-effect structure in which the 
two “parent” variables (or “causes”) of the common effect are not themselves directly 
connected to one another.  Such a configuration is often called an immorality within the 
Bayes net literature (since within such a structure, the two “parents” of the common 
effect, or “child”, are “unmarried”).33    
33 Such a structure is sometimes also given the more prosaic name “uncovered collider or “v-structure”. 
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With these two definitions, we can now state the following criteria for Markov 
equivalence. 
Verma-Pearl Criteria for Markov Equivalence: 
Two directed acyclic graphs (DAG’s) will be Markov equivalent if and only if 
they have the same skeleton, and the same set of immoralities.                                     
(Verma and Pearl, 1990, p. 224) 
To illustrate the usefulness of the Verma-Pearl criteria for Markov equivalence, 
let us apply them to a realistic example of a consumer belief structure.  For this purpose, 
consider the expository belief structure for Trader Joe’s cereal shown in Figure 12, 
below.  In this case, there is one core product (Trader Joe’s cereal) and four brand 
associations.   
 
 
 
 Figure 12.   Sample Bayesian network for Trader Joe’s cereal 
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Applying the Verma-Pearl criteria for Markov equivalence to this sample network 
reveals that there are in fact a set of three additional Bayesian networks that are Markov 
equivalent to the original network of Figure 12.  The full set of Markov equivalent 
structures is shown in Figure 13, below.34  
 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Figure 13.   Markov equivalent Bayesian network-based brand concept maps  
34 For reasons of compactness, we are using the abbreviations for each variable within these networks.  
Please refer to Figure 18 for a complete listing of the full name for each of these variables. 
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 Interestingly, according to the Verma-Pearl criteria, the networks in panels (b), 
(c), and (d) of Figure 13 are the only networks that are Markov equivalent to the original 
network (which is also shown in panel (a) of Figure 13 for ease of reference).  In other 
words, one cannot simply ‘choose’ to reverse the direction of a link within the original 
network or any of these variants.  One can check that doing so would either create an 
immorality (i.e., an uncovered collider structure) that did not exist before, or remove an 
immorality that already existed in the original network.  Either of these outcomes would 
alter the conditional dependence and independence properties of the network, causing the 
resulting structure to contain a different set of conditional dependencies and 
independencies from what is supported by the data that generated the original Bayesian 
network representation of that domain.   
 For example, note that the original network (panel (a) of Figure 13) contains 
precisely one immorality, namely the uncovered collider at variable ‘H’ (“Healthy”).  
One can check that each of the other three Markov equivalent structures also contain 
precisely the same immorality.  Further, one can also verify that changing any other link 
besides the ones that have already been altered to create the structures in panels (b), (c), 
and (d) of Figure 19 would indeed either destroy the uncovered collider at ‘H’, or create 
additional uncovered colliders that were not present in the original structure.  As 
discussed above, such a result would cause the new structure to possess different 
conditional dependence and independence properties from what would be supported by 
the data. 
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 As discussed earlier, since all four structures shown in Figure 13 are Markov 
equivalent, no set of purely observational (i.e., correlational) data will be sufficient to 
discern any one of these structures from any of the others.  If one of these structures is 
capable of generating a given set of empirical (correlational) data, then the other three 
structures in this Markov class are equally capable of generating the same set of empirical 
data. 
Interestingly, despite these various structures being observationally equivalent, 
each can be thought of as representing a different possible causal thought-world for the 
consumers holding that structure.  For instance, the consumers holding structure 13(a) as 
their belief network for this product can be said to be “Trader Joe’s centric”.  In other 
words, for these consumers, the fact that a cereal is a Trader Joe’s product plays the 
central role, and the consumer derives all the other properties from this fact.  On the other 
hand, consumers with the belief structure shown in Figure 13(b) are “organic-centric”.  
For these consumers, the fact that the cereal is an organic product plays the core role, and 
other facets of the product (such as the fact that it is a Trader Joe’s brand) play a 
secondary role to the organic nature of the product.  Similarly, those consumers holding 
the belief network of Figure 13(c) are “environmental-centric”, while those in Figure 
13(d) are “whole grain centric”.   
In terms of potential marketing strategy, note that despite the fact that each of 
these four structures has the same associative network (i.e., the same undirected link 
topology, or “skeleton”), each represents a fundamentally different way of viewing the 
causal nature of the variables within this market.  Due to these differences in how these 
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consumers view what causes what within this market, the individuals within each such 
causal micro-structure are apt to respond completely differently to most marketplace 
manipulations and promotional efforts as compared to consumers holding any of the 
other causal micro-structures within this set of observationally equivalent causal 
structures.   
Furthermore, note that if the original network (panel (a) of Figure 13) is the 
structure which is derived from a reliable set of data, then the Verma-Pearl criteria show 
that the three additional causal thought-world variants shown in panels (b), (c), and (d) of 
Figure 13 are the only such variants that could exist and still be supported by the 
collected data.  In other words, the principle of Markov equivalence, coupled with the 
very powerful Verma-Pearl criteria, reveals precisely which cognitive variations can exist 
based on a given set of data, and further, these criteria rule out any other such variants of 
these cognitive structures. 
It is important to note that were we to consider a purely associative structure (i.e., 
in which variables become associated, or graphically linked, if there is some appreciable 
correlation between them, but no directionality is assumed for any of the associations), 
then all four of these directional variants would collapse into the same exact associative 
structure, namely the common undirected “skeleton” underlying this general link 
connection pattern, or topology.  In other words, a non-directional technique (such as the 
BCM technique as it currently exists) would simply coalesce all of these different 
directional variants into one undirected structure.  Therefore, by treating the network as 
an undirected structure, the potential structural (and hence cognitive) differentiation that 
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is revealed by directional models of this brand concept would be lost, and would be 
replaced by a potentially less informative structure which would not reveal that several 
different causal configurations can co-exist within the data (and just as importantly, that 
any other such causal configurations would not be supported by the same collected data). 
If one further analyzes the collection of Markov equivalent cognitive variants that 
can co-exist within a directional model of a brand concept network, it becomes apparent 
that the direction of certain links is ‘fixed’ (or ‘protected’) because reversing such a link 
would either create a new uncovered collider structure that is not supported by the data, 
or would destroy an existing uncovered collider that is supported by the data.  For 
instance, in all of the cognitive causal variants of the Trader Joe’s network in Figure 13, 
both of the links leading to the brand association “Healthy” are directionally protected 
since reversing either of them would destroy the uncovered collider at “H” (and in some 
cases, might even create an additional uncovered collider that is not supported by the 
data).  On the other hand, many of the other links in the structures shown in Figure 13 are 
reversible, in the sense that their reversal merely creates an alternative causal structure 
that is observationally equivalent to the original structure (i.e., both the original structure 
and the version that includes the directional reversals would possess the same sets of 
conditional dependencies and independencies, and hence would be Markov equivalent).   
Since the cognitive ramifications of a reversible versus a non-reversible link are 
so profound, it becomes important to be able to ‘summarize’ those structural links which 
are known to be fixed within all variants belonging to a particular Markov equivalence 
class, and distinguish them from those structural links are known to be variable within 
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that same Markov class.  Such a summarization process can be accomplished by creating 
what is known as an essential graph for that Markov equivalence class (e.g., Pearl, 2000). 
Within the essential graph of a Markov equivalence class, every link which is 
directionally stable is shown with that stable directional orientation, and every link which 
can still be directionally varied while still maintaining the same overall independence 
properties within that structure (i.e., while still being capable of generating the same set 
of observed correlations) is shown as an undirected link.  In this manner, the essential 
graph for a given Markov equivalence class becomes the standard representative for that 
class, in that it indicates all of the essential features shared by each causal structure within 
that class, as well as illustrating the features which are still underdetermined, or variable, 
within that class. 
 Given a causal graph  𝐺𝐺, it is typical to use the notation [ 𝐺𝐺 ] to indicate the 
collection of all causal structures which are Markov equivalent to 𝐺𝐺 and to use the 
symbol 𝐺𝐺∗ refer to the essential graph for [ 𝐺𝐺 ] (Koller and Friedman, 2009).  For 
illustration, the essential graph  𝐺𝐺∗ for the Markov equivalence class of cognitive causal 
variants [ 𝐺𝐺 ] for the Trader Joe’s network is shown in Figure 14.  (For ease of reference, 
we have included both the original directed network G and the essential graph G* in this 
diagram.)  Thus we see that a directional technique such as Bayesian network analysis 
coupled with the Verma-Pearl Markov equivalence criteria is also capable of generating 
non-directed links (such as those shown in the structure 𝐺𝐺∗ of Figure 14), but does so 
very carefully, i.e., by first showing that both directions of a particular link can co-exist 
in the structure without altering the conditional independence properties in the data. 
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original causal graph  𝐺𝐺 essential graph  𝐺𝐺∗ 
Figure 14.   Original causal structure 𝐺𝐺 from Figure 13 (left panel), and the essential 
graph 𝐺𝐺∗ for the Markov equivalence class [ 𝐺𝐺 ] generated by 𝐺𝐺 (right panel). 
 
Based on this essential graph for the equivalence class generated by the original 
causal structure 𝐺𝐺, we can see that the observational data which gave rise to 𝐺𝐺 is 
sufficient to “lock in” two of the directional links in the causal structure which represents 
that data set.  On the other hand, we can see that the remaining three links can be oriented 
in either direction and still generate a directional structure which can explain the 
observed data.  Based on this representation, for instance, a brand manager for the TJ’s 
brand would have to be careful to note that the only causal directions that are “locked in” 
by the type of observational data that is available for customers to use in formulating 
their cognitive structures for these brand associations are the links from Organic to 
Healthy and from Whole Wheat to Healthy.  All of the remaining causal directions within 
the network exist in both directions (within different permissible causal variations of the 
basic structure), and hence these are the links which the manager will likely find are more 
easily manipulable (both by the TJ’s brand as well as by its competitors). 
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3.   Computational Aspects of Bayesian Network Models 
3.1    Bayesian Network Structural Estimation Procedures 
 Given that the main use of a Bayesian network model of a brand concept network 
is to understand consumers’ reasoning patterns regarding the constituent variables, and 
that such reasoning patterns may often have an inherent directionality, it stands to reason 
that the mechanism utilized to uncover the connectivity structure among these constituent 
variables should be as sensitive to the directional structure as possible.  Although 
multiple forms of structural elicitation exist in the Bayesian networks literature, these 
methods can roughly be categorized into either constraint-based methods, score-based 
methods, or a combination of these two (Koller and Friedman, 2009).   
Constraint-based structural elicitation methods seek to list all conditional 
independencies of the form  A ⫫ B | C  that exist among disjoint sets A, B, and C of 
variables within the domain, and then to assemble these independencies into the most 
likely joint network structure that would exhibit these independencies.  Although such 
approaches are conceptually quite straightforward (and are also quite close in spirit to the 
intended semantic meaning of the derived network), it is obviously quite difficult in 
practice to determine all of the conditional independencies in a large data set with enough 
accuracy to ensure that one has not mistakenly included any spurious independencies, or 
perhaps neglected to add in certain specific actual independencies that do exist in the 
domain, but may not have been represented strongly enough in the particular data 
collected.   
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 As an alternative to such constraint-based structural elicitation methods, certain 
structural scores may be used as a target for optimization, with the idea being that the 
structure which optimizes such a score given a particular data set will be the most likely 
network structure for the domain from which that particular data set was collected.  Such 
score-based techniques have the advantage of allowing one to essentially “trade-off” 
imprecision across multiple possible links at the same time, thereby potentially avoiding 
the “all-or-nothing” nature of the link determination steps that exist within constraint-
based methods.  In these techniques, the score that one is optimizing is essentially a 
“stand-in” for the structure that would exist among the variables based on specific 
conditional independence relationships among those modeled variables.    
 We will initially examine constraint-based estimation procedures, which are more 
straightforward and simpler to understand than are score-based techniques.  Following 
this, we will outline the development of structural scores which seek to capture much of 
the structure of these constraint-based techniques within an abstract function.  In addition, 
as described earlier in this thesis, since Bayesian networks can only be distinguished up 
to Markov equivalence, these structural estimation procedures are themselves only 
capable of deriving Bayesian network structure up to a set of Markov equivalent directed 
structures.  The fact that such structural estimation procedures stop at the point at which a 
Markov equivalence class of structures is determined makes sense from a consumer 
behavior standpoint, since any member of such a Markov equivalence class represents a 
cognitive causal variant that is equally capable of representing the observed data, and 
hence all such cognitive causal variants can co-exist within the respondent population. 
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3.2    Constraint-Based Structural Estimation 
 The core concept at the heart of constraint-based Bayesian network structural 
estimation is that the link structure of a Bayesian network can essentially be thought of as 
a graphical encoding of the set of conditional independence and dependence relations 
among the modeled variables which are supported by the given data (Geiger, Verma, and 
Pearl, 1990;  Lauritzen, Dawid, Larsen, and Leimer, 1990).  Constraint-based algorithms 
essentially proceed by first identifying the set of such conditional independence and 
dependence relationships that exist within the given data (i.e., the set of ‘constraints’ that 
exist in that data), and then these constraint-based methods attempt to construct a network 
that best encodes these dependencies and independencies, taking interactions between the 
derived directions of these relationships into account.  Furthermore, since directed (i.e., 
Bayesian) networks can only be distinguished up to Markov equivalence, these structural 
estimation procedures are themselves only capable of deriving Bayesian network 
structure up to a set of Markov equivalent directed structures.   
 Initially, constraint-based algorithms proceed by enumerating all conditional 
independence relations of the form  𝑋𝑋 ⫫ 𝑌𝑌 | 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌 , where 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌 denotes some subset of 
variables in the domain (not including X or Y) which serves to render variables X and Y 
conditionally independent.  Following Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008), the test statistic 
typically employed for these procedures is the G2 statistic given by 
𝐺𝐺2  =   2 � 𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 �𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 �
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦,𝑥𝑥                                          (5) 
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where x and y represent configurations of variables X and Y respectively, and z represents 
a possible configuration of the ‘separator’ 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌.  Also in this formula, 𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 represents the 
count of the number of occurrences of the event (X=x , Y=y , Z=z) in the data, with 𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦, 
𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, and 𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥 defined similarly.  Finally, we define the expected count  𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 via the 
formula �𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 𝑁𝑁𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥� / (𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥).  Under the null hypothesis of conditional independence of X 
and Y given 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌, the overall G2 statistic will have an asymptotic 𝜒𝜒2 distribution with  (𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 − 1)(𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 − 1) ∏ 𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍∈𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌   degrees of freedom, where 𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 , 𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌 , and 𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍 represent the 
cardinality of the sample space (i.e., the number of possible configurations) for each of X, 
Y, and Z respectively.  In typical applications, the degree of the separating sets 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌 which 
are utilized in these conditional independence tests must often be limited (usually to three 
variables or fewer) in order to control the combinatorial expansion of this phase of the 
procedure, as well as to adjust for the available sample size (since each level of ‘nesting’ 
of the conditional independence tests requires successively larger sets of data in order to 
be reliable). 
 By repeated application of this initial conditional independence testing procedure, 
one can determine whether a separating set 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑌𝑌 exists for each pair of variables X and Y 
in the domain.  If no such separator can be found for a particular pair of variables, then 
these two variables are joined by an undirected link (indicating that they are 
unconditionally dependent based on the collected data).  Once all such unconditional 
dependence relations have been found, the resulting undirected graphical structure is 
called the skeleton of the network.  (In some sense, the skeleton of the network is the 
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structure that the BCM technique derives, assuming that subjects can accurately gauge 
which variables are directly dependent when eliciting the links in the network.) 
 Once the network skeleton has been derived, the search for directionality begins 
via the identification of all collider (i.e., common effect) structures in the network.  This 
stage involves examining each triple of variables {X,Y,Z} for which X and Y are 
adjacent in the skeleton structure, Y and Z are adjacent in the skeleton structure, but X 
and Z are not adjacent.  For each such triple of variables satisfying this condition, one 
investigates whether the central variable in the triple (i.e., the variable involved in the two 
adjacencies, namely the variable Y using the enumeration described above) is a member 
of any set 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍 which separates the two terminal variables X and Z in that triple.  The idea 
here is that the central variable in a collider structure serves to probabilistically connect 
the two terminal variables in that structure (viz., Appendix B).  Hence, if the central 
variable Y in the triple {X,Y,Z} is never present in a separator 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍 serving to separate the 
terminal variables X and Z, it must be the case that the directional structure among these 
three variables is of the form  X → Y ← Z.  Stated another way, if the directional 
structure among these variables was any of  X → Y → Z ,  X ← Y → Z , or  X ← Y ← Z, 
then Y would certainly separate X and Z, and hence we would have found variable Y to 
be a member of at least some separating set 𝑆𝑆𝑋𝑋𝑍𝑍 serving to probabilistically separate X 
and Z. 
 Once the collider structures within the skeleton have been identified, each 
additional link within the skeleton that has not yet been directed during the collider 
identification procedure is examined to determine if its direction can be chosen so as to 
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not introduce any additional colliders or eliminate any colliders that have been previously 
established.35  In practice, it may not be possible to orient every structural link in this 
manner.  In some sense, any links which remain unoriented can be thought of as a type of 
graph-theoretic “confidence region”.  Furthermore, one can also utilize the Verma-Pearl 
criteria to investigate whether various structural links are reversible without resulting in 
removing the derived structure from its Markov equivalence class.  Each such additional 
directed variant within this equivalence class represents a potential causal ‘thought-
world’ or cognitive variation that is consistent with the given data, and which belongs to 
the equivalence class [ G ].  Finally, one can determine the essential graph representation 
G* which represents the entire equivalence class [ G ] to which the initial solution 
belongs. 
As further described in Spirtes et al. (2000), there are several modifications to this 
basic constraint-based algorithm, each of which employs certain graph-theoretic 
properties to simplify or streamline various stages of the procedure.  However, all such 
constraint-based methods follow this same basic heuristic.36  Overall, the constraint-
based methods are very direct, and relatively simple as compared with score-based 
methods, which are discussed in a succeeding section.   
35 Interestingly, Meek (1995) has identified a set of four necessary and sufficient orientation rules which 
serve to maximally direct the remaining links at this stage of the procedure 
36 For instance, the Peter-Clark (or ‘PC’) algorithm described in Spirtes et al. (2000) utilizes the fact that if 
two variables X and Y can be d-separated, then they must be d-separable by either the direct parents of X 
or the direct parents of Y, which allows one to reduce the search for separating sets to the immediate 
neighbors of X and Y.  In addition, this algorithm improves efficiency by starting with a complete graph 
on n vertices and removing direct inter-variable links once a separator is found (as opposed to beginning 
with the empty graph on n vertices and adding direct inter-variable links in cases where no separator can 
be found). 
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3.3    Application: Bayesian Network Analysis of the Taco Prima Brand Map 
 Bayesian network model.  In order to illustrate the advantages offered by a 
Bayesian network analysis of consumers’ perceived associations for a well-known brand, 
data from five hundred individuals regarding their perceptions of the Taco Prima fast 
food chain were analyzed.  Initial interviews revealed that the most common perceived 
brand associations shared across the respondents were the following six characteristics37 
(each of which is listed with its eventual abbreviation shown at the right): 
1. Evokes Good Memories   (“Memories”) 
2. Is a Leader     (“Leader”) 
3. Unique and Different Menu Items  (“Unique”) 
4. Is Innovative     (“Innovative”) 
5. Inexpensive Menu Items   (“Inexpensive”) 
6. Comes Out With New Things  (“NewThings”) 
Since several of these descriptors represent fairly abstract brand characteristics, it 
might be difficult for respondents to accurately gauge whether their concepts of the Taco 
Prima brand are characterized by a relation between such descriptors.  For example, the 
brand associations ‘Evokes Good Memories’ and ‘Is a Leader’ each do relate to the core 
brand (Taco Prima), but it may be quite difficult for consumers to be able to judge if their 
perception of Taco Prima is characterized by an association between these two brand 
characteristics.  On the other hand, recall that Bayesian network structural estimation 
37 Each of these six questionnaire items was collected on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by 1 = ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ and 5 = ‘Strongly Agree’, with the value of 3 representing ‘Neither Agree nor Disagree’.  The 
data were obtained from a commercial source with the understanding of privacy regarding the details of 
the respondent population and the interview procedure.     
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procedures can operate with simple Likert-style data in which individuals are only asked 
to express how strongly they associate each attribute with the core brand.38  In this sense, 
it is hoped that the Bayesian network-based methodology for determining the detailed 
interconnection structure among the brand associations within a brand concept map can 
offer a valuable extension to the pioneering techniques represented by the BCM 
methodology.    
To illustrate the use of a constraint-based structural estimation procedure, we 
applied the Peter-Clark (or ‘PC’) algorithm described in Spirtes et al. (2000) to this data, 
as implemented in the Hugin Lite software package (available at the Hugin Expert 
website: www.hugin.com).  Based on an alpha value of 0.05 for the conditional 
independence test portion of the PC procedure, the resulting Bayesian network structure 
for this data is shown in Figure 15, below. 
 
Figure 15.    Bayesian network model of the Taco Prima brand concept map 
38 The conditional independence properties in the collected data are then used to determine the 
interconnection structure among the attributes which is most compatible with the dependence and 
independence properties in that data. 
Memories 
Leader 
Unique 
Innovative Inexpensive NewThings 
94 
 
                                                     
Strategic Analysis.  In examining this resulting Bayesian network model, an 
initial point to notice is that each pairwise connection between variables has a high 
degree of ‘face validity’.  In essence, each individual connection in the structure makes 
intuitive sense.  It is quite interesting that such logical links between variables emerge 
from a procedure that does not directly probe for those links.  Rather, the Bayesian 
network estimation procedure utilizes respondents’ ratings of how strongly they associate 
each of the characteristics with the core brand, and then the resulting conditional 
independence properties in this set of ratings are used to derive the connections between 
the variables.   
Moving on to analyze some of the internal properties of this derived brand 
concept map, one is initially struck by the fact that the brand association ‘Leader’ is 
purely a result (or an effect) of other variables, and is not itself predictive of any other 
variables within this data.  This is an interesting finding because it not only shows which 
specific brand associations lead to consumers perceive Taco Prima as a leader, but it also 
shows that being perceived of as a leader does not in and of itself ‘help’ (i.e., ‘lead to’) 
any other of these brand associations.  In some sense, it is a ‘terminal’ brand association, 
in that it leads to no other associations besides itself.  This finding, if confirmed, should 
suggest to Taco Prima that a goal of being perceived of as a leader may not benefit the 
company as strongly as might have been suspected. 
 In contrast, the Bayesian network model reveals that being perceived of as 
‘Unique’ has the most widespread effect on the other Taco Prima brand associations.   
Not surprisingly, ‘Unique’ leads to being perceived of as a leader and being thought of as 
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innovative.  However, it is quite surprising that ‘Unique’ leads directly to ‘Memories’.   
In this sense, the perception of Taco Prima as being unique seems to reinforce people’s 
willingness to associate good thoughts or memories with the Taco Prima brand, thereby 
increasing brand affect as well as elaborative processing of the brand.  Hence, according 
to this Bayesian network derived brand concept map, Taco Prima’s most effective point 
of leverage may in fact be its perception or image of being unique.  Furthermore, the only 
variable which directly influences perceptions of uniqueness is the perception that Taco 
Prima comes out with new things.  Therefore, this fast food chain’s most effective 
promotional strategy may be to continually come out with new products in order to foster 
the perception of uniqueness, which in turn will encourage strong positive memories of 
the brand.   
Interestingly, a study of Taco Prima’s strategic marketing decisions and 
promotional strategy reveals that this company’s management has seemingly come to this 
same conclusion through trial and error experimentation with the brand.  Specifically, the 
company’s product development and marketing strategy seems to center around the 
constant ‘churning’ of new inexpensive products, and employs an advertising message 
that focuses on the novelty, uniqueness, and low prices of these new products.  For many 
large brands such as this, the notion of continually introducing new products has the 
potential to actually diminish consumers’ ability to choose among the firm’s offerings, 
and hence also has the capacity for reducing overall brand evaluations (Broniarczyk        
et al., 1998; Boatwright & Nunes, 2004).  However, as this Bayesian network analysis 
shows, for Taco Prima the opposite may in fact be true: continually introducing new 
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products seems to increase the perception of uniqueness, which would in turn clearly 
foster the positive thoughts (i.e., ‘memories’) which would lead to increased brand equity 
and increased repeat patronage.   
Hence, the directional brand concept map derived through a Bayesian network 
analysis of consumers’ opinions of specific aspects of the Taco Prima brand reveals that 
the best marketing strategy for this firm is actually quite counterintuitive based on current 
strategic marketing theories.  However, the optimal strategy for this firm which is 
revealed by the Bayesian network derived brand concept map nonetheless coheres 
precisely with the successful strategy currently pursued by Taco Prima’s management.  
Note, in addition, that had we utilized current marketing strategy theories to derive a set 
of presumed relations among these brand associations and then utilized a confirmatory 
directional procedure such as structural equation modeling in order to test that proposed 
model, we may never have found such a counterintuitive yet eminently realistic brand 
concept model such as this. 
Cognitive variation.  When analyzing the Taco Prima brand image as derived 
from a Bayesian network model, one must remember that some links may be reversible 
without altering the independence and dependence properties of the given data, while 
other links are not reversible in this manner.  (Recall that the set of alternative directed 
structures which are derived from reversing various subsets of those reversible links is 
called the Markov equivalence class of the original structure.)  Based on these notions, 
we can provide a deeper level of analysis of the brand concept map - one that is only 
available in directed structures such as this. 
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In order to facilitate the presentation of this additional layer of analysis, we will 
use the first letter of each of the Taco Prima brand associations.  Since both ‘Inexpensive’ 
and ‘Innovative’ both start with the letter ‘I’, we will (with due apologies to the Taco 
Prima Corporation) utilize the mnemonic ‘C’ (standing for ‘Cheap’) in place of 
‘Inexpensive’, and we will continue to use ‘I’ to denote ‘Innovative’. 
To explore the possible cognitive variants which are observationally equivalent to 
the original structure, we begin by looking for uncovered collider structures (i.e., 
‘immoralities’) since these are the indicators of the locations of significant conditional 
independencies in the original data.  For ease of reference, the graphical structure of the 
Taco Prima brand concept map from Figure 15 is reproduced in Figure 16, below, with 
just the one-letter variable abbreviations used.  Examining the network structure in Figure 
16 reveals several colliders, but most of them are ‘covered’ colliders (i.e., the two 
terminal variables in the collider structure are themselves directly connected).  For 
example, the collider M--L--I is ‘covered’ by the link from M to I, and the collider N--I--
U is ‘covered’ by the link from N to U, etc.  In fact, there is only one uncovered collider 
in this brand map, namely M--I--N (which is indicated in Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16.  Taco Prima brand concept map, with immorality M--I--N highlighted 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
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Since the collider M--I--N in this network is an immorality, we cannot reverse 
either the link M → I or the link I ← N since this would ‘destroy’ the immorality, 
resulting in a structure with different conditional dependence and independence 
properties from the original.  Hence these two links are ‘protected’ in this structure: they 
can neither be removed nor reversed.  Based on this observation, one can see that the link 
I → L also cannot be reversed because this would create an uncovered collider structure 
at node I (namely L → I ← N ).  Furthermore, since the direction of the I → L link 
cannot be reversed, this means that we cannot reverse the M → L link either, since this 
would create a cycle among the variables M, L, and I.  Hence these two additional links    
(I → L and M → L) are also directionally protected.  Thus we have a ‘core’ of four 
directionally protected links within this overall structure, as shown in Figure 17 below.39 
 
Figure 17.   Taco Prima brand concept map with directionally protected links 
indicated. 
39 In this Bayesian network model, we are disallowing any directed cycles.  If one chooses to allow such 
‘infinitely repeating cycles’, then the link from M to L would be reversible (and would cause an endless 
cycle among M, L, and I).  However, if all three variables mutually implied one another in an endless 
cycle or loop, then this would indicate that the combination of all three variables might be a unified 
aggregate construct rather than three separate constructs.  Since consumer behavior considerations 
suggest that M, L, and I are indeed separate constructs, we will maintain the standard Bayesian network 
practice of disallowing any configurations which result in a directed cycle. 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
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We are now left with only five non-directionally protected links to examine.      
Of these, the link from C to N is obviously reversible, since it is a terminal link in the 
structure and its reversal will neither create nor destroy any immoralities, nor will it 
create any cycles (which are not permitted in a Bayesian network).  Hence we now have 
two rather similar directional variants: the original brand concept map, and the version 
obtained from reversing the arrow between variables C and N. 
 Now let us examine the remaining four links case by case.  For ease of 
enumeration, we will work from left to right, beginning with the link between variables  
U and M.  As indicated in Figure 18, reversal of this link would result in an uncovered 
collider (M -- U -- N) at variable U.  Therefore, to accommodate the reversal of U--M, we 
must also reverse U--N.  Of course, this would create a collider structure U -- N -- C, so 
we also would need to reverse the N--C link.  All of these considerations are detailed in 
Figure 18.  
 Once the U--M link is reversed (along with the necessary reversals of links U--N 
and N--C needed to accommodate the initial U--M link reversal), we need to examine the 
remaining non-protected links for possible additional structural variants that could result 
from these initial reversals.  As indicated in Figure 18, a subsequent reversal of either    
U--L or U--I is not possible due to the creation of various cycles (see Figure 18 for 
details).  Therefore, the reversal of U--M (along with the required subsequent reversals of 
U--N and N--C) forms one additional structural variant that is Markov equivalent to the 
original brand concept map. 
100 
 
 Figure 18.   Analysis of the reversal of the M--U link 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
Reversing M--U causes U--N and N--C to be 
reversed, since otherwise we would get 
immoralities at either U or N. 
However, reversing both U--L and U--I together causes the new cycle I--U--N 
to appear, so this arrangement is ruled out.   
Conclusion: Once M--U has been reversed (and U--N and N--C are reversed to              
allow this to occur), no additional changes can be made.   
Reversing U--L without also reversing U--I 
would lead to a cycle among U, L, and I.  
Hence both links must be reversed together. 
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 Moving on to the U--L link, we see that its reversal creates a new immorality at 
L--U--N and a new cycle at L--U--I.  As shown in Figure 19, each of these can be 
corrected, but these corrections then create a new cycle, and hence are disallowed.  Thus, 
we cannot reverse the link from U to L. 
 
Figure 19.   Analysis of the reversal of the U--L link 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
Reversing L--U creates two problems:     
a new immorality at L--U--N,                               
and a new cycle L--U--I.   
Together, these two corrections create a 
new cycle at I--U--N.  Therefore the 
original L--U reversal is ruled out.  
To correct L→U←N, we have to reverse 
U--N (and hence N--C).  To correct the 
cycle at L--U--I, we have to reverse U--I. 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
102 
 
 Now examining the U--I link, Figure 20 shows that its reversal will create a new 
collider (at I--U--N), but not a new immorality (since that new collider is ‘covered’ by the 
N--I link).  However, the U--I reversal does create a new cycle, namely the “outside 
cycle” M--I--U, and removal of that resulting cycle would yield the same structure that 
we found previously when reversing the M--U link.   
 
Figure 20.    Analysis of the reversal of the U--I link 
 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
Reversing the U--I link creates a new collider 
I--U--N, but this is a covered collider, so it is 
not a new immorality.   
However, reversal of U--I does create a new cycle at M--I--U.  The only 
way to remove that cycle would be to reverse M--U, but this would create 
an uncovered collider M--U--N.  (We could remove the M--U--N 
immorality by reversing U--N and N--C, but this would just give us a 
structure we have already accounted for.)   Hence U--I cannot be reversed. 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
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 Finally, as shown in Figure 21, reversal of U--N also entails the reversal of N--C, 
and then no additional structures are possible once these changes are made. 
 
Figure 21.    Analysis of the reversal of the U--N link 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
Reversing N--U creates a new collider at N. 
Once U--N (and N--C) are reversed, we still cannot reverse either U--L or 
U--I because either of these reversals would create a new cycle.  We can 
reverse U--M (once U--N is reversed), but this gives a previous structure. 
Conclusion:  Reversing U--N and N--C together is permissible. 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
M 
L 
U 
I N C 
We can easily correct this new 
collider by reversing C--N. 
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In summary, a directional analysis of the original Bayesian network structure of 
Figure 15 reveals that there are three additional cognitive variants of this original 
structure which are possible given the collected brand concept data.  Each of these three 
additional cognitive variants is Markov equivalent to the original one, and hence all four 
of these cognitive causal variants can simultaneously co-exist within the data.  For 
reference, these four cognitive variants are shown in Figure 22.  (In this Figure, we have 
continued to show the original directionally protected links in red, while indicating the 
links which are reversed as dashed blue arrows.)  Essentially, these structures all differ 
from one another along a peripheral pathway which, in the original Bayesian network 
based brand concept map is oriented as:  Cheap (i.e., ‘Inexpensive’) → New Things → 
Unique → Memories.  Within each directional variant (as shown in Figure 22), we see 
that various subsets of the links on this particular pathway are reversible.     
Note that all four of the directional variants in Figure 22 are consistent with the 
collected data.  Hence, according to this data, it is possible for consumers to think that in 
terms of the Taco Prima brand, ‘Cheap’ (i.e., ‘Inexpensive’) implies the existence or 
creation of new products, which in turn implies uniqueness, and finally generates good 
memories about the brand.  For these consumers, cheap prices are the initial driving force 
behind this chain of inferences.  On the other hand, the data also shows that a chain of 
reasoning which is ‘new product-centered’ is also possible, viz., M ← U ← N → C.  
Similarly, a chain of reasoning that is ‘uniqueness-centered’ ( M ← U → N → C ) is 
possible, as is a chain of reasoning that is ‘memories - centered’ ( M → U → N → C ).   
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Quite interestingly, all of the other inter-association connections besides the ones 
on the M ← U ← N ← C pathway are fixed by the data.  Hence, as revealed by the 
Bayesian network analysis of this brand concept map, there are only four cognitive 
variations which will neither violate any of the conditional independencies in the original 
data nor generate any additional conditional independencies which are not represented in 
the data.  As an example of these conserved pathways, consider that all structural variants 
(see Figure 22) must contain the chain of reasoning: New Things → Innovative → Leader.  
No other connection topologies or connection directions among these three variables 
would be consistent with the conditional dependence and independence relationships that 
exist in the data.  Similarly, in all structural variants, the brand association ‘Leader’ is 
purely a result of other associations (namely ‘Memories’, ‘Unique’, and ‘Innovative’), 
and does not in and of itself lead to other brand associations.  (One can similarly find 
multiple other directed relationships that are conserved in all four of the Bayesian 
network cognitive variants consistent with the original data.) 
It is perhaps most intriguing that the portion of this overall brand concept map 
which is directionally reversible without ‘upsetting’ the conditional independence 
properties of the data is precisely the chain of reasoning:  Cheap (i.e., ‘Inexpensive’)  →  
New Things  →  Unique  →  Memories  which was identified earlier as the most likely 
driver of product line differentiation and brand equity for this firm.  In other words, the 
Bayesian network based brand concept map for this firm has revealed that all of the 
cognitive differentiation among consumers that is consistent with the data must exist 
along this particular pathway.    
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Note that in some sense, this finding can be regarded as a confirmation of the fact 
that this pathway is the strategically critical one for the firm.  If consumers’ cognitive 
structures (i.e., their brand concept maps) did not differ to such a high degree along this 
pathway, then there might have been enough regularity in the joint distribution of these 
four variables to allow one or more of them to ‘screen off’ the others, which we would 
spot as a non-removable uncovered collider located somewhere along this pathway.  
Instead, the Taco Prima data supports the existence of four distinct cognitive variations, 
each of which specifies a slightly different set of predictive and diagnostic relations 
among the variables on this one particular pathway.   
Thus, consumers are apparently highly sensitive to a variety of cognitive 
influences related to the relationships among the variables Inexpensive, New Things, 
Unique, and Memories.  Furthermore, if consumers are so sensitive to these particular 
relationships for the Taco Prima brand, then they are also likely to be quite sensitive to 
them when considering any of Taco Prima’s direct competitors as well.  Hence, it is no 
surprise that the pathway containing these particular relationships is the strategically 
critical one for Taco Prima - this is likely to be the “battleground” pathway for firms 
attempting to compete for a segment of this marketplace niche.      
Directed separation analysis.  Now consider the ‘screening-off’ properties that 
exist among the variables in the Taco Prima brand concept network.  By utilizing the 
formal definition of the d-separation condition (viz., Section 2.3), we can determine the 
complete set of separation properties that exist within this brand concept structure.  Given 
that this is a relatively small network, the separation properties that it encompasses are 
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relatively limited in number.  As it turns out, there are actually six cases within this brand 
concept network in which probabilistic communication between variables in the network 
is blocked by the presence of another variable.  Of these six directed separation 
properties, four are relatively obvious from the graphical structure of the network, and 
two are a bit less obvious.  In order to facilitate a detailed discussion of these separation 
properties, the original Bayesian network-derived brand concept map for Taco Prima is 
repeated as Figure 23, below. 
 
Figure 23.    Taco Prima brand concept map (from Figure 15) 
 
 
To begin with, it should be relatively obvious from the structure of the graph that 
the brand association New Things will act to probabilistically “screen off” each of 
Memories, Unique, Leader, and Innovative from the effects of the brand association 
Inexpensive.  These relations can be easily demonstrated because the pathway from 
Inexpensive to any of these four brand associations forms a causal reasoning chain 
structure involving New Things as one of the intermediate variables (and there is no 
Memories 
Leader 
Unique 
Innovative Inexpensive NewThings 
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alternate pathway in the network for information to pass from Inexpensive to any of these 
other associations except by passing through New Things).   
However, just because a screening-off or directed separation property is obvious 
from the structure of the network does not mean that it is trivial with regards to the 
strategic ramifications of the associated brand concept.  For instance, these four 
screening-off relations involving the ability of New Things to render the brand 
characteristic Inexpensive irrelevant to the remainder of the network are really quite 
interesting.  Essentially, these four d-separation conditions reveal that the means by 
which the association Inexpensive acts or affects the rest of the Taco Prima brand concept 
must occur via the action of Inexpensive on consumers’ perceptions of New Things.  In 
other words, the fact that this brand is perceived of as “inexpensive” must be applied to 
something before it can lead to any perceptions of innovativeness, leadership, uniqueness, 
or positive affect (i.e., ‘memories’).  Hence, as revealed by the directed separation 
properties of the Taco Prima brand concept map, the association Inexpensive “alone” 
cannot affect the other brand associations - it can only affect the remainder of the brand 
concept when it is applied to New Products.  This finding provides an additional 
explanation of why such a high rate of “product churning” seems to be such a critical 
component of Taco Prima’s general product development and marketing strategy. 
Furthermore, as this brand concept network indicates, the relationship between 
Inexpensive and New Things is configured in such a way that once a consumer knows or 
perceives the value of New Things for the Taco Prima brand, that knowledge actually 
renders Inexpensive irrelevant to the remainder of the network.  Hence, by and large, 
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consumers seem to already perceive the concept of “New Things” as applied to the Taco 
Prima brand as encompassing the notion of “Inexpensive”.  Once a consumer knows or 
perceives the level of the New Things variable for the Taco Prima brand, the notion of 
“inexpensiveness” provides no additional information that the consumer does not already 
have. 
In addition to these four relatively graphically apparent directed separation 
properties, the Taco Prima network also possesses two additional d-separation relations 
that are less obvious to see based merely on the network configuration., namely 
(Memories ⫫ Inexpensive) | Unique  and  (Memories ⫫ New Things) | Unique .  One way 
to derive these facts is to directly employ the causal Markov condition, namely that a 
variable’s parents can render that variable independent of all of its nondescendants in the 
network.  In this case, Memories has only one graphical parent, namely Unique.  
Furthermore, Memories has two nondescendants in the network, namely New Things and 
Inexpensive.  Hence by the causal Markov condition, Unique (the graphical parent of 
Memories) would have to be capable of rendering Memories independent of those 
nondescendants.   
On one level, these two additional separation relationships imply that once 
consumers know (or assume) the level of uniqueness represented by Taco Prima, the fact 
that this brand also may offer inexpensive new things no longer affects consumers’ 
affective response to the brand (i.e., ‘Memories’).  In other words, New Things and 
Inexpensive (or, by our earlier discussion, the conglomerate of “inexpensive new things”) 
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can only affect the memories (or affective thoughts) that consumers associate with the 
brand by acting through those consumers’ perceptions of the uniqueness of the brand.   
However, if we examine the structure of the network a little more closely, we can 
see that the reason why “inexpensive new things” cannot reach Memories through a 
pathway other than the one passing through Unique is because there is a common-effect 
structure at the brand association Innovative.  By the properties of common-effect 
structures (or “colliders”), probabilistic information cannot pass through the node at 
Innovative as long as the level of innovativeness is relatively unknown or vague.  On the 
other hand, if the level of innovativeness was clear to consumers, then information would 
certainly be able to flow from “inexpensive new things” to Memories through the node at 
Innovative, and therefore the brand association Unique would no longer be able to          
d-separate Innovative or New Things from their effect on Memories.   
Hence, as it stands, the Taco Prima brand concept network structure raises the 
very reasonable point that if consumers are unsure of the level of innovativeness 
represented by the Taco Prima brand, then the fact that this brand may be known for 
constantly introducing inexpensive new things will affect consumers’ “memories”           
(i.e., affect) for the brand through the role that these inexpensive new things play in 
establishing perceptions of uniqueness.  On the other hand, if consumers do perceive a 
specific level of innovativeness from the Taco Prima brand, then this opens up a second 
pathway by which consumer feelings or memories for the brand can be affected by the 
perception of inexpensive new things.  Therefore, in general, it is in Taco Prima’s best 
interest to not just foster the perception of constantly coming out with new things, but 
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rather, to also foster the notion that such new things are actually innovative.  Thus, it 
should come as no surprise that this brand’s promotional message not only typically 
contains arguments that the firm’s new products are unique, but also typically contains 
arguments that their constant stream of new products are indeed quite innovative (i.e., the 
“wow factor” is consistently stressed in their ads in relation to the new products that are 
introduced).  For example, a typical Taco Prima ad might tout the company’s new 
“Doritos taco shell” as not just being unique to Taco Prima, but also as being really 
clever, e.g., “only Taco Prima could come up with a taco shell made from Doritos”, 
which is a tag line with both uniqueness and cleverness (or innovativeness) connotations. 
 
3.4   Likelihood Scores for Bayesian Networks 
The Taco Prima brand concept network analyzed in Section 3.3 was estimated via 
a constraint-based algorithm.  As described earlier, this class of structural estimation 
procedure directly analyzes each conditional independence relation within the data and 
constructs a directed network based on distinguishing among the various types of 
directional three-variable substructures that are found to exist within the recovered 
structure.  The advantage of this method is that it directly analyzes each conditional 
independence relation in the data and bases its structural estimation on these revered 
conditional independencies.  However, this particular advantage of constraint-based 
structural estimation procedures can also be regarded as a potential disadvantage with 
certain data sets, since if there is any lack of certainty about the conditional 
independencies in the data at the initial stage of structure estimation, then the procedure 
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could possibly result in a non-optimal structure.  Of course, this propensity can be 
controlled to a great degree through analysis of the structures that result from the use of 
different alpha-values in the conditional independence testing portion of the estimation 
procedure, but the fact remains that each decision of whether or not two variables in the 
domain are able to be ‘separated’ (i.e., rendered conditionally independent of one 
another) given a third variable (or set of variables) is essentially an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
declaration - either the relationship is declared to represent a conditional independence or 
it is not. 
One possible means of correcting for this ‘all-or-nothing’ determination of 
whether or not a particular pair of variables is independent conditional on a third variable 
(or subset of variables) is to utilize some form of comparative scoring function which 
essentially allows one to ‘trade-off’ some imprecision between each conditional 
independence determination.  In developing such a measure, we can utilize another aspect 
of a Bayesian network representation of a set of brand associations, namely the ability of 
each set of graphical ‘parents’ in the network to explain (or predict) the distribution of 
values found in their associated graphical ‘child’ variable.  By seeking the structure 
which maximizes such a score, one can presumably derive the graphical structure which 
best exhibits the conditional independence and conditional dependence properties of the 
data (e.g., Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Of course, once again, due to the nature of 
Bayesian networks, this determination can only be made up to Markov equivalence. 
If we let 𝐺𝐺 represent such a graphical structure (i.e., a Bayesian network) under 
consideration, and we let  𝐷𝐷 represent the specific data set collected from the intended 
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domain of application for the network, a potential choice of ‘scoring’ function to be 
optimized is the probability 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺) of the data set given the potential model under 
consideration.  Since the probability 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺) represents the likelihood score 𝐿𝐿(𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷), 
the task of finding an optimal graphical structure 𝐺𝐺 in this manner will also require an 
optimal choice of parameters 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 .  Therefore the estimation problem can be expressed 
more completely as one of maximizing  𝐿𝐿(〈𝐺𝐺, 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ∶ 𝐷𝐷).  Following Koller and Friedman 
(2009), we can iterate this optimization in two stages: 
max 
𝐺𝐺,𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿(〈𝐺𝐺, 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   =   max𝐺𝐺 � max𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺  𝐿𝐿(〈𝐺𝐺, 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ∶ 𝐷𝐷) � (6) 
However, since we are assuming that we will choose parameters 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺  which maximize the 
likelihood of the data given the graph, we can utilize the maximum likelihood parameters 
𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 , in which case the optimization problem reduces to : 
    max 
𝐺𝐺,𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 𝐿𝐿(〈𝐺𝐺, 𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  =  max𝐺𝐺  � 𝐿𝐿�〈𝐺𝐺, 𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺〉 ∶ 𝐷𝐷� � (7) 
Using  𝑟𝑟(𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷) to denote the logarithm of this objective likelihood function, we derive 
the likelihood score for the network structure 𝐺𝐺, viz.,  
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   ∶=   𝑟𝑟(𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷) (8) 
where once again we are assuming that the MLE parameters 𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺  for the graph 𝐺𝐺 are being 
employed. 
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 To get a better idea of the form of the likelihood score in a realistic scenario, 
consider a situation in which we would like to compare the scores of two models:         
𝐺𝐺0 ∶   𝑋𝑋 , 𝑌𝑌  versus  𝐺𝐺1 ∶   𝑋𝑋 →  𝑌𝑌 .  (In other words, we are examining a typical scenario 
in which we are considering whether or not to add a specific directed link to a basic 
network structure.)  To make matters simple, we will assume that each of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 are 
Bernoulli(𝜃𝜃) random variables.  Therefore, once again following Koller and Friedman 
(2009), the likelihood scores of these two competing models can be computed as: 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺0 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   =   𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  � 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥)
𝑚𝑚
𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦) 
=  ��𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) +  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)�
𝑚𝑚
 (9) 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺1 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   =   𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  � 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥)
𝑚𝑚
𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)|𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) 
=  ��𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) +  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)|𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥)�
𝑚𝑚
 (10) 
 
where in each case, 𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) and 𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦) represent the 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ occurrence (or “realization”) of 
the variables X and Y respectively within the data stream represented by 𝐷𝐷. 
 We can now compare the two likelihood scores as follows : 
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𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺1 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   –  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺0 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   
=   ��𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)|𝑚𝑚(𝑥𝑥) –  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑚𝑚(𝑦𝑦)�
𝑚𝑚
=   � 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  −  � 𝐵𝐵(𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦  (11) 
where 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) and 𝐵𝐵(𝑦𝑦) represent the number of occurrences of the MLE parameters  𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥  and  𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦 respectively in the data set 𝐷𝐷 which consists of 𝐵𝐵 overall observations.   
Again following Koller and Friedman (2009), we can let 𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) and 𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦) represent the 
respective empirical frequencies within the 𝐵𝐵-observation data set 𝐷𝐷, and hence we can 
rewrite the difference in the likelihood scores of these two models as: 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺1 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  –  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺0 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   
=   � 𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥)
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  –  � 𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦)𝑦𝑦  
                           =   𝐵𝐵 ∙ � 𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥)
𝑃𝑃�(𝑦𝑦)
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦   
                           =   𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃�  (𝑋𝑋; 𝑌𝑌) (12) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃�  (𝑋𝑋; 𝑌𝑌) represents the mutual information between X and Y with reference to the 
empirical distribution 𝑃𝑃� (MacKay, 2003). 
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 The point to be made in this simple case of the choice between model 𝐺𝐺0 ∶ 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌  
and 𝐺𝐺1: 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌  is that the relative increase in the likelihood score that is obtained by 
adding a link between two previously unconnected variables is directly proportional to 
the mutual information that exists between those two variables within the empirical 
distribution.  Furthermore, since the mutual information between two variables is a 
measure of the strength of the dependency between those variables, we see that as the 
dependency between two variables within a domain increases, the likelihood score 
measure will increasingly prefer structures that contain an explicit link between those two 
variables.    
 We can extend these results to more general Bayesian network configurations as 
follows: 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   =   𝐵𝐵 ∙ � 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃�  (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
)   −   𝐵𝐵 ∙ � 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
   (13) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺  denotes the set of graphical “parents” (direct ancestors) of variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in the 
structure 𝐺𝐺, where 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 ) represents the mutual information between the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 
variable in the model and its graphical parents (computed in the empirical distribution 𝑃𝑃�), 
and where 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) is the entropy of the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ variable, i.e., 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) = ∑ 𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 1 𝑃𝑃�(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  .   
(Of course, the overall enumeration from 𝑖𝑖 = 1  to  𝑖𝑖  in equation (13) refers to an 
enumeration across each of the 𝑖𝑖 variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 in the induced model represented by the 
graphical structure 𝐺𝐺.)       
118 
 
Generalizing our earlier conclusions from the simple binomial case, we can see 
from the result in equation (13) that the graphical structure that maximizes the likelihood 
score (when using the MLE parameters for 𝐺𝐺) will be the structure for which the parents  
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺  of the nodes  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  in the model “explain” the most about their immediate graphical 
children (in the sense of maximizing the mutual information between those graphical 
parents and their immediate graphical descendants).  In other words, the graphical 
structure which maximizes the likelihood score with reference to a particular empirical 
distribution will be the one which possesses a parent-to-child graphical topology which is 
able to embed the greatest proportion of the overall shared dependence between the 
variables into the parent-to-child links within that model.   
However, this propensity for the likelihood score to prefer models which 
increasingly place more and more of the overall dependency among the variables into the 
parent-to-child link structure can often result in serious ‘overfitting’ of the derived 
models.  As an example, consider the simple case of the comparison between  𝐺𝐺0 ∶ 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌  
and   𝐺𝐺1 ∶ 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 .  Since the difference in the likelihood scores between these two 
models is  𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃�  (𝑋𝑋; 𝑌𝑌) and mutual information is always nonnegative (and is strictly 
positive in all cases in which X and Y are not exactly independent within the empirical 
data), we see that the likelihood score will always prefer the model 𝐺𝐺1: 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 to the 
model 𝐺𝐺0: 𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌  no matter what the data set 40.    
40 This, of course, assumes that we are ruling out the set of cases in which X and Y happen to be exactly 
independent in some empirical data set.  However, the set of cases in which this occurs is clearly 
measure zero within the overall space of possible data sets. 
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3.5   Bayesian Structural Scores 
 In order to maintain the desirable features of the likelihood score, but remedy its 
propensity to severely overfit the data, we can attempt to “spread” the choice of model 
parameters 𝜃𝜃 away from a single “concentrated” choice 𝜃𝜃� and broaden this parameter 
choice to include more potential values for 𝜃𝜃, each “weighted” by some prior likelihood 
of its occurrence.  In other words, we can attempt to remedy the shortcomings of the 
likelihood score by ‘broadening’ it to incorporate a Bayesian model of the parameter 
estimation.41 
To facilitate the development of this broader type of structural measure, consider 
the overall goal of the overall structural estimation process:  namely to maximize the 
probability 𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺 | 𝐷𝐷), where 𝐺𝐺 represents a graphical structure (i.e., a Bayesian network) 
under consideration, and 𝐷𝐷 represents a specific data set collected from the intended 
domain of application for the network.  Now applying Bayes’ Theorem, we can rewrite 
this probability as: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺 | 𝐷𝐷)   =    𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)   (14) 
Since the denominator of this expression is essentially a normalizing factor that will be 
the same for any structure 𝐺𝐺 under consideration, we can restrict our attention to the 
properties of the numerator.  For simplicity, we can linearize the multiplicative form of 
41 This discussion of Bayesian structural scores follows from Koller and Friedman, 2009. 
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the numerator by taking logs, resulting in an expression that is often called the Bayesian 
score of the considered network 𝐺𝐺 in terms of the given data set 𝐷𝐷, viz.,  
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)   ∶=    𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  +  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) (15) 
 The second term in this expression, namely  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺), can be considered as a 
“structural prior” in the sense that we can assign some prior probability to different initial 
graphical structures.  However, the differences in the probabilities of any reasonable prior 
structures are typically minimal (Koller and Friedman, 2009), and this term is usually 
regarded as being negligible compared to the first term in this score function42.  The first 
term in Equation 15 is the log of the marginal likelihood of the data (given the structure), 
which can be computed using standard techniques as follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)   =    � 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 〈 𝐺𝐺 ,  𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ) 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 | 𝐺𝐺 ) 𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺
𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺
 (16) 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 〈 𝐺𝐺 ,  𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ) is the likelihood of the data 𝐷𝐷 given the network 〈 𝐺𝐺 ,  𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉, and 
𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 | 𝐺𝐺 ) represents our assumptions about the prior distribution of the parameters of the 
network structure.   
Since the marginal log-likelihood of the data, namely 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺), is the critical 
quantity in the Bayesian score of a data set, it will be very beneficial to examine its 
structure in greater detail.  To do so, we will make the reasonable assumption that the 
data are generated by a multinomial mechanism, and hence that we can utilize a 
42 For this reason, a uniform structural prior is often used in practice. 
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conjugate Dirichlet prior for the data.43  To develop a parameterized expression for the 
marginal log-likelihood of the data, assume that we have a very simple multinomial 
mechanism:  specifically a binomial mechanism with a Beta(𝛼𝛼1, 𝛼𝛼0) prior distribution 
over a single variable 𝑋𝑋.  Letting 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥0 denote the two possible outcomes of 𝑋𝑋, and 
assuming that our data set 𝐷𝐷 consists of 𝐵𝐵 observations, we can write the maximum 
likelihood function for the data as follows : 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝜃𝜃 �  )    =    � 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥1) 
𝐵𝐵
�
𝑀𝑀�𝑥𝑥1�
∙   � 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥0) 
𝐵𝐵
�
𝑀𝑀�𝑥𝑥0�
 
(17) 
where 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥1) and 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥0) represent the number of occurrences of the outcomes 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥0 
respectively within the 𝐵𝐵 observations that constitute the data set 𝐷𝐷. 
 Since the data were generated by a multinomial mechanism, we can compute the 
likelihood 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺) of the data given the graph by using a direct computation (rather than 
via the integral given in equation 16).  Specifically, using the chain rule, we can compute 
the probability of the 𝐵𝐵 observations in the data set 𝐷𝐷 as follows: 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀)   =   𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥2 | 𝑥𝑥1 ) ⋯  𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 | 𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀−1) (18) 
However, since we are using a Beta(𝛼𝛼1, 𝛼𝛼0)  prior for 𝑋𝑋, we can write the successive 
conditional probabilities in the following general form: 
43 The assumption of multinomial sampling is in keeping with basic Bayesian network practice, and also 
matches well with typical marketing survey data. 
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𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗+1 =  𝑥𝑥1 | 𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  �    =    𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥1) +  𝛼𝛼1 𝑗𝑗 +  𝛼𝛼  
𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗+1 =  𝑥𝑥0 | 𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  �    =    𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥0) +  𝛼𝛼0 𝑗𝑗 +  𝛼𝛼   
(19a) 
 
 
(19b) 
where  𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥1)  and  𝑗𝑗(𝑥𝑥0)  are the number of occurrences of outcomes  𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥0  
respectively within the first 𝑗𝑗 data observations, and where  𝛼𝛼 =  𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼0 .   Therefore, 
each of the 𝑗𝑗 factors in the probability expression we derive for any particular data string 
�𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� will either be of the form  𝛼𝛼1+ ℎ𝛼𝛼+𝑑𝑑    or   𝛼𝛼0+ 𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼+𝑑𝑑   where 𝑖𝑖 represents the 
observation number being evaluated (i.e., 1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑗𝑗 ), and where ℎ and 𝑝𝑝 represent the 
number of 𝑥𝑥1 or 𝑥𝑥0 outcomes respectively that were seen in the first 𝑖𝑖 − 1 data 
observations within that string. 
 Since the order of occurrence of the 𝐵𝐵 data observations that constitute the data 
set 𝐷𝐷 is irrelevant to the overall probability of the particular data string that was observed 
(i.e., since we are assuming exchangeability of the particular data observations within the 
string, and hence the overall numbers of each particular outcome are the sufficient 
statistics for that string, rather than the particular sequence of outcome occurrences 
itself), we can “group” all of the 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥0 outcomes separately and rewrite the overall 
probability of the data as : 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀) = [𝛼𝛼1 ∙ (𝛼𝛼1 +  1) ⋯ (𝛼𝛼1 +  𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥1)  − 1)] ∙ [𝛼𝛼0 ∙ (𝛼𝛼0 +  1) ⋯ (0 +  𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥0)  − 1)]
𝛼𝛼 ∙ (𝛼𝛼 + 1) ⋯  (𝛼𝛼 + 𝐵𝐵 − 1)  
 
(20) 
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Since 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼0 are hyperparameters for the distribution, they are not necessarily 
restricted to integer values, and hence we can use the gamma function to rewrite the 
expression in (20) in a more compact form, viz.,  
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀)   =    Γ(𝛼𝛼)  Γ(𝛼𝛼 + 𝐵𝐵)  ∙    Γ�𝛼𝛼1 + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥1)�  Γ(𝛼𝛼1)  ∙    Γ�𝛼𝛼0 + 𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥0)�  Γ(𝛼𝛼0)  (21) 
where we have utilized the relationship  𝛼𝛼 ∙ (𝛼𝛼 + 1) ⋯ (𝛼𝛼 + 𝐵𝐵 − 1)  =   Γ(𝛼𝛼+𝑀𝑀)
Γ(𝛼𝛼)    in order 
to reduce some of the iterated products in the original expression in Equation 20. 
 Now we can extend this derivation to the case of a multinomial (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) 
distribution over a single variable 𝑋𝑋 with a conjugate Dirichlet(𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2 , … , 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛) prior for 
the data.  A parallel derivation to that shown above gives the following analogous 
expression for the probability of the observed data : 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀)    =     Γ(𝛼𝛼)  Γ(𝛼𝛼 + 𝐵𝐵)  ∙  �   Γ �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖��  Γ(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) 𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
  (22) 
 In order to generalize this derivation even further so that it can encompass a full 
Bayesian network, we must ensure that the same type of modularity (or “locality of 
influence”) that exists in a simple multinomial example over one variable can be 
replicated in a more complex network structure.  We can ensure that such modularity will 
be maintained in a more general Bayesian network by imposing some regularity 
conditions, which will take the form of a global independence condition and a local 
independence condition on the network parameters (Koller and Friedman, 2009). 
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 To begin to derive these regularity conditions, we can first consider how to extend 
the previous case of a single variable 𝑋𝑋 into the more general case of two variables 
connected by a directed link  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌.   In such a case, we will need to jointly model the 
parameters and the data, such as shown in Figure 24 below (in which the data instances 
for X and Y are denoted by  𝑋𝑋1 , 𝑋𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀  and  𝑌𝑌1 , 𝑌𝑌2 , … , 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀 respectively). 
 
Figure 24.   Joint model of I.I.D. data and parameters for a single link  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 
From this figure, we can see that knowledge of the parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 will serve to 
d-separate each pair of linked observations 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  from each other such pair of linked 
observations 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 , 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 ( 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖 ).  Furthermore, given such a structure, each path between 
parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 is of the form  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 → 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 → 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ← 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 , and so the parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 
and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 will be d-separated from one another given observation of all the 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝑝𝑝  (or, 
𝑋𝑋1 
𝑌𝑌1 
𝑋𝑋2 
𝑌𝑌2 
𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀 
𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 
𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 
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technically, given the lack of observation of all the 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖′𝑝𝑝 , which we assume will not occur 
in a collected data set).    
Importantly, under such a data structure, if the parameters 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 were 
independent a priori, they will remain independent once updated by the network.  In other 
words, a network structure of this form will not induce any network-derived 
dependencies between a priori independent parameters.  Furthermore, under such a 
structure, it is possible to compute the posterior distributions over 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 
independently of each other.  This independence property of the parameters is what we 
want to “mirror” within more complex Bayesian networks.  More specifically, for a 
general Bayesian network with parameters 𝜃𝜃 =  �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋1|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋1 , … , 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 �  we will say that 
the prior 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃) possesses global parameter independence if it can be decomposed into a 
product  ∏ 𝑃𝑃 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖 .   Most standard priors will satisfy such a criterion, but if, for 
instance, it is assumed that certain nodes in the network “share” certain properties, such 
as the same propensity to assign certain values to observations, then such a global 
parameter independence criterion would fail to hold. 
In the setting of a general Bayesian network, the benefit of having a prior that 
satisfies global parameter independence can be further seen by analyzing the expression 
for the posterior distribution of the parameter:   
 
𝑃𝑃( 𝜃𝜃 | 𝐷𝐷 )    =    𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝜃𝜃 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃)
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)   (23) 
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In this expression, the 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝜃𝜃) term is the (global) likelihood function for the network, 
and general results from Bayesian network theory (e.g., Koller and Friedman, 2009) show 
that it can be decomposed into a product of local likelihoods: 
 𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝜃𝜃 )    =    �  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∶ 𝐷𝐷�
𝑖𝑖
 
=    �   �  𝑃𝑃 � (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚 � �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚  ∶  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 � 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
 (24) 
Since the marginal likelihood term 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷) in the denominator of the posterior 
distribution 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃 | 𝐷𝐷) is a normalizing factor (and additionally does not depend on G), the 
only remaining term to consider from the posterior distribution expression (23) is the 
expression for the prior distribution of the parameters.  This is where the assumption of 
global parameter independence becomes useful, since under this assumption, we can 
express  𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃)  as  ∏ 𝑃𝑃 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖   and hence the overall posterior for 𝜃𝜃 becomes: 
 
𝑃𝑃( 𝜃𝜃 | 𝐷𝐷 )    =    𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝜃𝜃 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃)
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)   
=     ∏  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∶ 𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖   ∏ 𝑃𝑃 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)  
=    1
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)  �  �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ∶ 𝐷𝐷�  ∙ 𝑃𝑃 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ��
𝑖𝑖
 
 
 
(25) 
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As Equation 25 shows, each component 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  of 𝜃𝜃 only contributes to one factor 
within the overall product expression for the posterior, and hence under this assumption 
of global parameter independence of the prior 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃), we can decompose the global 
posterior distribution into a product of local posterior distributions, viz.,  𝑃𝑃( 𝜃𝜃 | 𝐷𝐷 )  = ∏  𝑃𝑃 � 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  � 𝐷𝐷 �𝑖𝑖  . 
  As shown above, the global parameter independence condition allows us to 
reduce the global Bayesian estimation problem to a series of far simpler local Bayesian 
estimation problems.  However, within these local estimation problems, we will typically 
wish to assume a particular form of local parameter independence.  To derive this 
condition, once again consider the basic case of a single directed link  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 between 
two network variables.  In order to analyze the specific local properties of this structure, 
we will assume a simple binary distribution on each of these two variables, and a tabular 
CPD for representing their joint distribution.  In essence, this assumption amounts to 
adding a local model to the global structure shown in Figure 22. 
 In this model for the structure  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 , the binary variable 𝑋𝑋 is relatively easy to 
analyze: if we assume that we have a Dirichlet prior for its parameter 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 , then the 
posterior distribution of 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 given the data  𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀 , namely  𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 | 𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀), will 
once again be Dirichlet.  However, the remaining parameters are the conditional ones, 
namely the vector  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 =  𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦0|𝑥𝑥0 , … , 𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1 .  If we assume that the influence of each of 
𝑥𝑥0 and 𝑥𝑥1 are independent a priori, then we can use a separate Dirichlet prior for each of 
𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 and 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1, yielding the overall prior  𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋�  =  𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0� ∙ 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1� .   Given 
these assumptions, the modified version of Figure 22, in which we have added the local 
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parameterizations to the model, would appear as shown in Figure 25, below (where we 
are once again using  𝑋𝑋1 , 𝑋𝑋2 , … , 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀  and  𝑌𝑌1 , 𝑌𝑌2 , … , 𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀 to denote the various data 
instances). 
 
Figure 25.   Joint model of I.I.D. binary data and parameters for a link  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌 
 
 Interestingly, it would appear that observation of the data on 𝑌𝑌 would serve to 
correlate the two conditional parameters  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 and  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 (since observation of the 
central node 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 in a collider such as  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 → 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ←  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 will allow the two terminal 
variables to probabilistically influence each other).  However, the “choice” of which 
conditional parameter 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 or  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 actively governs the probability of a specific data 
instance on 𝑌𝑌 is actually a function of which particular outcome ( 𝑥𝑥0 or 𝑥𝑥1 ) was observed 
for 𝑋𝑋 during that particular realization of the network data.   
𝑋𝑋1 
𝑌𝑌1 
𝑋𝑋2 
𝑌𝑌2 
𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀 
𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀 
𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋 
𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 
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Specifically, if the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ observation 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 of variable 𝑋𝑋 happens to show value 𝑥𝑥0 , 
then the conditional distribution of observation  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 for variable 𝑌𝑌 will be governed by 
parameter 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0, and the link from 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 to 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 in the collider  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 → 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ←  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1  will no 
longer be active.  In symmetric fashion, of course, the link from 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 to 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  in the collider 
structure  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 → 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ← 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1  will become inactive whenever the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ observation 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 of 
variable 𝑋𝑋 happens to show value 𝑥𝑥1.  Therefore, for each realization of the data for these 
variables, we have a form of context-specific independence of 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0 and  𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1 given the 
particular value of the variable 𝑋𝑋 that was observed, namely the relation  𝑃𝑃� 𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 � 𝐷𝐷 �  = 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0  � 𝐷𝐷 � ∙ 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1  � 𝐷𝐷 � .   Based on this analysis, we can show that if the priors  
𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0� and 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1� are Dirichlet with hyperparameters  �𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦0|𝑥𝑥0  , 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥0�  and  
�𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦0|𝑥𝑥1  , 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1�  respectively, then the posterior distributions 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0  � 𝐷𝐷 �  and  
𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1  � 𝐷𝐷 �  will be also be Dirichlet with updated hyperparameters   � 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦0|𝑥𝑥0 + 𝐵𝐵[𝑥𝑥0, 𝑦𝑦0]  ,  𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥0 +  𝐵𝐵[𝑥𝑥0, 𝑦𝑦1] �  and  � 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦0|𝑥𝑥1 +  𝐵𝐵[𝑥𝑥1, 𝑦𝑦0]  ,  𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1 +  𝐵𝐵[𝑥𝑥1, 𝑦𝑦1] �  
respectively (Koller and Friedman, 2009). 
 We now wish to apply this form of network decomposition to a more general 
Bayesian network structure.  As was the case above, we wish to be able to guarantee that 
if we have Dirichlet priors for the parameters of our network, that we will be able to once 
again recover Dirichlet posterior parameter distributions from that network.  First, we 
need to extend our previous analysis of a network variable 𝑌𝑌 and its graphical parent 𝑋𝑋, 
and instead consider the more general situation of a variable 𝑋𝑋 and its set of graphical 
parents 𝑈𝑈.  As we did above, we will wish to assume that the prior distribution  𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈) 
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over the conditional parameter 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈 can be written as a product of local priors involving 
the graphical parents of 𝑋𝑋.   Therefore, we will extend our two-variable local 
independence assumption   𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋� = 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥0� ∙ 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥1�  by instead writing this 
assumption as  𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈�  =  ∏ 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑢𝑢�𝑢𝑢  .    
Once again, as was done in the simpler case of a single directed link  𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌, it 
will typically be beneficial to “couple” the two assumptions of global and local parameter 
independence.  As described above, global parameter independence asserts that the global 
prior 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃) can be decomposed into a product  ∏ 𝑃𝑃 �𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖   of local priors for the 
parameters corresponding to each variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 conditional on its set of graphical parents in 
the network.  Following this, the assumption of local parameter independence will allow 
us to write each local prior  𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑈𝑈�  as a product  ∏ 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑢𝑢�𝑢𝑢   of priors for 𝑋𝑋 
conditional on each individual parent  𝑝𝑝 ∈ 𝑈𝑈.   
In analogy to the procedure used in the previous example, once we assume both 
the global and the local parameter independence conditions for the prior 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃), we can 
extend the previous analysis to show that the posterior distribution for the parameters will 
also have a local decomposition, given by Equation 26 (e.g., Koller and Friedman, 2009). 
 𝑃𝑃( 𝜃𝜃 | 𝐷𝐷 )    =     �  �  𝑃𝑃 � 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  � 𝐷𝐷 �
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 (26) 
Based on this local decomposition, we can also show that if each 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑢𝑢� is Dirichlet 
with hyperparameters �𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥1|𝑢𝑢 , … , 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛|𝑢𝑢� ,  then the posterior distribution 𝑃𝑃�𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋|𝑢𝑢 � 𝐷𝐷 � 
will be Dirichlet with hyperparameters �𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥1|𝑢𝑢 + 𝐵𝐵[𝑝𝑝, 𝑥𝑥1] , … , 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛|𝑢𝑢 + 𝐵𝐵[𝑝𝑝, 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛] �.   
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 Now we can apply these results to the estimation of the Bayesian score for a given 
network.  Recall that this score is derived from the numerator of the expression for the 
posterior probability of a graph given the observed data, namely  𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺 | 𝐷𝐷) =  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)∙𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)      
Specifically,  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  is defined as the log of this numerator, i.e.,  
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  ∶=  log  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  + log  𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) .   Since the structural prior 𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) 
typically makes a negligible contribution to the score, we instead focused upon the term 
containing the marginal likelihood of the data given the graph structure, namely 
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺), which can be computed as  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺) =  ∫ 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 〈 𝐺𝐺 ,  𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺〉 ) 𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺 | 𝐺𝐺 ) 𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺  .    
Our goal is to further characterize this integral by applying the global and the 
local parameter independence assumptions for the prior.  Under the global parameter 
independence assumption only, this integral can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺 ) = 
  � � �  𝑃𝑃 � (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚 � �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚,  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , 𝐺𝐺 �
𝑚𝑚 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃 � 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 � 𝐺𝐺� 𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖   
 
 
(27) 
In addition, if we also maintain the local parameter independence assumption, we can 
further break this expression down “parent-by-parent” within the parental set 𝑈𝑈, giving us 
the expanded integrand sown in Equation 28: 
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𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺 )  = 
� �  �  � 𝑃𝑃� (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚 � 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  ,  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , 𝐺𝐺 �
𝑚𝑚 ∶ (𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖)𝑚𝑚=𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉�𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃� 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� 𝐺𝐺�𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (28) 
Now recall that in the case of a multinomial (𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛  ) distribution over a 
single variable 𝑋𝑋 with a conjugate Dirichlet(𝛼𝛼1 , 𝛼𝛼2 , … , 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛) prior for the data, we were 
able to show that the probability of the data reduced to the expression   𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀)  =
  Γ(𝛼𝛼)  Γ(𝛼𝛼+𝑀𝑀)  ∙  ∏   Γ�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝑀𝑀�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖��  Γ(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  .  In the more general case of a Bayesian network with 
graphical structure 𝐺𝐺, we will similarly be able to use the closed-form expression for the 
marginal likelihood of the Dirichlet prior in order to derive an analogous expression for 
the probability of the data given the graphical structure of the network (Koller and 
Friedman, 2009):  
     𝑃𝑃( 𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺 )   =   
     �  �  Γ�𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�  Γ�𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 +  𝐵𝐵[𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖] � 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   ∙ �   Γ �𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝐵𝐵�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖��  Γ �𝛼𝛼
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� 
𝑛𝑛
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)     (29) 
where  � 𝛼𝛼
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∶   𝑗𝑗 = 1 , … , |𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖| �  are the hyperparameters for  𝑃𝑃 � 𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 � 𝐺𝐺� ,  and 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 =  ∑  𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  are the summed “pseudo-counts” associated with the respective 
Dirichlet hyperparameters.   
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Overall, the Bayesian score for a Bayesian network with Dirichlet priors will be 
of the form:  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  ∶=  log  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  +  log  𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) , where the  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  term 
will have the closed-form expression given in Equation 29, and where the structural prior 
𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) will typically be either uniform or close to uniform (and will typically play a 
negligible role compared to the 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  term).     
Asymptotically as the size 𝐵𝐵 of the data set goes to infinity, the Bayesian score 
does approach the relatively simpler Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) measure given 
by  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  ∶=  𝑟𝑟� 𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷 �  −   𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝑀2 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺]  , where the 𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 are the MLE 
parameters for the network, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺] measures the number of independent parameters 
in the network (MacKay, 2003; Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Furthermore, it can be 
shown that both the BIC and Bayesian measures are consistent up to Markov equivalence 
(i.e., both measures will converge to some member of the Markov equivalence class of 
the “true” generating structure 𝐺𝐺∗ as the size 𝐵𝐵 of the data set goes to infinity).  
Therefore, in cases where one merely wishes to utilize the derived graphical 
structure to compute marginals over various queries, it might seemingly suffice to derive 
the graphical structure by optimizing any particular consistent scoring function.  
However, when one needs to allow for directionality within the derived structure to play 
a role, this entails the use of the structure to potentially compute the results of 
interventions to the graph, as well as to distinguish between which direction represents 
predictive reasoning in the mind of the consumers, versus which direction represents 
diagnostic reasoning for those consumers.  Since such queries are particularly sensitive to 
the specific “microstructure” of the network, one needs to be sure that the structural 
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measure that most directly reflects that microstructure is utilized in the structural 
estimation procedure.  Hence, for Bayesian network modeling tasks in which such 
microstructural and directional considerations are likely to prove critical, it may be safest 
to utilize either the Bayesian measure, or the closely related Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) measure. 
What is especially interesting about the Bayesian structural score itself is that it is 
able to be a consistent estimator of the generating distribution without requiring any 
explicit ‘penalizing’ function for structural complexity.  Compare this with other 
consistent structural estimators derived from information-based (i.e., entropy or minimum 
description length) concerns, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score, for 
example.  Recall that the Bayesian Information Criterion measure is given by the 
function:   𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  ∶=  𝑟𝑟� 𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷 �  −   𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝑀2 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺]  ,  where  𝜃𝜃�𝐺𝐺  are the 
MLE parameters for the network, 𝐵𝐵 represents the cardinality of the data on which the 
estimate is made, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺] measures the number of independent parameters in the 
derived network.  This score can be re-written to more explicitly represent its 
information-theoretic foundations as follows (Koller and Friedman, 2009): 
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺: 𝐷𝐷) ∶=   𝐵𝐵 � 𝑰𝑰𝑃𝑃�� 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �  −  𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
� 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)  −  𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵2 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺]𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
         
 
(30) 
The entropy term in this expression (i.e., the second term on the right-hand side) 
is not sensitive to the specific graphical structure of the underlying network, and hence 
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this term will not influence the choice of network structure.  This leaves a trade-off 
between the positive contribution of the mutual information term  𝐵𝐵 ∑ 𝑰𝑰𝑃𝑃�� 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   
and the negative contribution of the model complexity term  𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝑀
2
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚[𝐺𝐺] .  Therefore, a 
measure such as  𝐵𝐵 ∑ 𝑰𝑰𝑃𝑃�� 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   which is based purely on the shared information 
between the various nodes of the network and their graphical ‘parents’ will need to be 
augmented by a complexity-penalizing term in order to avoid overfitting.  On the other 
hand, the Bayesian measure (namely, the measure given by  𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵 (𝐺𝐺 ∶ 𝐷𝐷)  ∶= log  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  +  log  𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) ,  where the  𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷 | 𝐺𝐺)  term is given by the closed-form 
expression given in Equation 29, and where the structural prior 𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺) will typically be 
either uniform or close to uniform) is able to be a consistent structural estimator without 
the need for introducing such a complexity-penalizing term because the Bayesian 
measure simply incorporates the precise independence relationships that would be 
expected from multinomial data within a directed graphical structure which obeys the 
specific local and global parameter independence properties that are quite natural to 
expect in such circumstances.  In other words, although other measures such as the B.I.C. 
criterion can also aggregate individual data into a joint structure, it does not accomplish 
this task in as natural of a manner as the Bayesian structural measure.     
Furthermore, since the mutual information term within the B.I.C. measure is a 
linear function of the data size 𝐵𝐵 while the model complexity “penalty” term is a 
logarithmic function of 𝐵𝐵, the complexity penalty term will have its maximum relative 
contribution (relative to the contribution of the mutual information, or “model-fit” term) 
when the size of the data set is small (Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Hence, with 
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moderately-sized data sets, the structural differences between the independence-derived 
Bayesian score and the information-theoretic B.I.C. score may prove to be important, and 
one may wish to utilize the Bayesian score in such cases. This is especially true in cases 
where one wishes to maximally discern differences between the predictive and diagnostic 
directions within the brand concept map of the targeted population.44 
Additionally, one should note that the B.I.C. measure converges to the Bayesian 
measure in the large-sample limit.  Since in the large-sample limit, the mutual 
information term  𝐵𝐵 ∑ 𝑰𝑰𝑃𝑃�� 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ;  𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  of the B.I.C. measure vastly predominates, this 
implies that the Bayesian measure must also be maximizing the ability of the parents of 
each node to explain the values of their child nodes (Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Within 
the B.I.C. measure, the relative contributions of the complexity penalty and the mutual 
information term vary as the sample size grows.  However, the structure of the Bayesian 
measure remains constant over increasing sample sizes.  Hence the Bayesian measure’s 
propensity to maximize the parent-to-child predictiveness must be occurring at all 
different sample sizes.  Therefore for multinomial data (which is the predominant form of 
data encountered in typical survey-based marketing research), the Bayesian measure 
represents an essentially optimal means of aggregating the subjects’ individual data in 
such a way as to consistently derive structures in which the parents of each node can 
maximally explain the values of their child nodes at each particular sample size. 
44 In general, if one only wishes to use a Bayesian network to compute the results of conditional or 
marginal queries, then the directions of the given links are not as important as the overall link topology 
(Koller and Friedman, 2009).  However, for distinguishing predictive versus diagnostic reasoning, or for 
examining the potential results of interventions versus observations, the link directionality will also be a 
critical factor in the model. 
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3.6   Application: Score-Based Structure Estimation of Brand Concept Maps for 
Retailers Old Navy and Abercrombie & Fitch 
 Analysis method.  In order to illustrate the use of score-based Bayesian network 
structural estimation procedures, these methodologies were applied to the derivation of 
brand concept maps for two well-known retailers: Old Navy and Abercrombie & Fitch.  
Initially, a set of open-ended questions concerning these retailers was administered to a 
cross-section of undergraduates at a large Southwestern university.  The responses to 
these open-ended questions were then analyzed by several team members and those 
recovered concepts which were repeated across multiple subjects were retained for 
further study.  A pilot questionnaire was created based on these retained associations and 
was once again administered to the same set of undergraduates.  The twenty-five brand 
associations which received the highest number of responses on this pilot questionnaire 
were then utilized in a larger-scale follow-up survey in which 800 undergraduates were 
asked to separately rate how strongly they associated each of these attributes with the 
retailer Abercrombie & Fitch and with the retailer Old Navy.  The order in which these 
two retailers appeared in the questionnaires was reversed on half of the administered 
surveys.  Responses were given on a simple five point Likert scale (anchored by 1 = not 
at all and 5 = strongly associated).  Due to a small number of non-responses, the final 
number of recovered surveys differed slightly from 800.    
 Since the number of possible directed acyclic graph structures on n variables is 
super-exponential in n (Friedman and Koller, 2003), it is not necessarily possible to 
reliably estimate a full directed structure on all twenty five variables based on the number 
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of data observations that were collected for this study.45  Hence a representative subset of 
thirteen variables was selected from this larger set of brand associations.   
 In order to derive the structure of the corresponding brand concept maps based on 
these particular variables, a Bayesian search procedure was utilized, as implemented in 
the GeNie program suite, version 2.0 (available from genie.sis.pitt.edu).  This algorithm 
begins with a random directed acyclic graph structure connecting all variables in the 
domain, and uses a greedy hill climbing procedure with random restarts to traverse the 
space of possible directed acyclic graphs based on those variables (Heckerman, 1995; 
Chickering, Geiger, and Heckerman, 1995; Chickering, 1996).  At each stage of the 
search procedure, the algorithm examines every directed acyclic graph structure which is 
a neighbor of the current DAG (within the space of possible DAG structures), and 
iteratively moves to that neighboring structure which has the highest Bayesian structural 
score.46  Within this search procedure, a ‘neighboring structure’ is one which is 
obtainable from the current structure by applying any one of three allowed structural 
perturbations: the addition of a directed edge, the deletion of a directed edge 47, or the 
reversal of the direction of an edge that is already included in the structure (Chickering, 
1995, 1996; Koller and Friedman, 2009).48   The Bayesian search procedure utilized here 
45 Since we further partitioned the data for each retailer by respondent gender, this resulted in 
approximately 400 data observations for each of the four data subsets (two retailers by two genders).  
Also note that the size of the space of directed acyclic graphs on 25 variables means that heuristic search 
methods will likely be required to search this space no matter what the size of the data set might be. 
46 Depending on the number of variables involved, a reasonable limit is sometimes placed on the number of 
allowable parents that each node may have. 
47 Edge deletions can potentially raise the overall structural score of the network if the removed edge 
provides redundant information about the states of the child node that it points to. 
48 Technically, one could accomplish an edge reversal by first deleting that edge and then adding back an 
edge with the reverse orientation at that same location, which would seem to make edge reversal a 
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also incorporates a particular prior distribution into the Bayesian score measure, namely 
the BDeu prior, which has several desirable properties, the most notable of which is that 
it assigns equal scores to all Markov-equivalent Bayesian network structures (Buntine, 
1991; Heckerman et al., 1995).   
 Utilizing these techniques, the search for a Bayesian network based brand concept 
map was performed separately on four different subsets of the collected data: 
Abercrombie & Fitch - female respondents (henceforth termed “A&F-females”), 
Abercrombie & Fitch - male respondents (termed “A&F-males”), Old Navy - female 
respondents, and Old Navy - male respondents.  Recall that the Bayesian search 
procedure operates via a greedy hill-climbing algorithm with random restarts within the 
large space of all directed acyclic graphs formed from the variables in the study.  Since 
this implies that the algorithm approaches a maximum from multiple random directions, 
we took even further advantage of this randomization aspect by executing the algorithm 
multiple times within each of the four data sets until each data set yielded multiple runs in 
which the same maximum-scoring structure was returned.  Such a result implies that the 
same maximal structure had been found beginning from multiple, highly different 
directions.  Hence these multiple runs of the program which resulted in the same structure 
provided further evidence that the recovered structures were highly unlikely to simply 
superfluous rule.  However, removal of an edge often results in a lower Bayesian structural score 
(especially if the parent node of that edge has any appreciable explanatory power over the child node of 
that edge, above and beyond the influence that other possible collections of parent nodes have on that 
child node).  Hence a strictly monotonic greedy hill-climbing procedure would not locate such a 
neighboring structure unless edge reversal is included as an explicitly permissible transformational rule.   
(See Chickering, 1995, 1996, and Koller and Friedman, 2009, for more details.) 
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represent local maxima, but rather, that they truly represented the global maxima for the 
Bayesian score as applied to that data set.49    
Results and discussion.  The brand concept maps for Abercrombie & Fitch and 
Old Navy which are derived by this procedure are presented in Figures 26 and 27 
respectively.  A comparative analysis of these four brand concept maps follows below. 
Gender differences in the perception of trendiness.  One critical difference that 
is readily apparent between males and females across both retailers is that females seem 
to regard “Trendy” as the central feature of their brand concepts, while males place 
“Trendy” in a much more peripheral position in both cases.  Probing these differences 
even further, one finds that males seem to have a relatively superficial concept of 
“Trendy”, since in each case they conceive of “Trendy” as being predictive of only some 
fairly overt brand characteristics.  For instance, in the case of A&F, males view “Trendy” 
as predictive of brand characteristics such as “Bright Colors”, “Crowded”, and “Stylish” 
(which, for males’ perceptions of A&F, is a maximally peripheral association).  
Similarly, males perceive of trendiness for Old Navy as merely being predictive of 
“Preppy”, which in this case may be regarded as essentially synonymous with “Trendy”, 
i.e., males seem to regard trendiness for Old Navy as simply indicating the form of 
trendiness that they perceive to exist at that retailer, namely “Preppy”.   
49 Due to the heuristic nature of this approach (along with the exceedingly large size of the space of all 
possible DAG structures formed from these variables), the procedure may get “trapped” within a local 
“plateau” of structures which have the same Bayesian structural score (such as a set of members of the 
same Markov equivalence class, for instance).  Of course, this possibility is strongly ameliorated by the 
algorithm’s use of random restarts within each run.  Nevertheless, some runs of the program within each 
data set would return idiosyncratic structures which had lower overall scores than the eventual structure 
which was accepted as the optimal one for that data set.  For each of the four data sets, the structure that 
was declared to be the optimal one was returned the most often by the multiple runs of the program, and 
had the highest score out of all of the returned structures for that data set.   
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While males in both cases seem to regard “Trendy” as nothing more than a 
convenient ‘label’ for several other overt brand characteristics, females in both cases 
seem to have a much more nuanced interpretation of trendiness.  For instance, within 
their brand concept maps for Old Navy, females see trendiness as being predictive of 
both stylishness and variety, as well as having an ‘excitement’ component.  Further, 
within the brand concept map for Abercrombie & Fitch, females see trendiness as being 
diagnostic of “Exciting”, and predictive of “Stylish” (and hence also of “Sexy”, which is 
a child node of “Stylish”).  However, within this same brand image, females also see 
“Trendy” as having a more superficial component, leading to “Tight Fit”, “Bright 
Colors”, as well as the entire cluster of ‘teenage’ concerns (such as “Teens”, “Preppy”, 
and “Girly”).  Hence females see trendiness for Abercrombie & Fitch as having both a 
‘serious’ component (“Exciting”, “Stylish”, “Sexy”) which is likely related to the deeper 
meaning of this concept for females, as well as a more trivial component (“Tight Fit”, 
“Bright Colors”, “Teens”, “Preppy”, and “Girly”) which likely describes what females 
perceive to be a component of the type of trendiness offered by this particular retailer.   
Of course, such gender-based differences in the perceptions of trendiness should 
come as no surprise since clothing trends are known to form a system of non-verbal 
communication (Holman, 1980; McCracken and Roth, 1989), and further, as shown by 
Myers-Levy and Maheswaran (1991) and Myers-Levy and Sternthal (1991), there are 
systematic differences in males’ and females’ modes of information processing as well as 
their utilization of message cues.  Hence, the finding that females seem to utilize the 
characteristics of both Abercrombie & Fitch and Old Navy to form more complex social 
144 
 
codes involving responsiveness to fashion trends than do males is certainly to be 
expected based on former research.  However, the directional brand concept maps 
derived via a Bayesian network analysis of this brand data also reveal some surprising 
differences even within females’ views of the trendiness construct, as is detailed in the 
next subsection.   
Excitingness and the trendiness/stylishness construct.  As another indicator of 
the comparative complexity of females’ perceptions of trendiness, the variables “Trendy” 
and “Stylish” have the same bivariate relationship within females’ views of both retailers’ 
brand images (namely “Trendy” directly implies “Stylish” in both cases), but the location 
of these two variables in reference to the remainder of the brand image differs in each 
case.  For instance, within the A&F brand image for females, “Stylish” leads to “Sexy” 
and “Crowded”, whereas “Trendy” leads to both “Bright Colors” and “Tight Fit”, and 
hence indirectly to “Teens”, “Preppy”, and “Girly”.  Thus within the A&F image for 
females, it seems that the form of stylishness offered by the brand is a ‘sexy’ form of 
style, but the types of trends satisfied by the brand are trends toward tight-fitting clothes 
that are predictive of teens, preppiness, and girliness.  On the other hand, within females’ 
brand image for Old Navy, the form of style that females perceive the brand to offer is 
one of girliness, teens, preppiness, and bright colors, while the aspects of trendiness that 
females perceive the brand to offer comprise associations such as “Exciting” and 
“Variety”.  Hence, females seem to perceive Old Navy as catering to a ‘teen’ type of 
style, and a form of trendiness that seems more reminiscent of the type of shopping 
145 
 
experience offered by the store (“Variety” and “Exciting”) rather than a specific type of 
clothing style per se.   
Now consider the fact that for the A&F-females brand image, “Exciting” leads to 
“Variety” and “Trendy”.  This indicates that females may perceive of A&F as being 
exciting because it offers variety and a specific form of trendiness which consists of a 
‘teen popularity’ component as well as a sexy style component.  In comparison, females 
seem to perceive of Old Navy as being trendy because it is an exciting and variety-laden 
place to shop.  In other words, it seems as though females’ view of Old Navy centers 
more around the shopping experience as being a reason for its trendiness (while its style 
is centered on teen concerns), while on the other hand females’ view A&F as being 
exciting because of the trends it satisfies (which has a teen component as well as a sexy 
style component).  Thus the directional relation between ‘excitingness’ and the general 
concepts of trendiness and style are effectively reversed for these two retailers, and this is 
an insight that is made apparent by the directional nature of the Bayesian network-
derived brand concept maps.   
Gender-based perceptions of “Working Out” and “Sexy”.  Although there are a 
myriad of differences between females’ and males’ brand concept maps for these two 
retailers, the differences between males’ and females’ perceptions of the roles of the 
“Working Out” variable and the “Sexy” variable are particularly instructive.  For 
example, whereas males consistently perceive of “Working Out” as an outcome of 
“Exciting” across both retailers’ brand constructs, females place “Working Out” in 
different positions in each case.  Within the brand concept map for Abercrombie & Fitch, 
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females place “Working Out” as a consequence of “Preppy”, while within the Old Navy 
brand concept map, females place “Working Out” as a direct consequence of “Tight Fit”.   
These findings make sense in light of the directional differences in females’ 
perceived relationships between the excitingness construct and the trendiness/stylishness 
construct.  As was described in the previous subsection, females seem to view the 
trendiness of Old Navy as having a major component that is simply based on the 
shopping experience at that retailer, i.e., the trendiness of the brand is, to a large extent, 
manifested as ‘excitingness’ and ‘variety’, both of which would describe the shopping 
experience rather than the clothes per se.  Hence it makes sense that for this retailer, 
females see “Working Out” in utilitarian terms, i.e., as simply an outcome of “Tight Fit” 
(which is a logical relationship between these constructs) rather than as possessing any 
sort of stylistic relevance or expressiveness for the brand, since the brand is seemingly 
more characterized by the shopping experience than by the clothing styles.   
On the other hand, as we also saw in the previous subsection, females tend to 
view the Abercrombie & Fitch brand as being exciting because it is trendy and has a sexy 
style, i.e., the A&F brand seems to predominantly be viewed via the stylistic statement it 
makes rather than by the shopping experience per se.  Hence, in this case, the position in 
which females place “Working Out” within the brand concept map also makes a great 
deal of sense, because it is positioned as an outcome (or diagnostic indicator) of a stylistic 
component of the brand (namely “Preppy”). 
The two genders also differ greatly in their placement of the brand association 
“Sexy”.  Specifically, whereas females tend to place this construct in relatively peripheral 
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positions, males on the other hand (perhaps not surprisingly) place “Sexy” very close to 
the center of their brand concept maps in each case examined.  In fact, within their brand 
concept maps of Abercrombie & Fitch, males actually place “Sexy” as a central ‘source 
node’ (i.e., an ‘exogenous’ node which ‘drives’ all of its neighboring nodes, which in this 
case were ‘Exciting’ and ‘Tight Fit’).  Furthermore, within their brand concepts of Old 
Navy, males place “Sexy” as a central node which serves to connect “Exciting” and 
“Stylish”.   
Lastly, note that there are interesting gender-based differences in the perceptions 
of the role of the variable “Tight Fit” within these retailers’ brand concept maps, and 
these differences tend to parallel the findings made for the brand association “Sexy”.  For 
instance, for female respondents, “Tight Fit” was either an immediate antecedent or an 
immediate consequent of “Trendy”, indicating that females viewed “Tight Fit” as a form 
of either predictive or diagnostic indicator of the overall trendiness of the brand.  
However males on the other hand consistently placed “Tight Fit” as an outcome of 
“Sexy”, which indicates that they are viewing this variable in much more direct physical 
terms than do the female respondents.  Of course, these findings once again reinforce the 
notion that males and females are utilizing these two brands as different forms of 
consumption or style codes (e.g., McCracken and Roth, 1989), with females holding 
much more complex definitions of this code than do males. 
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4.   Inference in Bayesian Network Structures 
4.1   A Bayesian Network-based Measure of Brand Association Strength  
 Due to the directed nature of the links in a Bayesian network, the definition of 
connection strength measurements can be more complex than for comparable undirected 
networks (Jitnah, 1999).  In their extensive study of such measures, Nicholson and Jitnah 
(1998) determined that the mutual information measure of dependence (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949) has superior properties than do other forms of dependence measure when 
used as the foundation for a link strength calculus within Bayesian network structures.   
 In order to describe the development of such mutual information-based link 
strength measures for Bayesian networks, recall that the uncertainty of a random variable 
X can be quantified by its entropy H(X), defined as follows (Shannon and Weaver, 1949): 
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋)   =   � 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2 1 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)    =   − � 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
 
 
 
(31) 
Utilizing the entropy measure of uncertainty, one can then define the mutual information 
between two random variables X and Y as the difference between the uncertainty of either 
of the two variables versus that variable’s uncertainty given that the value of the other 
variable of the pair is known, as follows (MacKay, 2003; Ebert-Uphoff, 2007): 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌)   =   𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋)   =  � 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦)  
𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  
 
 
(32) 
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where the entropy 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) of the conditional distribution of Y given X is defined as the 
weighted average of the uncertainty of Y given each possible value of the conditioning 
variable X, viz., 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) =  ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 .  Furthermore, note that since the joint 
probability 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) in Equation (32) can be written as the product of the associated 
conditional and marginal probabilities, i.e., 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦) ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦), 
we can also express the mutual information between X and Y in the form: 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌)   =   � 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦)
𝑦𝑦
� 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦) 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦) 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥)   
𝑥𝑥
 
 
 
(33) 
 Since Bayesian network structures involve graphical representations of 
conditional independence relations, we must extend the mutual information measure to 
such conditional distributions.  For example, the mutual information between variables X 
and Y conditional on knowledge of a third variable Z can be defined analogously to the 
unconditional case (MacKay, 2003; Ebert-Uphoff, 2007), namely as 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌 | 𝑍𝑍)  = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑍𝑍) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍), where the conditional entropy is given by  𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)  = ∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥 , i.e., by the weighted average of the conditional entropy of Y 
given knowledge of the states of X and Z (where the weighted averaging is performed 
over all possible configurations of the states of X and Z).  Expansion of this expression 
yields a conditional mutual information expression which is analogous to the 
unconditional version given in Equation (32), as follows (MacKay, 2003; Ebert-Uphoff, 
2007):  
150 
 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋, 𝑌𝑌 | 𝑍𝑍)  =   � 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) � 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)
𝑦𝑦
𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦|𝑧𝑧)   
𝑥𝑥,𝑥𝑥  
 
 
(34) 
In order to focus this measure on the quantification of the strength of one 
particular link connecting variable X  to variable Y , we follow Ebert-Uphoff (2007) and 
define the conditioning set Z  in Equation 34 as being the set of all other graphical parents 
of Y  (i.e., those graphical parents of Y  which are disjoint from X) within the given 
Bayesian network structure.  In this manner, the act of conditioning on all other parents Z  
of Y  which are disjoint from the other parent X  renders the link X  → Y  the only active 
predictive link into variable Y , and hence the recovered strength measure will uniquely 
correspond to just this one link.  Hence when the conditioning set Z in Equation 34 
corresponds to the set of parents of Y which are disjoint from X, we refer to this measure 
as the link strength 𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌).  
Based on the meaning of the mutual information measure, the strength 𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌) 
of a given link X  → Y  as defined by Equation 34 represents the weighted average 
reduction in the uncertainty about the value of Y which can be attributed to knowledge of 
the state of the parent node X, given each possible combination Z of the other parent 
nodes of Y (Ebert-Uphoff, 2007).  This value can also be thought of as a measure of the 
amount of information contained in that link, and also as a relative measure of the degree 
to which the distribution of the antecedent variable X will affect the distribution of the 
consequent variable Y  (Nicholson and Jitnah, 1998; Jitnah, 1999).   
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4.2   Application: Link Strength Analysis of the Taco Prima Brand Concept Map 
As an illustration of its usefulness in quantifying the relationships within brand 
concept maps, the link strength measure 𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌) defined by Equation 34 was applied 
to the Taco Prima brand concept map derived in Section 3.3.  In each case, the link 
strength values 𝑆𝑆(𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌) were computed via a large spreadsheet analysis in which the 
values of each parent of the target variable Y  were conditioned on prior to computing the 
strength of the connection from X  to Y  in order to ensure that the link strength measure 
was specific to just the one directed link 𝑋𝑋 → 𝑌𝑌.  The resulting link strength values for 
the Taco Prima brand concept map are shown in Figure 28 (in which we utilized the one-
letter abbreviations for each brand association in order to facilitate displaying the link 
strength values directly within the same diagram as the association names).50 
 
 
Figure 28.  Link strength analysis for the Taco Prima brand concept map 
50 Recall that association “C” stands for “Inexpensive” (i.e., “Cheap”), while “I” stands for “Innovative”. 
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Clearly, the one link strength value that stands out in this brand concept map is 
that of the link from “New Things” to “Unique”.  In fact, S (NewThings → Unique) is 
over twice as large as any other link strength quantity within this brand concept map.  
From a strategic viewpoint, this finding is intriguing because this particular extremely 
strong link is located precisely in the center of the critical pathway Inexpensive → 
NewThings → Unique → Memories, which is the pathway that was hypothesized earlier to 
be the core driver of brand equity for this firm.  Furthermore, this critical pathway is the 
one which was identified (through Markov equivalence class analysis) to possess all of 
the allowable cognitive variations which are still consistent with the dependence and 
independence relations in the collected data.   
This finding raises the interesting conjecture of whether the permissible cognitive 
variations51 which can exist for a given brand concept structure essentially must 
encompass any extremely strong links in that structure.  Such a conjecture may hold true 
since such extremely strong links possess more information regarding the variables 
involved than do weaker links within that structure, and if consumers are going to hold 
differing directional (i.e., predictive and diagnostic) beliefs about a brand’s associations, 
it is quite plausible that these differences would center around variables which hold a 
great deal of information for those consumers’ understanding of the brand associations 
involved.   
51 By a permissible cognitive variation, we mean a structural variant which neither contradicts any 
established conditional independence relations nor establishes any new ones that were not identified in 
the data. 
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Stated more simply, if consumers are going to differ over something, they are 
likely to differ over something that has a lot of meaning for them.  In fact, a converse 
conjecture would be that quite possibly, a particular link (such as the link between New 
Things and Unique in the Taco Prima brand concept map) is quite important (i.e., has a 
high link strength value, and hence holds a great deal of information) because it serves to 
differentiate between different consumers’ cognitions about the brand.  Furthermore, this 
converse conjecture may be especially true when the inter-group or inter-consumer 
differences are directional in nature (as they are here), since directional beliefs are likely 
to possess an “if-then” character, and such “if-then” beliefs can serve as informal 
hypotheses of what causes or leads to what within a brand concept or a more general 
consumption domain (Hoch and Deighton, 1989; Sirsi, Ward, and Reingen, 1996). 
 
4.3   Application: Link Strength Analysis of the Old Navy and Abercrombie & Fitch  
Brand Concept Maps 
Link strength analysis was also applied to the brand concept maps for the retailers 
Abercrombie & Fitch and Old Navy.  Once again, the conditional mutual information-
based link strength measure defined in Equation 34 was utilized.  The resulting link 
strength values for both the males’ and females’ brand concept maps for each of these 
retailers are shown in Figures 29 and 30.  Since these are more extensive brand concept 
maps, the resulting link strength patterns show a large degree of variability across the 
four retailer brand concepts studied, but some interesting patterns do emerge.   
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Since we have four brand concept maps to compare, we can address questions 
such as whether the more ‘central’ links between brand associations tend to be stronger 
than the more peripheral links.  In this case, the answer quite obviously is “no”, since 
there are many peripheral links which have very high link strength scores, while there are 
a multitude of links near the center of each network which are comparatively very weak.  
Hence, at least based on this data, it does not seem that more centrally located links will 
necessarily be any stronger than more peripheral links within the same network. 
A second major issue which we can address by having four comparable brand 
concept maps is the determination of whether consumers’ brand concept maps tend to 
exhibit high link strengths between brand associations that can be regarded as partially 
synonymous with one another.  Since we are not directly asking consumers to determine 
which brand associations have the same or similar meanings, the best way we can 
operationalize the concept of “synonymous” would be to utilize the notion that if one 
concept has a very similar or identical meaning as another, then each of those concepts 
can be used interchangeably across virtually all situations.  In the case of a brand concept 
map, we can conceptualize “using” a brand association as “applying” that brand 
association in a particular way, i.e., as having that brand association either predictively or 
diagnostically imply another particular brand association across multiple contexts.  
Examining the four brand concept maps shown in Figures 29 and 30, there are three 
specific instances where consumers in all four maps consistently link the same two 
variables together in either a predictive or diagnostic relationship, and hence these 
variable pairs are likely to have similar operational meaning for the consumers involved.   
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One such instance of brand associations which directly entail one another across 
all four brand concept maps is the relationship Variety → Warehouse.  Note that this 
relationship makes intuitive sense because consumers may tend to perceive of a large 
product assortment as being reminiscent of a ‘discount’ or ‘warehouse’ type of retailing 
environment.  However, despite the fact that the brand association Variety is predictive of 
the brand association Warehouse in all four situations, the strength of the corresponding 
link Variety → Warehouse is actually quite low in all four brand concept maps, ranging in 
size from 0.089 to 0.137.  Hence consumers in all four situations may see Variety as 
being predictive of a warehouse environment (and conversely perceive of a warehouse 
environment as being diagnostic of high variety), but despite the apparent ubiquity of this 
directional relationship, the data shows that this directional association is fairly modest in 
size.   
Similarly, all four maps possess a direct link between the associations Girly and 
Teens,52 and once again the fact that these two brand associations are so consistently 
linked makes intuitive sense.  Interestingly, the directional relationship between these two 
brand associations has a somewhat “intermediate” strength across all four brand concept 
maps, with the link strength between Girly and Teens ranging from a low of 0.112 to a 
high of 0.321. 
52 The direction of the link between Girly and Teens is consistent within each retailer’s brand concept maps, 
but is reversed between the two retailers.  However, this just means that consumers in each case have 
opposing views of which of these two associations is predictive of the other versus which is diagnostic of 
the other.  The point remains that in all four brand concept maps, these two brand associations have a 
direct implicational relationship between them. 
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Finally, note that the direct link between variables Stylish and Trendy is conserved 
across all four brand concept maps.  Once again, the link directions are not consistent in 
all four maps, but all four maps do possess a direct connection between these two 
concepts.  Interestingly, the strength of the inter-concept link between Stylish and Trendy 
is actually quite high in all cases, ranging between 0.349 and 0.401 across the four brand 
concept maps.     
Similarly, there are cases where each gender is relatively consistent across brands, 
but where the two genders differ from one another within the same brand.  For instance, 
consider that males consistently place a direct link between Sexy and Exciting and 
between Sexy and Tight Fit. 53  Interestingly, in both cases the link from Sexy to Exciting 
is quite a bit stronger than the link from Sexy to Tight Fit.  Now consider the fact that 
both Sexy and Exciting are abstract or ‘interpretive’ descriptors, whereas Tight Fit is a 
‘concrete’ or ‘directly observable’ characteristic.  Hence, in this case, the link that males 
perceive between two directly connected interpretive descriptors is stronger than the link 
that they perceive between an interpretive descriptor and a directly observable 
characteristic.   
This, of course, raises the question of whether the difference in link strengths 
between descriptor types which was noticed for certain characteristics of males’ brand 
concept maps is a more general phenomenon.  As a partial answer to this question, 
consider that for females’ brand concept maps, the brand associations Tight Fit and 
53 The predictive versus diagnostic direction for the link that males perceive between Sexy and Exciting is 
reversed between each retailer, but males do perceive a direct link between these two associations across 
both retailers. 
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Exciting are linked by Trendy (rather than by Sexy as was the case in males’ brand 
concept maps).  What is fascinating here is that once again we see that the link between 
the more abstract or interpretive descriptors (namely Trendy and Exciting) is quite a bit 
stronger than the link between an abstract descriptor (Trendy) and a directly observable 
characteristic (Tight Fit), and furthermore, this pattern is consistent across both retailers’ 
brand concept maps. 
With this observation in hand, we can come back and re-examine the earlier 
finding that there was an appreciable link strength difference between the three cases in 
which we had specific links that were conserved across all four brand concept maps (i.e., 
the three cases which were hypothesized to represent approximate synonymy 
relationships within the context of these brand concept maps).  In the first of these three 
cases, we saw that there was a relatively weak link strength between Variety and 
Warehouse across all four brand concept maps.  Interestingly, both of these descriptors 
are fairly ‘concrete’ in nature, i.e., even though there may be differences across 
individuals in terms of how they view the relative levels of variety and ‘warehouse feel’ 
that exist at specific retailers, both of these descriptors do refer to characteristics that are 
externally observable.  Hence we have that the de facto synonymy relationship between 
two externally observable descriptors has a relatively low link strength, which is an 
observation that does fit in with the previously stated hypothesis concerning the differing 
link strengths that exist across descriptor types. 
Now consider the synonymy relation that was found to be intermediate in 
strength, namely the relationship between Girly and Teens.  In this case, it is somewhat 
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harder to declaratively classify these two descriptors, but clearly one can observe whether 
a retailer is frequented by teens (or caters to teen fashions), while the descriptor ‘Girly’ is 
more of an interpretive characteristic rather than something that one can ‘point to’ in a 
physical sense.54  Hence, in this particular example, we have that a relation between an 
abstract or interpretive descriptor of the brand and a more externally observable 
characteristic of that brand has an intermediate level of strength, which is again consistent 
with the earlier stated hypothesis. 
Finally, consider the potential synonymy relation between Stylish and Trendy that 
was discussed earlier.  In this case, both descriptors are clearly interpretive in nature, and 
it is also the case that the link between these interpretive descriptors is very strong across 
all four brand concept maps.  Therefore, this observation once again follows from the 
earlier stated hypothesis concerning the pattern of link strength differences that occur 
across differing descriptor or association types.   
One can also hypothesize about the potential reasons for this observed pattern of 
link strength differences that seems to exist between interpretive descriptors, between 
concrete (observable) descriptors, or between these two classes of descriptor.  Clearly, 
the most immediate potential explanation for these differences resides in the ‘fan effect’ 
which is hypothesized to underlie directional relations within the associative networks 
literature.  It seems reasonable to assume that because abstract or interpretive descriptors 
can potentially be applied to many concrete or observable situations, that such 
54 Of course, for a retailer that specifically caters to females, once could ‘point to’ the ‘Girly’ nature of that 
retailer’s brand image.  However, both Abercrombie & Fitch and Old Navy are retailers which cater to 
both genders, and hence the degree of ‘girliness’ of these retailers would likely be more of an 
interpretive judgment rather than an observable description. 
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interpretive descriptors will have a greater number of substructural associative links 
fanning out from them, and hence there is a greater chance that the fan structures from 
two such interpretive descriptors will meet, and also it is more likely that if they do meet, 
that they will meet in multiple places.  On the other hand, a concrete or directly 
observable descriptor may be too ‘tied’ to a specific context to have an appreciable 
number of links fanning out from it, and hence it is far less likely that the fans emanating 
from two such concrete descriptors will meet each other in very many places.  Finally, in 
the case of an interpretive descriptor and an observable descriptor, the fact that the fan 
structure associated with the interpretive descriptor will be relatively large and that of the 
observable descriptor will be comparatively limited would seem to imply that one will 
observe a level of link strength that is intermediate between that of two concrete or 
observable descriptors and that of two abstract or interpretive descriptors.55 
 
4.4   Informational Propagation in Bayesian Networks 
 As described in Section 2.2 of this thesis, the Bayesian network representation of 
a brand concept map exploits the conditional independence relations that exist in the data 
in order to break down the complex global factors that constitute the joint distribution of 
the brand association variables into simple local factors that each typically involve just a 
few variables.  In this manner, the Bayesian network representation of a brand concept 
map provides a very compact representation of the overall joint distribution of the full set 
55 One should note that despite the discussion of associative mechanisms, the links being referred to here 
are decidedly directional in nature.  As described in Section 1.4, the associative fan effect is a widely 
hypothesized mechanism by which an underlying associative stratum can result in a set of directional 
relations among attributes. 
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of variables involved in that brand concept (Pearl, 1988).  In fact, each node of a 
Bayesian network can actually be regarded as a local distribution of the values of the 
variable associated with that node, conditional on each possible state of its ‘graphical 
parent’ nodes (i.e., conditional on the values of its immediate predecessors in the 
directional structure of that network representation).56 
 Since the Bayesian network is simply a graphical representation of the overall 
multivariate joint distribution of the variables that constitute the brand concept map, the 
answers to specific propositional queries can be computed by using the mathematical 
properties of this distributional representation.  For instance, one may wish to know how 
observing or fixing the value of one or more variables in the network will affect the 
distribution of values within the remaining network variables.  For example, considering 
the Abercrombie & Fitch or Old Navy brand concept maps shown in Figures 27 and 28,    
a manager might be interested in ascertaining the likely effect that increasing the level of 
‘bright colors’ within his or her store might have on the distributions of the remaining 
network variables.  Such propositional queries can be answered in a concise and tractable 
way by exploiting the factored representation of the joint distribution that is represented 
by the corresponding Bayesian network model of the data.   
 In essence, there are two categories of network structure to consider here: 
structures in which there is just a single pathway between any two network variables, and 
structures in which there are multiple pathways between variables.  These structures are 
56 These distribution parameters can typically be estimated by a maximum likelihood calculation, again 
making use of the global and local decomposition properties afforded by the Bayesian network 
representation of the data (Pearl, 1988; Koller and Friedman, 2009).  This is especially straightforward in 
the case of multinomial data such as the type often encountered in typical Likert-style marketing surveys. 
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generally known as singly-connected networks and multiply-connected networks 
respectively (Pearl, 1988).  In the case of singly-connected networks, the pioneering 
effort to derive a tractable and precise informational propagation algorithm which can 
consider both the predictive influences of those directional links coming into each node 
as well as the diagnostic influences from directional links that are ‘coming out of’ that 
node was given by Kim and Pearl (1983).  Since that time, several methods have been 
developed which reduce multiply-connected networks to the singly-connected case 
through various processes (Koller and Friedman, 2009).   
The most commonly used such procedure for reducing a multiply-connected 
network to a singly-connected structure is that of clique-tree propagation, which was 
developed through the efforts of multiple researchers during the 1980’s and 1990’s (see, 
for instance, Huang and Darwiche, 1996, for a good introduction to this general class of 
procedures).  In essence, this technique groups together those variables which share a 
common ‘child’ node (a process called moralization, since it amounts to joining or 
‘marrying’ the parents of a common child node), and then triangulates each resulting 
cluster in order to form a clique structure (i.e., a subgraph in which each variable is 
directly connected to each other variable within that subgraph).  In most networks, there 
are multiple possible ways to accomplish this structural transformation, and the method 
singles out those transformations which result in a tree structure connecting the cliques 
(i.e., there is branching, but no cycle or loop structures within the structure), and then 
further singles out those tree structures which obey a form of informational monotonicity 
generally known as the running intersection property, which requires that any pathway 
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between two cliques must contain all variables that belong to the intersection of those two 
cliques.57  Such a structure consisting of a tree connecting cliques and which satisfies the 
running intersection property is called a clique tree.58 
Once this transformation of the original network into a clique tree structure is 
accomplished, each pair of neighboring cliques will have one or more variables in 
common, and the set of variables that are shared between two neighboring cliques is 
termed the sepset for that pair of cliques.  Furthermore, since the clique tree construction 
obeys the running intersection property, one can show that each sepset forms a minimal 
separator within the original Bayesian network, i.e., a minimal set of variables which, 
when conditioned on (through intervention or observation), will render those nodes on 
either side of that separator conditionally independent of each other.  The propagation of 
predictive and diagnostic influence among any two cliques can then be systematically 
accomplished by multiplying each probabilistic factor in the cliques on one side of the 
sepset which probabilistically separates those two cliques and then marginalizing out the 
variables from that side of the sepset which are not themselves present in that sepset 
(Huang and Darwiche, 1996; Koller and Friedman, 2009).  Hence, the system of sepsets 
in the clique tree structure derived from the original network form a maximally efficient 
collection of variables to condition on in order to perform informational propagation. 
57 Among other things, this property essentially ensures that no information is lost when transmitting 
information between those cliques, and that information propagation through the derived structure will 
mimic that which would have been obtained via an exhaustive marginalization process in the full joint 
distribution (Huang and Darwiche, 1996; Koller and Friedman, 2009). 
58 We also assume that the scope each probabilistic factor in the underlying distribution is contained within 
a single clique (which is a property often known as the family preservation property).  Again, see Huang 
and Darwiche (1996) and Koller and Friedman (2009) for more details. 
165 
 
                                                     
4.5   Application: Information Propagation in the Taco Prima Network 
 We have applied the clique and sepset-based information propagation mechanism 
to the Bayesian network model of the Taco Prima brand concept map59 which was 
derived via constraint-based methods in Section 3.3.  The associated clique tree 
computations were performed with the GeNie software package (Druzdzel, 1999).  The 
initial “baseline” (or “prior”) distribution of the variables in the Taco Prima brand 
concept map is shown in Figure 31. 60  
To demonstrate the usefulness of the information propagation mechanism within 
this network, assume that management is considering a new promotional effort to 
strongly reinforce and further improve Taco Prima’s inexpensive brand image, but they 
are unsure as to how effective this promotional strategy may be in fostering the ultimate 
goal of improving consumer affect (i.e., ‘Memories’) toward the brand.  Since all of the 
variables in the Taco Prima network are interconnected and also have positive link 
strengths (Section 4.2) as well as strong, positive, and highly significant bivariate Pearson 
correlations, it might be natural for management to think that the higher they can drive 
consumers’ perceptions that the brand is very inexpensive, the greater the corresponding 
ultimate effect on “Memories” (i.e., brand affect) is likely to be.  However, what this 
supposition does not take into account is that there are multiple interacting pathways by 
which predictive and diagnostic influence can propagate within the network. 
59 Since each of the four brand concept maps for the retailers Old Navy and Abercrombie & Fitch are 
singly-connected tree structures, they have very simple information propagation properties, and hence 
are not as instructive as are the informational propagation properties of the Taco Prima network.  Hence 
we chose to illustrate the information propagation method by using just the Taco Prima network. 
60 The abbreviations “v1” through “v5” in each distribution represent the five possible response values from 
the original questionnaire. 
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For instance, to attempt to answer management’s query about the likely effects of 
an effort to dramatically increase consumers’ perceptions that Taco Prima is inexpensive, 
we can enter specific evidence (such as Inexpensive = 5) into the network and then allow 
the information propagation algorithm trace its predictive and diagnostic influences 
throughout the network.  In this way, one obtains an updated (or ‘posterior’) distribution 
which incorporates this evidence into the probabilities of the variables involved.  The 
posterior distribution based on incorporation of the evidence value Inexpensive = 5 is 
shown in Figure 32. 
   
 
Figure 31.  Prior distribution of variables in the Taco Prima brand concept map 
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Figure 32.  Posterior distribution of variables in the Taco Prima brand concept map after 
incorporation of evidence Inexpensive = 5. 
 Clearly, many of these individual posterior distributions do differ in expected 
ways from the prior distributions shown in Figure 31.  For instance, as expected, 
evidence that Inexpensive = 5 leads to a decrease in the probability that either New Things 
or Unique will have values of 3 or 4, and an increase in the probability that New Things 
and Unique will each have a value of 5.  Similarly, for Innovative and Leader, the 
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posterior distributions for these variables have a reduced probability of the response scale 
value of 3 and an increased probability of having a value of 5, but in the case of these two 
variables, the probability of having a value of 4 is essentially unchanged from the prior 
distribution.  (Hence Innovative and Leader show a qualitatively different pattern of 
changes between the prior and posterior distributions than do New Things and Unique.) 
 Now to address management’s initial question, consider the posterior distribution 
of the variable Memories.  Despite the strong positive correlations among all variables in 
this network, as well as the positive link strength values for every inter-association link, 
the posterior distribution of the variable Memories differs little (if at all) from its 
distribution prior to the incorporation of evidence about consumers’ perceptions that the 
brand is inexpensive.  In essence, contrary to some very reasonable-seeming assumptions, 
the interaction of predictive and diagnostic information flow within this network makes 
the proposed increase in consumers’ perceptions of the brand as very inexpensive (i.e., 
Inexpensive = 5) essentially ineffective at appreciably altering the distribution of the 
variable Memories.  Hence according to this brand concept network, it would likely not 
be effective for management to try to improve brand affect (i.e., ‘Memories’) via driving 
the image of the brand towards the extreme “inexpensive” end of the price perception 
spectrum. 
 Similar observations about the informational updating properties of this brand 
concept can be made by incorporating various facets of evidence about each of the other 
variables in the network.  In each case, the procedure is essentially the same as that 
described above. 
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5.   Conclusions and Extensions 
5.1   General Summary and Conclusions 
 We initially set out to develop a means of analyzing the structure of consumers’ 
brand concepts which would extend the pioneering approach of Roedder John et al. 
(2006).  In keeping with the Brand Concept Mapping approach of Roedder John et al., we 
sought to uncover the specific link structure that serves to connect the brand associations 
so that it is clear which brand-related attributes are directly connected, and which are 
indirectly connected through one or more intermediaries.  Further, we sought to follow up 
on the suggestion by Roedder John et al. (2006) that there is likely to be a directional 
component to the links that consumers perceive to exist between various brand-related 
attributes, and that the Brand Concept Mapping approach could be notably extended if 
not just the connection pattern, but also the specific form of the links themselves (i.e., 
their internal make-up or constituency) was explored. 
 Through an examination of the marketing literature, it became clear that the 
marketing domain is replete with examples in which such belief structures are indeed 
directional in nature, ranging from causal attribution at all levels (e.g., Folkes, 1988; 
Weiner, 2000), directional priming effects (Nedungadi, 1990; Holden and Lutz, 1992; 
Farquhar and Herr, 1993), and even simple “if-then” reasoning within consumers’ 
conceptualizations of their environment (e.g., Hoch and Deighton, 1989; Sirsi, Ward, and 
Reingen, 1996).  Even consumers’ typical purposes in considering a purchase in the first 
place are known to be causal or directional in nature (Folkes, op. cit.).   
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Furthermore, by examining the core associative networks literature on which the 
brand concept map construct was originally based, one finds that researchers quite often 
utilize associative structures to explain or model directionally asymmetric phenomena.   
In fact, such directional associative phenomena have even been used to model various 
phenomena within the marketing domain itself (e.g., Ulhaque and Bahn, 1992; Lei, Dawar, 
and Lemmink, 2008).  Thus we sought to extend the Brand Concept Mapping procedure 
through the explicit consideration of directional links among perceived brand 
associations.   
A further analysis of the internal structure of directional links between attributes 
revealed that rather than simply being links which specify an antecedent and a 
consequent, directional associations also possess an internal structure that is sensitive to 
the difference between observational versus interventional conditions, and which clearly 
distinguishes between the predictive and diagnostic directions within directional 
relationships.  Furthermore, it is known that individuals’ reasoning patterns typically 
differ between the predictive and the diagnostic directions of the same directional or 
causal relationship (Tversky and Kahneman, 1980).  Therefore, the fact that the 
techniques utilized here can discern not just the connectivity between brand attributes, 
but also the directionality of that relationship can be extremely useful for understanding 
the directional reasoning patterns typically held by consumers. 
As shown earlier, at the level of two-variable structures (and assuming purely 
observational conditions), a directional relationship can appear and behave just like a 
non-directional or purely correlational relationship (since diagnostic reasoning will allow 
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the consequent of the directional relationship to show some influence over the antecedent 
of that relationship).  However, it is at the level of three-variable substructures where we 
begin to see an unavoidable differentiation between directional and non-directional 
relationships.  In fact, it is through a closer examination of the differences among the 
three-variable substructures known as the causal chain (A → B → C), the diagnostic 
chain (A ← B ← C), the common cause structure (A ← B → C), and the common effect 
structure (A → B ← C) that we begin to see the importance of not just dependence versus 
independence, but additionally the conditional independence construct as a means of 
distinguishing among otherwise observationally or correlationally indistinguishable 
configurations.   
As shown earlier, the limits of what the conditional independence construct can 
distinguish are known as Markov equivalence classes.  Within a Markov equivalence 
class, each structure will have the same conditional independence and dependence 
properties, but structures in different Markov equivalence classes will have differing 
properties of conditional independence.   
We then applied the principles of Markov equivalence and conditional 
independence to brand association data by utilizing both constraint-based and score-based 
structural discovery algorithms which take advantage of these conditional independence 
based differences among the various types of directed links and substructures which can 
connect the brand associations.  The recovered structures based on these discovery 
methods typically possess specific regularity properties, and are often collectively known 
as Bayesian networks.  A further analysis of the Markov equivalence classes (i.e., the 
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observationally indistinguishable sets of directed structures) within the Bayesian network 
representation of a brand concept map led us to realize that this methodology can 
prescribe the specific set of directional cognitive variations that can co-exist within a 
specific brand concept structure and still be consistent with the conditional independence 
properties inherent in the data.   
Lastly, we applied the specific structure of the directional links within a Bayesian 
network representation of consumers’ brand association data in order to provide two 
additional computational tools.  First of all, we provided a link strength measure which 
can be utilized to further probe the relationships among the variables in the domain, and 
we found that additionally, this measure seems to be sensitive to the abstract versus 
concrete nature of the brand attributes themselves.  Secondly, we utilized the directional 
structure of the inter-attribute links to allow for the application of information 
propagation tools, which can be used to precisely compute the posterior distribution of 
the variables in the network based on any given set of observational queries or evidence 
presented to the network. 
In conclusion, we feel that this effort has yielded a valid approach which 
successfully answers the call by Roedder John et al. (2006) for an extension to their 
pioneering Brand Concept Mapping approach, and which can explicitly consider 
directional relations among brand associations.  Further, by pursuing the various 
ramifications of this approach within the marketing domain, we feel that valuable 
additional tools have been provided which can be used to explore aspects of consumption 
phenomena which had previously been relatively inaccessible to marketing researchers. 
173 
 
5.2   Hypotheses and Future Extensions 
 The techniques explored in this thesis reveal a set of concepts and a related set of 
tools which can potentially be utilized by marketing researchers to explore new and 
important phenomena within multiple marketing domains.  However, these tools are not 
without their limitations.  For example, all of the structural discovery methodologies 
utilized in this thesis still strongly depend on the validity and completeness of the initial 
round of brand association elicitation in order to have a valid corpus of brand 
characteristics to work with.  Hence, just as is the case with other multivariate 
methodologies within the marketing domain, we still must depend on the invaluable 
contribution of exploratory and qualitative marketing research techniques.   
In addition, in order for the various structural discovery methods utilized here to 
be guaranteed to converge to the single most optimal structure or set of structures (as 
opposed to merely a satisfactory or comparatively optimal such structure), one also needs 
to assume that all relevant causal variables or background factors have been included in 
the model.  Just as is the case with other multivariate techniques, such an assumption is 
difficult or impossible to guarantee in practice, and hence one needs to regard the results 
of such studies with the same degree of caution as one does with the results of most other 
multivariate methodologies.  In other words, the Bayesian network technique is not a 
panacea for an improperly specified model. 
 In addition, we note that the brand concept map structures that are derived from 
the Bayesian network structural discovery protocols do not explicitly show the links 
between the brand attributes and the core brand itself.  Rather, it is implicitly assumed 
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that all attributes that are related to the brand essentially belong to a general structure 
with the brand as its center.  However, this is an area in which further research may be 
quite valuable, since it may be possible to include specific links to the brand itself by 
modifying these techniques appropriately. 
 Finally, it must be pointed out that by using these particular structural discovery 
protocols, we are not asking directly about whether a link exists between brand 
association A and brand association B.  Rather, we are simply asking consumers to 
endorse the degree to which they feel that the brand in question is characterized by each 
presented attribute, and then we utilize the conditional independence properties of the 
recovered data to impute the existence of an underlying link structure among those 
attributes.  This clearly differs strongly from the approach pioneered by Roedder John et 
al. (1996).  As mentioned several times throughout the thesis, we feel that this difference 
can perhaps be regarded as a strength of the technique, since it derives the brand concept 
structure from an easily retrievable form of data that does not place undue burdens on the 
respondents.  However, it is an indirect method, while the technique of Roedder John et 
al (ibid.) utilizes a direct elicitation methodology.  In this sense, the techniques developed 
here essentially go down a somewhat different analytical pathway than does the BCM 
approach.  Perhaps there is ground for a common structural discovery protocol in which 
the direct elicitation methodology pioneered by Roedder John et al. can be utilized along 
with the Bayesian network-based technique pursued here in order to determine a brand 
concept structure through a ‘triangulation’ between these differing approaches. 
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 In addition to these potential limitations of the techniques pursued in this thesis 
there are also several unanswered questions that could represent fertile ground for future 
exploration.  For example, we found (through a Markov equivalence class representation 
of the set of cognitive variants that can coexist within a given set of brand concept data) 
that there are typically cognitive subgroups of consumers, each of which may view 
specific links as having a direction that is opposite to that seen by other cognitive 
subgroups within that data set.  This raises the question of how prevalent each such 
subgroup is, as well as the intriguing possibility of using Bayesian network-based 
measures to quantify the cognitive ‘distance’ between such subgroups.  This might also 
allow researchers to uncover specific relations among such subgroups which relate to or 
expand upon other findings that are known within the sociocognitive influences literature.   
An additional hypothesis is related to the work presented here concerns 
information propagation within a brand concept network.  As we saw earlier, the sepsets 
(i.e., the minimal separating sets) within a clique tree representation of a Bayesian 
network provide a minimal “alphabet” of locations upon which one needs to condition in 
order to ascertain the degree and direction of information flow through the network as a 
whole.  Therefore, this property of network structures leads to the natural hypothesis that 
individuals may preferentially choose to condition on such minimal separators (or 
‘sepsets’) when selecting which variables to observe or manipulate (either actively or 
counterfactually) in order to understand the effect that one variable of interest has upon 
another within their targeted consumption domain, and hence these may be the variables 
that consumers naturally tend to focus on when constructing their consideration sets or 
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determining what to purchase.  Of course a related hypothesis would be that marketers 
may find it more effective to focus their advertising and communication strategies upon 
these variables, since these particular sets of variables serve as “linchpins” which regulate 
and restrict the flow of information through the network as a whole 
Lastly, a potentially fascinating area for future exploration is the relation between 
directionally protected links and reversible links with regards to consumers’ perceptions 
of the overall brand concept as well as the more general consumption domain in which 
that brand concept resides.  For instance, it stands to reason that since all permissible 
cognitive subgroups within a data set share the same set of directionally conserved or 
protected links, that such protected links are apt to be more difficult to influence through 
managerial action.  This raises the question of whether one can develop an index of 
relational pliability or manipulability which can quantify the relative level of influence 
that management may have on that particular relationship.   
Furthermore, we saw that the central reversible link within the Taco Prima brand 
concept map was also the link which had the strongest link strength measure.  It is 
unclear if this is coincidental, or whether there are either cognitive or strategic reasons 
why this should occur.  In fact, as we discussed earlier, it is possible that rather than 
merely indicating where important variables are located, an inter-variable association 
may actually have a high link strength because it is a location which drives cognitive 
differentiation among various causal subgroups of consumers.  If this is so, then such an 
analysis would represent an invaluable tool for managers seeking to determine the 
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optimal brand associations and inter-association relations upon which to intervene in 
order to pursue various brand-related strategic objectives.    
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A chain connection (e.g.,) consists of three random variables X, Y, and Z  for 
which X directly influences Y and for which Y directly influences Z, but for which there is 
no direct influence between X and Z.  Given this graphical arrangement, the joint 
probability of the three random variables X, Y, and Z is given by: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋,,𝑌𝑌,,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌.|.𝑋𝑋.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋                                      (35) 
We will discuss this form of connection with regards to multinomial data only.  Further 
details can be found in Koski and Noble (2009) and Koller and Friedman (2009).  
As stated in the thesis, we assert that conditioning on the central variable Y  of the 
chain connection  X → Y → Z  blocks communication between the terminal variables X  
and Z  within that connection.  To prove this assertion, note that by the basic probability 
calculus, any triple (X, Y, Z) of random variables will have a joint probability distribution 
that factors according to the form 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌   (i.e., the joint probability 
factors as the product of the conditional and marginal distributions).  Thus we can isolate 
the joint probability of the terminal vertices X  and Z  in this connection, as conditioned on 
the central variable Y, as follows: 
𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =    𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌                                                     (36) 
The above expression is valid for any triple of random variables for which 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 ≠0.  However, we can also factor the joint probability of X , Y , and Z  in the numerator of 
this expression according to the specific topology of the chain connection, yielding the 
following expression specific to this particular connection topology: 
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𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌.|.𝑋𝑋 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌  (37) 
Assuming 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋 ≠ 0, we can now utilize Bayes’ theorem to re-express the central 
quantity 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋  in the numerator of the above expression, thereby yielding the transformed 
expression shown below: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. � 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋 � .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌  (38) 
Cancelling common factors of 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌  and common factors of 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋  yields the reduced 
expression: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =   𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌..∙.  𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.|.𝑌𝑌 (39) 
and hence the terminal variables X  and Z  are independent in this topology when 
conditioned on the central variable Y  of the topology.   
Alternatively, one can also demonstrate this independence of X  and Z  conditional 
on Y  by examining the distribution of Z  conditional on X  and Y as follows: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌  =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋  =  𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌 (40) 
 
Of course, here we once again used the specific factorization of the joint distribution of 
X , Y , and Z  along the chain topology when decomposing the numerator of this 
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expression.  Therefore, we obtain another justification of the fact that communication 
between the terminal variables X  and Z  of the chain topology is blocked (i.e., variables X  
and Z  are rendered independent) when conditioned on the central variable Y  of the 
topology. 
Forward propagation of information along the chain connection : 
In addition to the above analysis showing the induced conditional independence 
of the terminal variables  X  and Z  in the chain topology, we can also utilize this 
factorization of the joint distribution in order to examine how messages are passed along 
a chain connection.  Specifically, by marginalizing the factored distribution over Y  and 
utilizing the factorization specific to this connection topology, we obtain: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)   =   � 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)
𝑦𝑦
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋)   =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) ∙ � 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)
𝑦𝑦
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋) (41) 
Essentially, the summation  ∑ � 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋)�𝑦𝑦 . in the last factor is playing the role 
of 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋) in the expression 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍) = 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋).    Since  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋)  ≠  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) , we have that  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍) ≠  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) in this 
topology, and X  and Z  are therefore dependent in this connection structure.  Furthermore, 
the expression  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)𝑦𝑦 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋)  shows the explicit form of the 
dependence of Z upon X within the chain connection. 
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We can also derive the result of conditioning the joint distribution of X, Y, and Z 
on the value of Y  by marginalizing the specific form of the factorization of the joint 
distribution of X, Y, and Z  along the chain connection as follows: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)  =    𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋)  ∑ ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥) 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  
                             =     𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋)  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥) ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧|𝑦𝑦) 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥   
                             =     𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋)  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥)  ∙  1 𝑥𝑥  ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 
                             =     𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌,𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦, 𝑋𝑋) 
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦)  ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 
                             =     𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦) ∙. 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 
(42) 
 
This computation shows that instantiation of the central variable Y  within the chain 
connection renders variables X  and Z  conditionally independent.   
However, it is much more instructive to more closely trace the detailed 
mechanism by which X  influences Z  (and conversely, by which Z  influences X) within a 
chain connection, and to observe the manner in which these paths of influence are 
blocked once the central variable Y  within this chain connection becomes instantiated.  
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Such an analysis also facilitates the study of message-passing schemes within the 
Bayesian network. 
As long as variable Y  remains uninstantiated, variables X  and Z  are able to 
“communicate” with each other.  For example, suppose that the variables X, Y, and Z are 
each binary, with probabilities parameterized as shown in Figure 33.  
   
 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋 𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥2 
 λ 1−λ 
 
𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 𝑦𝑦1 𝑦𝑦2 
𝑥𝑥1 α 1−α 
𝑥𝑥2 β 1−β 
 
𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌 𝑧𝑧1 𝑧𝑧2 
𝑦𝑦1 δ 1−δ 
𝑦𝑦2 γ 1−γ 
 
Figure 33.   Distribution of binary variables in the chain connection X → Y → Z 
Given no additional information, the probability that variable Z will take a specific value 
(say, 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧1 ) in this topology can be computed as follows : 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  =  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2) 
=  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1)� 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥2) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥2)�+ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2)� 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥2) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥2)� 
(43) 
After some algebraic simplification, this expression gives: 
X Y Z 
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𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  =  𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 (44) 
Similarly, we can express 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧2) in terms of the probabilities given in this chain connection 
topology, and after simplification we of course find that: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧2) = 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  =  1 −  𝛾𝛾 −  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) −  𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) (45) 
Since these expressions depend on 𝜆𝜆, we see that the distribution of the terminal variable in 
the chain topology is sensitive to the probability distribution of the initial variable in the 
chain. 
However, we can say even more.  Suppose that we discover that the variable X has 
become instantiated as, say,  𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥1.  Then this ‘signal’ will become propagated through the 
chain topology in the sense that we can now condition the distribution of Z on this instantiated 
value of X .  Specifically, using the given probabilities, we can compute this conditional 
probability as: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)  =   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦2, 𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥1)                         =  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥1) 
(46) 
and after some algebraic simplification, this expression reduces to the simpler form  
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)  =  𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 .  Similarly, 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧2|𝑥𝑥1)  can be expressed as  1 −  𝛾𝛾 −
𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) .  Obviously, the information that  𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥1 has drastically affected the 
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distribution of the variable Z  in a process that we can term forward propagation through 
the chain connection.   
Interestingly, the only way that the posterior distribution of variable Z (as 
conditioned on the information that 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥1) can be equal to the prior distribution of Z 
would be for the quantity  𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾  to equal the quantity  𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  + 𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 .   Equating these two expressions and reducing yields : 
𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾   =    𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 
⇔ 0   =   𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  −  𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  
⇔ 0  =   𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) − (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) 
⇔ 0  =  (𝜆𝜆 − 1)(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  
(47) 
Hence the only way for the posterior distribution of Z conditioned on 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥1 to 
equal the prior distribution would be for:  ( i)  𝛼𝛼 to equal 𝛽𝛽 (in which case 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) = 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥2), meaning that variables X and Y would be independent),  (ii) for 𝛿𝛿 to equal 
𝛾𝛾 (in which case 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) =  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2), meaning that variables Y and Z would be 
independent),  or (iii) for 𝜆𝜆 to equal 1 (in which case 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) = 1.).  Of course if either X 
and Y, or Y and Z are independent, then the respective link in the chain topology diagram 
would be absent, meaning that the diagram (and hence the factorization along the chain 
topology) would be invalid (i.e., an “unfaithful graphical representation”).  On the other 
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hand, if 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) = 1..then the “information” that X has been instantiated as 𝑥𝑥1 would be 
no new information at all, and we would be conditioning on information that is already 
present in the diagram.  Therefore, as long as the central variable Y in the chain topology 
is uninstantiated, all changes to the distribution of the initial variable X must be 
propagated forward through Y and affect the distribution of the terminal variable Z. 
Now if the central variable Y in the chain topology is instantiated to a specific 
value, then this process of forward propagation through the chain connection will be 
ineffective.  One can see this since in the presence of an instantiation such as  𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦1 , 
the structure of the chain topology will naturally reduce both 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1) to 
the quantity 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1).  Alternatively, one could incorporate the information that 𝑌𝑌 =
𝑦𝑦1  by letting 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 = 1 in the previously derived factorization along the chain structure, 
thereby reducing the expression  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) = 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾  as well as the expression               
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  =  𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 , to merely 𝛾𝛾 (which corresponds to 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) in the above diagram). 
Reverse propagation of information along the chain connection : 
The above discussion shows that the instantiation of the variable Y  in the chain 
connection  X → Y → Z  blocks the ability of a signal at X  from altering the distribution 
of Z .  Now consider the reverse process:  a signal arriving at variable Z  in this chain 
topology is propagated through the chain all the way back to X, this time in a process that 
we term reverse (or ‘backward’) propagation.  To see how this influence is manifested, 
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assume that variable Z becomes instantiated as, say,  𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧1.  We can then use Bayes’ 
theorem to propagate this change to the variable Y, giving: 
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦1|𝑧𝑧1)  =    𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  (48) 
 
Following this, we can propagate the change one level further to the variable X  by once 
again employing Bayes’ theorem: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1)  =    𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  (49) 
 
Note that in order to obtain the values of  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1) within this 
reverse propagation expression, we have to use the forward propagation step described 
above.  Employing these techniques in tandem (and once again using the parameters 
given in the above diagram) yields the expression:  
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1)   =     𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)    
=    [ 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛾𝛾 ] ∙ 𝜆𝜆
𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 
 
(50) 
Therefore the information that  𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧1 has altered the probability 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) from its prior value 
of 𝜆𝜆 to the posterior value given here.   
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In fact, the only way for the information that  𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧1 to not alter the distribution of X 
is for  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1) to equal 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) , and this will only occur under the condition that: 
𝜆𝜆 =   [ 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛾𝛾 ] ∙ 𝜆𝜆
𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  +  𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾) +  𝛾𝛾 (51) 
 
Simplification of this equation results in the expression: 
𝜆𝜆2(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  + (𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆 − 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)  =   0 (52) 
and hence that: 
(𝜆𝜆2 − 𝜆𝜆)(𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)   =   0 (53) 
Therefore the only way that the instantiation of Z would not alter the distribution 
of X via reverse propagation in this topology is for either X and Y to be independent (i.e., 
𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽), for Y and Z to be independent (i.e., 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛾𝛾 ), or for the value of X to already be a 
certainty (i.e., 𝜆𝜆2 = 𝜆𝜆, hence either 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) = 1 or 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) = 0., so either  𝑋𝑋 =  𝑥𝑥1  or  
𝑋𝑋 =  𝑥𝑥2  respectively ).  
Once again, if we assume that the central variable Y in the chain topology is 
instantiated to a specific value, then this process of reverse propagation through the chain 
connection will be blocked.  This is fairly obvious based on the topology since X can 
depend on Z only through Y.  Alternatively, we can demonstrate this blocking effect by 
incorporating the assumption that 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦1 via setting the value of parameters α and β both 
to 1.  Through this assumption (and once again using the parameters given above), we 
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have that  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1, 𝑦𝑦1)  =  [ 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾 ]∙𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾)+ 𝛾𝛾  =  [ 1(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾 ]∙𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(1−1)(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 1(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾)+ 𝛾𝛾  =  𝛿𝛿∙𝜆𝜆 
𝛿𝛿
 =  𝜆𝜆   (i.e., under the assumption that = 𝑦𝑦1, the conditional probability 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1) 
reduces to 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) ).  Similarly, under the assumption that = 𝑦𝑦2 , parameters α and β both 
reduce to 0, so we have that  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1, 𝑦𝑦2)  =  [ 𝛼𝛼(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾 ]∙𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛽𝛽(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾)+ 𝛾𝛾  = [ 0(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 𝛾𝛾 ]∙𝜆𝜆
𝜆𝜆(0−0)(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾) + 0(𝛿𝛿−𝛾𝛾)+ 𝛾𝛾  =   𝛾𝛾∙𝜆𝜆 𝛾𝛾  =  𝜆𝜆  (hence under the assumption that 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦2 , the 
conditional probability 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1) once again reduces to 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) ). 
The above analyses show that instantiation of the central variable Y  in the chain 
topology  X → Y → Z  does indeed block communication between the two terminal 
vertices X and Z, but not in a symmetric manner.  In the ‘reverse’ direction, the 
instantiation of Y  as either 𝑦𝑦1 or 𝑦𝑦2 reduces the conditional probability 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥1|𝑧𝑧1) to 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1), an effect which can only be described as classical ‘blocking’:  given Y’s 
instantiation, the value of Z  has absolutely no effect on X’s distribution.  However, in the 
‘forward’ direction, the effect of instantiating the central variable Y does not so much 
block the effect of X upon Y, but rather ‘overrides’ that influence:  the instantiation of Y 
as 𝑦𝑦1 reduces both  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  to 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1), and the instantiation of Y as 
𝑦𝑦2 reduces both 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1) to 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2).   
In summary, for a ‘chain’ type connection  X → Y → Z ,   the two terminal 
variables X and Z communicate as long as the intervening ‘connector’ variable Y  is 
uninstantiated, and are rendered conditionally independent of each other (the 
communication between them is ‘broken’) once the intervening variable Y  becomes 
instantiated.   
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APPENDIX B 
D-SEPARATION WITHIN A COMMON CAUSE CONNECTION 
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A fork, or ‘common cause’ connection  X ← Y → Z  consists of three random 
variables X, Y, and Z for which Y directly influences both X and Z , but for which there is 
no direct influence between X and Z .  Given this graphical structure, the joint probability 
of the three random variables X , Y , and Z  is given by the expression:  𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋,,𝑌𝑌,,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌   Once again, we will discuss this form of connection with regards to 
multinomial data only.  Further details can be found in Koski and Noble (2009) and 
Koller and Friedman (2009). 
First we will show that conditioning on the central variable Y  blocks 
communication between the terminal variables X  and Z .  As was the case within the 
chain connection discussed previously, we can write that  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌  for any 
joint distribution of three variables X, Y, and Z ,  and if  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 ≠ 0  we can once again 
rearrange this factorization into the form:  
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌  (54) 
This expression is valid for any triple of random variables for which 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 ≠ 0.  However, 
we can also factor the joint probability of X , Y , and Z  in the numerator of this expression 
according to the specific topology of the fork connection, yielding the following 
expression specific to the ‘fork’ connection topology: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.|.𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌  (55) 
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Cancellation of the redundant 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 factor yields the reduced factorization  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌 = 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑌𝑌 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.|.𝑌𝑌   and therefore the terminal variables X  and Z  in the fork topology are 
conditionally independent given the value of the central variable Y  of this topology. 
Alternatively, one can also demonstrate this independence of X  and Z  conditional 
on Y  by examining the distribution of Z  conditional on X  and Y as follows: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍.|.𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌  =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌  =  𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌 (56) 
 
Of course, here we once again used the specific factorization of the joint distribution of 
X , Y , and Z  along the ‘common cause’ (or ‘fork’) connection when decomposing the 
numerator of this expression.  Therefore, we obtain another justification of the fact that 
communication between the terminal variables X  and Z  of this connection topology is 
blocked (i.e., variables X  and Z  are rendered independent) when conditioned on the 
central variable Y  of the topology.   
Furthermore, the symmetry of the roles of variables X and Z  in the fork 
connection can be explicitly demonstrated by conditioning X on Y  and Z  (as opposed to 
conditioning Z on X  and Y  as was done above).  Applying the factorization of the joint 
distribution along the fork connection then yields: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.|.𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  =    𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌  =  𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌 (57) 
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Message passing along the common cause connection : 
In addition to the above analysis showing the induced conditional independence 
of the terminal variables  X  and Z  in the fork topology, we can also utilize this 
factorization of the joint distribution in order to examine how messages are passed along 
such a connection.  Specifically, prior to the instantiation of any variables, the joint 
probability of X  and Z  is obtained by marginalizing the factored distribution X , Y , and Z  
over the various values of the central variable Y  in the fork connection: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)  =  � 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)
𝑦𝑦
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦) (58) 
Since 𝑦𝑦 is the variable of summation, we cannot remove the third factor in the 
summand, and hence X  and Z  are not independent in this connection topology.  However, 
conditioning the joint distribution of  X  and Z  on an instantiated value of Y  will result in 
X  and Z  being (conditionally) independent in this topology, as shown below: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)    =     𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦)   ∑ ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦) 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  
                               =    𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦)    𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦) ∙ ∑ ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦)  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥   
                               =     𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦)    ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦) ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧|𝑦𝑦) 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  
                                                           =      𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)  ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦)                                      (59) 
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However, once again it will be much more instructive to actually trace the 
detailed mechanism by which X  influences Z  within such a connection, and to observe 
the manner in which these paths of influence are blocked once the central variable Y  
within this topology becomes instantiated. 
As long as variable Y  remains uninstantiated, variables X and Z are able to 
“communicate” with each other.  For example, once again suppose that the variables X, Y, 
and Z are each binary, with probabilities parameterized as follows: 
 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌 𝑦𝑦1 𝑦𝑦2 
 λ 1−λ 
 
 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌 𝑥𝑥1 𝑥𝑥2 
𝑦𝑦1 α 1−α 
𝑦𝑦2 β 1−β 
 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌 𝑧𝑧1 𝑧𝑧2 
𝑦𝑦1 δ 1−δ 
𝑦𝑦2 γ 1−γ 
Figure 34.  Distribution of binary variables in a common cause connection 
To see the effect that instantiation of variable X  has on variable Z , let us assume 
that X  has the value 𝑥𝑥1  and then compute the conditional probability 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1) within 
this topology.  This yields the following expression: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)  =   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) +  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦2, 𝑥𝑥1) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥1) 
(60) 
X 
Y 
Z 
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However, in this topology variable Y  once again intervenes between variables X  and Z , 
meaning that 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦1, 𝑥𝑥1) can be reduced to just 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1), and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1| 𝑦𝑦2, 𝑥𝑥1) 
reduces to just 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2).  Making these substitutions, and using Bayes’ theorem to re-
express 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦1|𝑥𝑥1) and 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋(𝑦𝑦2|𝑥𝑥1) yields: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)   =   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1)𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1)   +   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2)𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1)  
(61) 
Furthermore, since variable X  receives information from variable Y , the two 
occurrences of 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥1) in this expression can be expanded using the law of total 
probability to reflect this dependence, giving: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)   =   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1)𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2)   
+   𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2)𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦1) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥1|𝑦𝑦2) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2) 
(62) 
Using the parameters assumed in the above diagram, this expression reduces to: 
𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋(𝑧𝑧1|𝑥𝑥1)   =    𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜆𝜆) 𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜆𝜆)  (63) 
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Since the marginal probability that 𝑍𝑍 = 𝑧𝑧1  is simply given by 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧1)  =  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦1) ∙
𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦1) + 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧1|𝑦𝑦2) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌(𝑦𝑦2), which given the above parameterization is expressed as +𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜆𝜆) , the only way that the instantiated value of X  could fail to affect the 
distribution of Z  in this topology would be if  
 𝛿𝛿𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 + 𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜆𝜆) 
𝛼𝛼𝜆𝜆 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜆𝜆)   =   𝛿𝛿𝜆𝜆 + 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜆𝜆) (64) 
Clearing the denominator, expanding the resulting expression, and re-factoring gives us:     
0 =   (𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝜆𝜆2 − 𝜆𝜆) (65) 
Therefore, the only way for one terminal variable in the ‘fork’ topology to fail to 
influence the other terminal variable would be either for the central variable Y  to be 
instantiated to one of its specific values (which would make 𝜆𝜆2 − 𝜆𝜆 = 0 in the above 
expression), or for variables X and Y or variables Z and Y to be independent (which 
would make 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽 or 𝛿𝛿 = 𝛾𝛾 respectively).  Hence once again the instantiation of the 
central variable blocks the influence of each terminal variable upon the other.   
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D-SEPARATION WITHIN A COMMON EFFECT STRUCTURE 
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A ‘collider’ (or common effect) connection  X → Y ← Z  consists of three 
random variables X, Y, and Z for which both X and Z each directly influence variable Y, 
but for which there is no direct influence between variables X and Z.  (Due to the lack of 
a direct connection between variables X and Z, this structure is also commonly called an 
unshielded collider in the literature.)  Given this graphical structure, the joint probability 
of the three random variables X , Y , and Z  is given by: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋,,𝑌𝑌,,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌.|.𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍..∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍 (66) 
We will discuss this form of connection with regards to multinomial data only.  Further 
details can be found in Koski and Noble (2009) and Koller and Friedman (2009) 
Since 𝑝𝑝.𝑌𝑌|.𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍 =  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍 ⁄  for any three variables X , Y , Z  having 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍 ≠ 0, we 
can rewrite the above topology-specific factorization as: 
𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋,,𝑌𝑌,,𝑍𝑍 =   𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍 ∙ � 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍 � (67) 
Hence we have that  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍  =  𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋.∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 , so as long as  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍 ≠ 0 we can 
reduce this expression to 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍 = 𝑝𝑝.𝑋𝑋 .∙. 𝑝𝑝.𝑍𝑍 .  Therefore, as long as both 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍  and 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍  are 
nonzero, we have that the two terminal variables in a collider connection are 
unconditionally independent of each other.  In other words, contrary to the situation we 
had earlier with the chain and fork connections, communication between the terminal 
variables X and Z in the collider connection is blocked when the intervening variable Y  is 
uninstantiated. 
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We will now show that (once again contrary to what was the case with the chain 
and fork connections),  the instantiation of the central variable Y  in this topology actually 
creates a link between the two terminal variables X and Z , and thereby facilitates 
communication between these two variables.  Prior to the instantiation of Y , we can 
marginalize the joint distribution of X, Y, and Z over the values of Y , obtaining: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)  =  � 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)
𝑦𝑦
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) 
                     =  𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) ∙ � 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍)
𝑦𝑦
 
                     =   𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) 
(68) 
On the other hand, instantiation of the variable Y  in this topology will result in the 
conditional distribution: 
𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦)  =    𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑋𝑋) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍)   ∑ ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧) 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  (69) 
This expression is not a simple product of 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋|𝑦𝑦) and 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦), meaning that once 
the variable Y  is instantiated, variables X and Z  are no longer independent.  Therefore, 
instantiation of the central variable in the collider topology allows the two terminal 
variables in this connection communicate with each other.    
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Alternatively, one can solve for  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) rather than 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍|𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋, 𝑍𝑍|𝑦𝑦) in order 
to obtain a somewhat simpler expression showing the conditional dependence of 
variables X and Z  when Y  is instantiated.  In this case, we are essentially assuming that 
we have already instantiated Y  and that now we also want to propagate the additional 
instantiation of X  through the collider connection.  Thus we compute: 
 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌(𝑍𝑍|𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)   =    𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌,𝑍𝑍(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑍𝑍)𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)    =    𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑍𝑍) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥)𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍)   ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥)𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧) 𝑥𝑥   
                                                                   =    𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥)  ∙  𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑍𝑍)    𝑝𝑝𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥) ∙  ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧) 𝑥𝑥  
                                                                   =    𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍) 𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑍𝑍)   ∑  𝑝𝑝𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋,𝑍𝑍(𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧) 𝑥𝑥  
(70) 
Since this expression is not equal to 𝑝𝑝𝑍𝑍(𝑧𝑧), we have that in the context of an instantiated 
central variable Y , the additional instantiation of  X  will affect the distribution of the 
other terminal variable Z  in the collider connection.  Instantiating Y  has enabled 
communication between X and Z  within the collider topology. 
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APPENDIX D 
ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF D-SEPARATION 
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The Bayesian network representation of the set of joint relationships among a 
group of modeled variables facilitates the efficient manipulation of relevance and 
irrelevance relationships (i.e., relations of both marginal and conditional independence 
and dependence) among the modeled constructs.  As Pearl (1988) states,  
The advantage of network representation is that it allows people to express 
directly the fundamental qualitative relationship of ‘direct dependency’.  The 
network then displays a consistent set of additional direct and indirect 
dependencies and preserves it as a stable part of the model, independent of the 
numerical estimates.  (Pearl, 1988, p. 51) 
The mechanism by which this is accomplished, i.e., the means by which the 
Bayesian network representation facilitates the efficient manipulation of independence 
and dependence relationships among variables, is termed the directed separation principle 
(or just ‘d-separation’ for short).  Pearl’s original characterization of the d-separation 
principle is given below : 
If X, Y, and Z are three disjoint subsets of nodes in a DAG D, then Z is said to d-
separate X from Y, denoted 〈 𝑿𝑿 | 𝒁𝒁 | 𝒀𝒀 〉𝐷𝐷 , if there is no path between a node in X 
and a node in Y along which the following two conditions hold:  (1) every node 
with converging arrows is in Z or has a descendant in Z, and (2) every other node 
is outside Z.       (Pearl, 1988, p. 117)   
Another, more common formulation of the d-separation criterion is typically given 
in terms of the existence of structures known as paths and blockers.  Following, e.g., 
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Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008), we can state this alternative formulation of the d-separation 
criterion as follows: 
A path Φ between Φ = 〈 𝑝𝑝 , … , 𝑎𝑎 〉 in a DAG 𝔾𝔾 = (V ,E) is said to be blocked by 
a subset 𝑆𝑆 ⊆ V if Φ contains a vertex 𝑤𝑤 such that either of the following 
conditions hold: 
1.     𝑤𝑤 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, and the edges of the path Φ  do not  meet head-to-head at 𝑤𝑤. 
2.     Neither 𝑤𝑤 nor any of its descendants are in 𝑆𝑆, and the edges of the path Φ do 
meet head-to-head at 𝑤𝑤. 
Rather than basing the d-separation criterion on a set of negated conditions (as in 
the definition from Pearl, 1988, given above), or on partially negated conditions (as in 
the definition by Kjaerulff and Madsen also given above), it is helpful to reframe d-
separation as a positively framed (i.e., non-negated) set of conditions, as is done for 
instance in Korb and Nicholson (2004).  Framed in this way, the d-separation criterion 
becomes: 
Given variables X and Y, along with a set of variables Z disjoint from both X and 
Y, the variables X and Y are d-separated given Z if and only if all paths Φ between 
X and Y are “cut” by one of the following graph-theoretic conditions: 
1.     Φ contains a chain A → B → C such that  B ∈ Z. 
2.     Φ contains a divergent connection A ← B → C such that B ∈ Z. 
3.     Φ contains an unshielded collider A → B ← C  such that neither B nor any of 
B’s descendants is in Z. 
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Finally, it is very useful to point out that a highly practical substitute for the d-
separation criterion does exist in the literature, namely the directed global Markov 
criterion of Lauritzen, Dawid, Larsen, and Leimer (1990), which is stated below: 
For a directed acyclic graph G = (V ,E) and disjoint subsets 𝑨𝑨, 𝑩𝑩, and 𝑺𝑺 of V, any 
pair of vertices a∈A  and b∈B  will be d-separated by 𝑆𝑆 whenever all paths from 
a to b are blocked by the vertices of 𝑺𝑺 within the moralized graph consisting of 
the ancestors of  𝑨𝑨 ∪ 𝑩𝑩 ∪ 𝑺𝑺,  i.e., the graph �𝑮𝑮𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛(𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵∪𝑆𝑆)�𝑀𝑀 . 
According to Kjaerulff & Madsen (2008), the directed global Markov condition is 
quite often much easier to apply than the traditional d-separation criterion.  (In fact, many 
authors refer alternately to Lauritzen d-separation when referring to the directed global 
Markov condition, and Pearl-Geiger d-separation when referring to the original version.)    
To illustrate the usefulness of the directed global Markov condition (i.e., of 
Lauritzen d-separation), Kjaerulff & Madsen (2008) provide the following illustrative 
example of a DAG along with three sets of variables A, B, and S, and ask whether it is 
true that (A ⊥ B |S )G  within this graphical structure (from Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008): 
   S    B  
         
A         
         
         
         
         
         
Figure 35.  Structure representing a d-separation query 
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To utilize the directed global Markov condition, we reduce this graphical structure 
to just the ancestral set of 𝑨𝑨 ∪ 𝑩𝑩 ∪ 𝑺𝑺  by removing any nodes that are not ancestors of at 
least some member of ∪ 𝑩𝑩 ∪ 𝑺𝑺 .  This results in the reduced graphical structure  
𝑮𝑮An(𝑨𝑨∪𝑩𝑩∪𝑺𝑺)  shown below (again, from Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36.  Ancestral set for a d-separation query 
Next we moralize this structure by connecting (or ‘marrying’) the parents of any common 
children, and then replacing all directed links by undirected ones.  This results in the 
structure �𝑮𝑮𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛(𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵∪𝑆𝑆)�𝑀𝑀 , from Kjaerulff & Madsen (2008): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37.  Moralized structure for a d-separation query 
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Now it is easy to determine whether or not set S  d-separates sets A  and B .  To do 
this, we merely need to check whether there is a path from A  to B in this modified 
(moralized ancestral) graph that avoids passing through S.  In this example, there is such 
a path:  namely the path from A  to B involving the arc at the top of the structure.  
Therefore we easily conclude that S  does not d-separate sets A  and B in the original 
graph G . 
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